


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
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
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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

FOR

FY 1983

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Prepared by

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)

March 1982

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**FY 1983**

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

**March 1982**

# FY 1983 DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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PART A. DEFENSE MANPOWER  
REQUIREMENTS

## PART A - Defense Manpower Requirements

Part A presents a summary of the Department of Defense manpower program for Fiscal Year 1983. It describes each of the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs), summarizes manpower requirements for each DPPC, and explains the essential elements of U.S. defense policy from which manpower requirements are determined. It also describes the manpower requirements and achievements of each of the individual Services and the defense agencies.

Chapter I	-	Introduction
Chapter II	-	Summary of Requirements
Chapter III	-	Army
Chapter IV	-	Navy
Chapter V	-	Marine Corps
Chapter VI	-	Air Force
Chapter VII	-	Defense Agencies

## I INTRODUCTION

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense hereby submits to the Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report (DMRR) for FY 1983 in compliance with Section 138(c)(3) of Title 10, United States Code.

This report should be read and used along with the following related Defense Department reports:

1. The Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1983 Budget.
2. The FY 1983 Military Manpower Training Report.

#### I. Organization of the Report

This report explains the Department of Defense manpower requirements for active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian strengths incorporated in the President's Budget for FY 1983. To assist Congress in considering authorizing legislation for FY 1984, the report also includes strengths requested by the Department of Defense for that fiscal year.

The report is organized into two major parts plus three annexes that are submitted separately. The three annexes are sent to Congress at the same time as this report.

Part A. Defense Manpower Requirements (Chapters I through VII). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II is a summary of the FY 1983 manpower program. Chapters III through VII contain the details on manpower requirements for each of the military services and the defense agencies.

Part B. Special Analyses and Data (Chapters VIII through XII). This part contains special analyses or data on five subjects related to the Defense manpower program. Chapter VIII discusses recruit quality. Chapter IX discusses drug and alcohol abuse in the armed forces. Chapter X discusses the cost of manpower. Chapter XI presents data on forces and manpower by location. Chapter XII contains an audit trail of the structure changes within the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) that have occurred since the revision of the FY 1982 DMRR. These chapters are included because of special interest or request by the Congress.

Base Structure Annex. The Department will submit a Base Structure Annex in compliance with the reporting requirement. This annex will relate our FY 1983 base structure to the force structure for that period and will provide estimates of base operating support costs.

Unit Annex. As requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided that describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific types of units within the force.



DOPMA Annex. Public Law 96-513, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), requires the submission of specified detailed data on the Services' officer corps. These data are contained in a separate annex.

## II. The Total Force

Defense manpower is divided into three categories: active military, reserve components, and civilians. Each of these categories of manpower contribute to the total US military capability; hence, they constitute the "Total Force".

A. Active Military. The active military are those men and women who comprise: the combat units, those units that engage enemy forces; the combat support units, those units that provide support in the combat theater; and the other support units, those units, primarily in the continental United States, that require military incumbents, such as training and recruiting units. These men and women are on call twenty-four hours a day and receive full-time military pay. There are about two million active duty military personnel.

B. Reserve Components. Reserve component manpower is divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower augmentation for the active force. It has three elements: Selected Reserve units, Pretrained Individual Reservists, and a training pipeline. Selected Reserve units are organized, equipped, and trained to perform a wartime mission. Members of Selected Reserve units train throughout the year and participate annually in active duty training.

Pretrained Individual Reservists include Individual Mobilization Augmentees, members of the Inactive National Guard, and Individual Ready Reservists. The Individual Ready Reserve generally consists of people who have served recently in the active forces or Selected Reserve and have some period of obligated service remaining on their contract. The majority of the members in the Individual Ready Reserve do not participate in organized training.

The training pipeline is composed of those people who are members of the Selected Reserve but who have not completed sufficient training to be awarded a skill. Training pipeline personnel are not deployable upon mobilization.

The Standby Reserve generally consists of members who have completed their statutory six-year military obligation and have chosen to remain in the Standby Reserve. The Retired Reserve consists of former Reserve members who have retired and have transferred to the Retired Reserve. Members of the Standby and Retired Reserves do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. They, as well as retirees from the active forces, may be mobilized by authority of Congress.

The reserve component manpower requested by the Department of Defense is limited to that of the Selected Reserve, including full-time support personnel, since that number is authorized by Congress. The Selected Reserve numbers over 900,000 people.

C. Civilians. Defense Department civilians provide support services to the active and reserve military in all of those functions that do not require a military incumbent. Of a total population of over 1,000,000 civilians, 67 percent repair airplanes, ships, and tanks; provide logistical support; or operate and maintain military installations. Another 11 percent provide research and development support, medical support, and communication support. These activities contribute directly to the readiness of the armed forces. A more detailed breakout of Defense civilian activities is in Chapter II.

D. Manpower Mix. When there is a choice, the Defense Department attempts to fill each job with the least expensive form of manpower. Jobs not requiring military personnel are done by civilians or, except for policy jobs, by contract depending on which is determined to be less costly. Jobs requiring military personnel are filled by reserves unless the unit's mission requires a higher state of readiness than can be maintained in a reserve status.

Although the general principle is minimizing cost, other factors may alter the mix in any specific case. Among these other factors are: the rotation base, providing jobs for active military personnel in the United States to offset repeated tours in foreign countries or at sea; lack of personnel availability due to the inability to recruit a military person or a civilian; or maldistribution in the separate ceilings imposed on active, reserve, and civilian manpower.

### III. Manpower Counting

The manpower figures used in this report reflect strengths as of the end of a fiscal year. This is the number of people on, or expected to be on, departmental rolls or receiving drill pay at that time.

In the manpower authorization request (Chapter II), we show average strengths for the reserve components as required by section 138(b) of title 10, United States Code. Additionally, fiscal year end strengths are given.

Beginning in FY 1981, personnel employed under the part-time career employment program established by section 3402 of title 5, United States Code are counted as a fraction of full-time based on the number of hours worked, as set out in section 3404 of that title. The FY 1982 and FY 1983 civilian end strengths given reflect this accounting change.

### IV. Defense Planning and Programming Categories

The Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) are used throughout this report to describe and explain defense manpower requirements.

The DPPCs are based on the same program elements as the ten Major Defense Programs, but the elements are aggregated differently. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each program, all the resources that can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber squadrons but the base support personnel that sustain these units. The DPPCs, on the other hand, aggregate activities performing similar functions. For example, base support is given separate visibility. Each approach has utility for the management of resources; however, the DPPC system is particularly well suited for explaining how manpower resources are used. The DPPCs are listed below.

#### DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

##### 1. Strategic

Offensive Strategic Forces  
 Defensive Strategic Forces  
 Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

##### 2. Tactical/Mobility

Land Forces  
 Tactical Air Forces  
 Naval Forces  
 Mobility Forces

##### 3. Auxiliary Activities

Intelligence  
 Centrally Managed Communications  
 Research and Development  
 Geophysical Activities

##### 4. Support Activities

Base Operating Support  
 Medical Support  
 Personnel Support  
 Individual Training  
 Force Support Training  
 Central Logistics  
 Centralized Support Activities  
 Management Headquarters  
 Federal Agency Support

##### 5. Individuals

Transients  
 Patients, Prisoners, and  
 Holdees  
 Trainees and Students  
 Cadets

#### DPPC DEFINITIONS <sup>1/</sup>

##### 1. STRATEGIC

The DPPCs in the Strategic category consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces that have as their fundamental objective deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces, bases overseas, and allies.

##### Offensive Strategic Forces

This category contains program elements for land-based ICBMs; sea-based SLBMs, ballistic missile submarines and supporting ships; long-range bombers and refueling tanker aircraft; strategic cruise missiles; and operational headquarters for these forces.

<sup>1/</sup> All DPPCs include the reserve components as appropriate.

## Defensive Strategic Forces

This category contains program elements for interceptor aircraft and anti-ballistic missile systems, including directly supporting communications, command control, and surveillance and warning systems, and for support to the civil defense preparedness program.

## Strategic Control and Surveillance

This category contains program elements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), airborne satellite and ballistic missile early warning and control systems, satellite and orbiting objects surveillance systems, and supporting radar and optical sensor systems.

## 2. TACTICAL/MOBILITY

The DPPCs in the Tactical/Mobility category consist of land forces (Army and Marine Corps), tactical air forces (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), naval forces (Navy and Marine Corps), and mobility forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy).

### Land Forces

This group consists of DPPCs for Army and Marine Corps comprising division forces and theater forces.

#### Division Forces

This category contains program elements for Army divisions, nondivisional combat brigades/regiments, other nondivisional combat forces, and tactical support forces; and for Marine Corps combat and combat support units (including helicopter support units of the Marine Air Wings). Program elements for the procurement and stockpiling of Army and Marine Corps war reserve materiel are also included in this category.

#### Theater Forces

This category contains Army program elements for theater-wide and specialized units, including separate infantry brigades stationed in Alaska, Berlin, Panama Canal Zone, Iceland, and the Caribbean; units in Europe that provide for supply, maintenance, and security control of nuclear ammunition support of NATO; theater surface-to-surface missile units; tactical surface-to-air missile units; theater heavy engineering battalions for support of other services; theater psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare units; and their supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units. Also included are similar earmarked reinforcing units in Forces Command.

### Tactical Air Forces

This category contains program elements for Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; direct support aircraft, armament and electronics maintenance units, and

weapon system security units; multipurpose aircraft carriers; air-launched tactical missile systems; tactical air control systems; Fleet Marine Forces direct support aircraft; and operational headquarters for these forces. Also included are program elements for Air Force resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC) and war reserve materiel.

#### Naval Forces

The DPPCs in the Naval Forces group include the Navy's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and supporting forces.

##### ASW and Fleet Air Defense Forces

This category contains program elements for surface combatant ships (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates), fixed wing and helicopter ASW squadrons, attack submarines, mines and mine countermeasures, and directly supporting forces. Also included are program elements for air-, sea-, and submarine-launched ordnance and missiles.

##### Amphibious Forces

This category contains program elements for amphibious assault ships, supporting ships and tactical support units, coastal/river forces, special warfare forces, explosive ordnance disposal forces, and inshore undersea warfare forces.

##### Naval Support Forces

This category contains program elements for carrier-on-board delivery squadrons, fleet support ships, underway replenishment ships, construction forces, deep submergence systems, and fleet telecommunications. Also included are program elements for tactical intelligence, war reserve materiel, and the TRITAC program.

#### Mobility Forces

This category contains program elements for strategic, tactical, and administrative airlift, sealift, and land movement of passengers and cargo by both military and commercial carriers, including military cargo, tanker, and support ships and the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet. Program elements for corresponding or supporting reserve component units are also included in this category. This category also contains program elements for tactical medical airlift squadrons, air and sea port terminal operations, traffic management, integral command and control systems, aerospace rescue and recovery, Air Force special mission forces, and the non-management headquarters activities within the Joint Deployment Agency.

### 3. AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES

The DPPCs in the auxiliary activities category consist of those major Defense-wide activities conducted under centralized OSD control. Included are DPPCs in the intelligence, centrally managed communications, research and development, and geophysical activities categories.

## Intelligence

This category contains program elements for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of Defense, consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program, including intelligence communications.

## Centrally Managed Communications

This category contains program elements for the long-haul Defense Communications System, the military service communications systems, satellite communications engineering and installation activities, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center.

Excluded are program elements for base and command communications, intelligence communications, and communications systems dedicated to strategic, tactical, or WWMCCS missions.

## Research and Development Activities

This category contains all research and development (Program 6) program elements, except those for weapons systems for which procurement is programmed during the FYDP projection and except for program elements identifiable to a Support Activities DPPC such as Medical or Personnel Support. Also excluded are operational systems development and other programs elements not in Program 6 but containing research and development resources.

## Geophysical Activities

This category contains program elements for meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities, including the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, the Air Force and Navy weather services, navigational satellites, oceanography, and mapping, charting and geodesy activities.

## 4. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

The DPPCs in the Support Activities category consist of the base operating support functions for both combat and support installations; centralized activities, services and organizations providing medical and personnel support; individual and force support training; central logistics; management headquarters; federal agency support; and other centralized support activities.

### Base Operating Support - Combat Installations

This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands (Program 1, 2, and 4), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, installation audiovisual support, and air traffic control. Also included are resources for installation headquarters administration and installation operational, house-keeping, and service functions.

### Base Operating Support - Support Installations

This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands (Program 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, and installation audiovisual support. Also included in this category are all family housing activities. These program elements include resources for installation headquarters administration; installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions; and commissaries.

### Medical Support

This category contains program elements for medical care in DoD military medical facilities, including medical centers, hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, infirmaries, and laboratories; and for medical care to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of medical research and medical equipment and systems.

### Personnel Support

This category contains program elements for provision of varied service in support of personnel, including recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career training and intern programs. This category also includes research and development program elements for human factors and personnel development research.

### Individual Training

This category contains the staff and faculty program elements for formal military and technical training and professional education of military personnel conducted under centralized control of service training commands. Program elements include those for recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care individual training, and training support activities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of new or improved training equipment, techniques, and technology.

Excluded are program elements for training conducted in operational units, training of organized crews and units, education and professional development of DoD civilian personnel, off-duty and voluntary education programs, and combat development activities.

### Force Support Training

This category contains program elements for Air Force and Naval advanced flight training conducted by combat commands; Navy training conducted at sea and ashore in direct support of submarine, surface combatant, surveillance, and mine warfare forces; fleet level training

at fleet training centers, submarine schools, and anti-submarine warfare schools; and certain Army and Marine Corps force-related training activities. Included are resources for fleet readiness squadrons, Air Force combat crew training squadrons, and Army jungle and arctic training facilities.

#### Central Logistics

This group includes DPPCs for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities.

#### Supply Operations

This category contains program elements for the operation of supply depots and centers, inventory control points, and centralized procurement offices and for military personnel support to DLA. It also includes resources for POL pipeline and tanker operations and other resources specifically identified and measurable to centralized supply operations.

#### Maintenance Operations

This category contains program elements for the centralized repair, modification, and overhaul of end items of equipment and their components conducted at depots, arsenals, reprocessing facilities, and logistic centers.

#### Logistics Support Operations

This category contains program elements for centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance. Specifically included are program elements for industrial preparedness, second destination transportation, property disposal, production engineering and testing, construction planning and design, operation of printing plants, storage and disposal of inactive equipment, logistics administrative support, and other centrally managed logistic support services.

#### Centralized Support Activities

This category contains miscellaneous service program elements that provide centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. Specifically included are non-management headquarters program elements for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, combat developments, counterintelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, Defense Technical Information Center, personnel administration, finance centers, audiovisual activities, criminal investigations, claims, service-wide support, and other miscellaneous support.

#### Management Headquarters

The DPPCs in this category consist of five DPPCs for Management Headquarters as defined in DoDD 5100.73, "Department Management Headquarters": Defense Agencies, International Military Organizations, Unified Commands, Service Support - Combat Commands, and Service Support - Service Commands.



#### Management Headquarters - Defense Agencies

This category contains the management headquarters program elements for OSD, OJCS, and the defense agencies. The defense agencies are discussed in detail in Chapter VII.

#### Management Headquarters - International Military Organizations

This category contains the program elements for the military services' support of the headquarters of international military organizations. Examples are: NATO, United Nations Command (Korea), etc.

#### Management Headquarters - Unified Commands

This category contains the program elements for the military services' support of the headquarters of the unified commands. Examples are: US European Command, Pacific Command, etc.

#### Management Headquarters - Service Support - Combat Commands

This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of the combat commands, i.e., those in FYDP Programs 1, 2, and 4. Examples are: US Army, Europe; US Navy, Pacific Fleet; Strategic Air Command; etc.

#### Management Headquarters - Service Support - Service Commands

This category contains the program elements for the management headquarters of the military service support commands, i.e., organizations in FYDP Program 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Examples include: Service Secretariats, Air Force Training Command, Navy Material Command, etc.

#### Federal Agency Support

This category contains program elements for military and civilian DoD manpower assigned on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis to support other federal agencies.

### 5. INDIVIDUALS

The DPPCs in this group account for military personnel who are not considered force structure manpower and consist of transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees, and cadets.

#### Transients

This category contains only the Transient program element, which consists of active duty military personnel in travel, leave enroute, or temporary duty status (except for training) while on Permanent Change of Station orders.

Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

This category contains only the Personnel Holding Account program element, which consists of active duty military personnel who are dropped from the assigned strength of an operational or training unit for reasons of medical, disciplinary, or pre-separation nonavailability.

Trainees, Students, and Cadets

This category contains those personnel with the resource identification codes of Active Service Officer Students, Active Service Enlisted Students, Active Service Enlisted Trainees, Service Academy Cadets/Midshipmen, and Active Service Officer Accession Students.

## II SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS

## CHAPTER II

### SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request and provides an overview of manpower strength trends.

#### 1. National Security Objectives, Policy, and Defense Manpower

The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international environment in which US interests are protected. Achieving this objective is dependent upon the ability to influence international affairs from a position of recognized strength, to fight when necessary, and to terminate conflicts on terms compatible with US national security interests. To those ends, strong and capable armed forces are essential. A detailed and comprehensive statement of the objectives of American foreign policy and the way in which defense policies and strategy support their attainment can be found in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress for FY 1983.

Defense manpower comprises active and reserve military and civilian personnel. The size of the manpower program is based on the forces required to execute our military strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war.

The force structure for FY 1983 continues to be based on DoD's Total Force Policy, which recognizes that all units in the force structure contribute to our success in wartime. In structuring our forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve whenever feasible to maintain as small a peacetime force as national security policy and our military strategy permit. Selected Reserve units are available upon mobilization to bring the total force to its required combat capability. These reserve units must also be responsive to call up for limited periods without a declaration of war or national emergency. Active units, on the other hand, are those forces needed for a contingency not involving mobilization, for immediate deployment in a major war before Selected Reserve units can be deployed, and for forward deployment in peacetime as a deterrent against major conflict.

Civilians are the third component of the Total Force, and they provide 25 percent of the Department's manpower. In addition to providing civilian leadership, the Department of Defense's civilians repair ships, tanks, trucks, and airplanes; maintain military installations; operate communication systems; do research and development; perform intelligence analyses; operate the supply systems; and perform many other functions that do not require military personnel. The Department constantly strives to make the most efficient use of its civilian work force in order to keep the size of the work force to the lowest level possible. Work is contracted out when it can be done for less than in-house. Programs for increasing productivity have a high priority in the Department.

However, in spite of these actions, there are powerful forces at work to increase the number of civilians required. Recent emphasis on increases in readiness and sustainability requires more civilians in maintenance and supply functions. Borrowed military manpower must be replaced by civilians in order for the military personnel to man combat units. Increased procurement activity will require more civilians. In fact, the increased tempo in the Department will require more civilians in nearly every phase of DoD's activities.

The table on the following page is a summary of the major force elements planned for the end of FY 1982 and FY 1983 compared to those that existed at the end of FY 1981.

The defense manpower required to support these forces follows.

Summary of Major Force Elements

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Strategic</u>			
ICBM/SLBM	1,573	1,597	1,621
Bombers (PAA) <sup>1/</sup>	376	376	330
Tankers (KC-135) (PAA) <sup>1/</sup>			
Active	487	487	487
Guard/Reserve	128	128	128
Interceptor Squadrons			
Active	5	5	5
Guard/Reserve	10	10	10
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)	32	33	34
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>			
<u>Land Forces</u>			
Army Divisions			
Active	16	16	16
Guard	8	8	8
Army Separate Brigade/Regiments			
Active	9	9	9
Guard/Reserve <sup>2/</sup>	29	29	29
Marine Corps Divisions			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
Tactical Air Forces <sup>3/</sup>			
Air Force Squadrons			
Active	105	107	109
Guard/Reserve <sup>4/</sup>	56	59	60
Navy Squadrons			
Active	60	60	62
Reserve	21	21	21
Marine Corps Squadrons			
Active	31	31	31
Reserve <sup>5/</sup>	9	9	9
Naval Forces			
Carriers (active only)	12	13	13
Attack Submarines (active only)	86	95	98
Surface Combatants			
Active	187	193	204
Reserve	9	9	7
Amphibious Assault Ships			
Active	59	59	60
Reserve	6	6	6
Patrol Ships (active only)	1	6	6
ASW Aircraft Squadrons			
Active	52	52	52
Reserve	17	17	17
Mobility Forces			
Airlift Squadrons			
Active	34	34	34
Guard/Reserve <sup>6/</sup>	54	53	52
Sealift Ships			
Nucleus Fleet <sup>7/</sup>	80	75	78
Chartered Fleet	31	28	28

1/ Primary aircraft authorized.

2/ Includes four Reserve Component Brigades that roundout active divisions and one infantry brigade for school support upon mobilization.

3/ Includes tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, special operations, airborne TACS and TACCS, tanker/cargo (KC-10), and electronic combat squadrons.

4/ Includes 1 KC-10 Reserve Associate Squadron in FY 1982 and FY 1983.

5/ The Navy has developed a new method of classifying ships. This method is discussed on the next page.

6/ Includes 17 strategic airlift Reserve Associate squadrons.

7/ Includes 50 naval fleet auxiliary force and scientific support vessels operated by MSC.

In previous editions of this report, Navy ships have been classified into one of three categories: Active Fleet, Naval Reserve Fleet, or Naval Force Auxiliary Fleet. During 1981, the Navy developed a new methodology for counting ships, in order to present force assets in more meaningful terms--that is, whether the ships are part of the "Total Battle Forces" or are defined as "Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support" in terms of their readiness for mobilization to battle mission. Categories in the new method are organized as follows:

Total Battle Forces

- Strategic Forces
- Battle Forces
- Support Forces
- Mobilization Category "A"

Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support

- Auxiliaries and Sealift
- Mobilization Category "B"

Ships have been redistributed among the new categories. In most cases, the ships in one "old" category have been reclassified among more than one "new" category. (For example, 13 of the 43 ships in the Naval Reserve Force are now categorized as Battle Forces and the remainder as Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support.

The new terminology does not automatically indicate the nature of the crew. Although most ships in the Battle Forces category are manned by active military, many have combined active duty/Selected Reserve or civilian crews, according to the type of ship.

In FY 1983, the fleet will operate 535 Battle Force ships and 21 Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support vessels. Chapter IV of this report provides details of specific additions and deletions from the fleet.

## II. Manpower Request

The Department has requested that Congress authorize manpower strengths, for FY 1983 and FY 1984, as shown in the following tables.

### A. Active Duty Strength

Active Duty Military Personnel  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>
Army	783.8	783.8
Navy	569.2	581.3
Marine Corps	194.6	196.4
Air Force	600.0	609.7
Total	2,147.6	2,171.2

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

#### B. Selected Reserve Strength

The following table shows the manpower request for the Selected Reserve expressed in average strengths. The table also includes the corresponding end strength and the appropriate wartime manning requirement.

	<u>Selected Reserve Manpower</u> (Thousands)				Unit, Wartime Requirement <u>Strength</u>
	<u>Average Strength</u>		<u>End Strength</u>		<u>Strength</u>
	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY83</u>
Army National Guard	407.4	426.5	417.0	435.9	447.6
Army Reserve	258.7	276.0	268.5	286.2	287.4
Naval Reserve	105.5 <sup>1/</sup>	106.2	105.8	<sup>1/</sup> 106.5	113.4
Marine Corps Reserve	38.3	39.1	39.7	41.0	40.3
Air National Guard	101.1	102.5	101.8	103.2	103.0
Air Force Reserve	66.0	67.8	66.6	68.6	54.4 <sup>2/</sup>
DoD Total	977.0	1,018.1	999.5	1,041.4	1,046.1

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

<sup>1/</sup> This figure includes 11,828 TARs (Training and Administration of Reserves) transferred from the active authorization to the reserve authorization in FY 1983.

<sup>2/</sup> The Air Force also has 18,615 Selected Reserve Wartime Requirements for individual manpower ~~authorization~~.

The following table shows the number of reserve personnel on active duty in support of the reserve components. This full-time manpower is included in the Selected Reserve totals throughout this report.

	<u>Full-Time Reserve Manpower</u> <sup>1/</sup> (End Strength in Thousands)	
	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Army National Guard	14.4	17.6
Army Reserve	8.3	10.5
Naval Reserve <sup>2/</sup>	12.0	12.6
Marine Corps Reserve	0.7	0.7
Air National Guard	5.2	5.8
Air Force Reserve	0.5	0.5
DoD Total	41.0	47.7

<sup>1/</sup> It should be noted that military technicians are not included in these data. They are counted as civilians.

<sup>2/</sup> This strength includes 11,828 Navy TARs transferred from the active to the reserve authorization beginning in FY 1983.



C. Civilians

Civilian Authorization Request 1/  
Direct and Indirect Hires, Military Functions  
End Fiscal Year Strength

	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>
Total DoD	1,035,842	1,035,482

1/ Includes approximately 56,000 National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also members of the Selected Reserve.

Consistent with Section 501(c) of Public Law 94-361, the DoD Appropriation Authorization Act for FY 1977, the requested civilian authorization includes full-time, part-time, intermittent, permanent, and temporary employees; it excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian employees:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth Programs. Excluded under this category are: Stay-in-School Campaign, Temporary Summer Aid Program, Federal Junior Fellowship Program, and worker trainee opportunity programs. Employment in these categories, based on past experience, will be about 8,500 in FY 1983 and FY 1984.

2. National Security Agency employees are excluded in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions. Excluded are employees performing civil functions administered by DoD, including Corps of Engineer Civil Works, cemeterial activities, and the Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil functions employment at the end of FY 1983 and FY 1984 is planned to be about 33,000.

The composition of the total DoD civilian request for FY 1983 is shown in the following table by component, direct and indirect hire.

Composition of Civilian Authorization Request for FY 1983  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Direct Hire</u>	<u>Indirect Hire</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	323.7	62.7	386.4
Navy	309.8	10.8	320.6
Marine Corps 1/	( 17.6)	( 3.0)	( 20.6)
Air Force	229.7	13.1	242.8
Defense Agencies	83.8	1.8	85.6
Total DoD	947.0	88.5	1,035.5

1/ Marine Corps civilians are included in Department of Navy strengths.

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

### III. Manpower Overview

Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables.

#### Defense Employment (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Actual</u>				<u>FY 83 Budget</u>	
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military						
Active	2,687	3,547	2,050	2,082	2,110	2,148
Selected Reserve	953	922	851	899	946	1,000
Civilian <sup>1/</sup>	1,176	1,393	990	1,019	1,034	1,035

<sup>1/</sup> Direct and indirect hires.

A. Active Military Strengths. The FY 1983 authorization request for active duty military personnel is 2,147,600. This request is 37,300 greater than the planned FY 1982 end strength. Most of the increases are in combat forces and training support. The following table shows the shift in military manpower away from auxiliary and support activities since FY 1973.

#### Percent of Active Military Strength <sup>1/</sup>

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>FY 83 Budget</u>	
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Strategic/Tactical/Mobility Forces	53.6	59.4	59.9	60.0
Auxiliary and Support Activities	46.4	40.6	40.1	40.0

<sup>1/</sup> Military manpower in the Individuals account is not included.

Specific details of the force improvements are in the Service chapters.

Highlights of the active military manpower programs by Service follow.

#### Army

The Army's active military end strength and force structure essentially remain level between FY 1982 and FY 1983. Although there is an increase in transient strength that supports the reduction in Europe tour lengths for unaccompanied first-term enlistees to 18 months, the overall size of the individual accounts drops significantly. This situation permits the force to be better manned in FY 1983 than in FY 1982. The Army is instituting a new manning system that emphasizes unit rotation instead of individual replacement and a new requirements determination process for non-combat units based on industrial engineering techniques that tie objective work load factors to manpower requirements.

### Navy

In FY 1983, for the first time, TAR officer and enlisted personnel, who had previously been paid out of MPN and included in the active duty authorization, will be paid out of RPN and included in the Reserve authorization. It is necessary therefore to back 11,172 TAR personnel (the number of TARs in FY 1982) out of the FY 1982 active duty authorization in order to show true growth from FY 1982 to FY 1983. Thus, the Navy's active duty military strength increases by 27,372 from FY 1982 to FY 1983 (28,028 when TARs are included). This increase is primarily to support the new ships being added to the fleet. Manpower programs will focus on retention of petty officers, as well as on retention of pilots and nuclear trained officers.

### Marine Corps

The Marine Corps will make several changes in its structure in order to increase mobility and fire power. In FY 1983, two TOW platoons will be added, one artillery regiment will be reorganized, and the first light armored vehicle company will be established. Ongoing activation of Redeye and Hawk anti-aircraft missile units will continue. Restructuring 12 infantry battalions will offset much of this growth; even so, the active force will increase by 2,500 from FY 1982 to FY 1983.

### Air Force

Air Force manpower increases by 19,200 from FY 1982 to FY 1983. The Air Force continues to program for full equipage, modernization, and manning of its 26 tactical fighter wings. The Air Force is increasing support to new weapon systems, training, wartime readiness activities, and medical activities.

B. Guard and Reserve Strengths. Selected Reserve end strengths are programmed to increase by 101,000 in FY 1983 over the FY 1981 levels and by 54,000 over FY 1982 levels. These increases are possible because of improved retention and vigorous recruiting.

Pretrained manpower, which consists of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the Inactive National Guard, the Standby Reserve, and retired personnel will increase from 617,000 at the end of FY 1981 to 935,000 at the end of FY 1983. This is an increase of 155,000 over planned FY 1982 levels. While these increases are encouraging, we must exert more effort to increase the levels of pretrained manpower needed to meet wartime requirements.

C. Civilian Manpower. Beginning with the FY 1981 Budget Supplement, civilian manpower began increasing for the first time since the peak of the Vietnam War (FY 1968). This increase in civilian strength is programmed to continue in FY 1982 and FY 1983 for the Army, Navy, and Marines. Beginning in FY 1983 the Air Force has programmed civilian strength decreases. These decreases are primarily the result of contract evaluations and best estimates of cost effective contracting.

The planned FY 1983 civilian end strength is 16,000 higher than the actual strength at the end of FY 1981. Almost all of this increase will be used to strengthen our capability to overhaul ships, planes, tanks, and other equipment. Additional support will be provided to logistics and supply activities. This higher level of support will directly result in increased readiness of our armed forces.

For the past several years, each fiscal year, the Congress has authorized a civilian end strength for the Department. Beginning in FY 1982, the Congress did, for the first time, authorize operations and maintenance (O&M) funds. Since almost all of the Department's civilians are paid from the O&M account, the Department believes that the imposition of both a fiscal ceiling and a civilian end strength ceiling is redundant and unnecessary. Therefore, the Department recommends that the Congress not impose a civilian end strength ceiling and instead allow fiscal constraints to govern the size of the civilian work force.

#### IV. Manpower Management Improvements

The Air Force, as the DoD agent, has proposed legislation to provide the Secretaries of the military departments the authority to exceed their Congressionally authorized, active military manpower end strengths by up to 1.5 percent. Congress would be notified of any increases that exceed the authorized ceilings.

This legislation would eliminate the fixed, one-day (September 30 of each year) statutory ceiling on active duty personnel and solve several problems in management of the military force. The current one-day ceiling often dictates inefficient management practices, particularly in a period of force growth. Uncertainties such as unpredicted reenlistments and extensions that are not always offset by separations and retirements are inherent in military personnel management. With a declining force structure, which occurred for 13 years, the situation was not a serious impediment to force management, since early separations and delayed accessions helped to meet the following year's lower requirements. However, the situation is different with a growing or stable force structure. The delay of needed accessions in order to meet a fixed September 30 end strength count may underuse the training establishment, result in significant shortages by skill, and delay the scheduled fielding and support of new systems with trained personnel. The requirement to meet a one-day ceiling could also force the premature loss of experienced personnel needed in a growing or modernizing force.

This legislative proposal would alleviate these problems by allowing the Secretaries of the military departments to manage effectively and efficiently their active military personnel requirements with an end strength flexibility similar to that currently provided the Secretary of Defense for civilian end strength and Selected Reserve ceilings.

#### V. Summary of Manpower Requirements

The following tables summarize the FY 1983 Defense manpower programs and compare them to the FY 1981 and FY 1982 programs. The presentation is by DPPC category.

Beginning with the revision to the FY 1982 DMRR, undermanning has been shown as a single item. Discussions of undermanning are contained in each Service chapter.

TABLE 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1982</u> <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1983</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	92.4	96.5	97.0
Offensive Strategic Forces	71.5	75.1	75.6
Defensive Strategic Forces	8.0	8.0	7.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	13.0	13.4	14.0
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	956.8	994.6	1,007.1
Land Forces	562.6	566.2	567.9
Tactical Air Forces	174.6	191.2	197.3
Naval Forces	182.0	198.3	201.9
Mobility Forces	37.5	39.0	40.0
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	93.3	99.3	100.6
Intelligence	30.0	31.7	33.2
Centrally Managed Communications	31.6	33.7	33.5
Research and Development	21.9	23.8	23.7
Geophysical Activities	9.9	10.1	10.3
<u>Support Activities</u>	624.0	630.6	635.2
Base Operating Support	305.3	303.6	300.7
Medical Support	42.6	42.3	42.7
Personnel Support	32.2	31.9	32.4
Individual Training	96.5	100.1	103.8
Force Support Training	43.0	45.8	47.9
Central Logistics	19.0	20.6	21.0
Centralized Support Activities	44.6	44.2	44.8
Management Headquarters	38.3	39.2	39.2
Federal Agency Support	2.5	2.8	2.8
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	1,766.6	1,821.1	1,839.9
<u>Undermanning</u>		-22.1	-16.6
<u>Individuals</u>	315.6	311.3	324.3
Transients	76.4	76.8	84.1
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	17.0	15.1	12.7
Students, Trainees	208.8	206.1	214.1
Cadets	13.5	13.4	13.4
<u>Total</u>	2,082.2	2,110.3	2,147.6

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE 2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 Actual	FY 1982 FY 1983 Budget	FY 1983
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>24.2</u>	<u>23.5</u>	<u>23.6</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	13.2	13.1	13.2
Defensive Strategic Forces	10.2	9.6	9.6
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>687.3</u>	<u>707.1</u>	<u>745.6</u>
Land Forces	519.5	531.8	565.0
Tactical Air Forces	63.6	68.0	70.7
Naval Forces	51.3	56.8	57.8
Mobility Forces	52.8	50.4	52.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>18.2</u>	<u>18.8</u>
Intelligence	4.2	4.7	4.4
Centrally Managed Communications	12.3	12.1	12.9
Research and Development	0.3	0.1	0.3
Geophysical Activities	1.2	1.3	1.2
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>127.1</u>	<u>135.6</u>	<u>144.4</u>
Base Operating Support	37.5	35.0	43.4
Medical Support	11.5	13.6	18.1
Personnel Support	5.0	5.5	6.0
Individual Training	48.8	54.1	54.8
Force Support Training	0.8	0.6	0.6
Central Logistics	4.0	4.9	4.6
Centralized Support Activities	15.5	18.0	13.3
Management Headquarters	3.7	3.6	3.6
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>856.5</u>	<u>884.3</u>	<u>932.4</u>
<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>20.9</u>
<u>Active Guard/Reserve (Navy)</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>33.2</u>	<u>41.8</u>	<u>45.9</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	33.2	41.8	45.9
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>899.0</u>	<u>946.2</u>	<u>999.5</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 Actual	FY 1982 FY 1983 Budget	FY 1983 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	10.5	10.1	9.9
Offensive Strategic Forces	5.4	5.1	5.0
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.2	3.0	2.9
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.9	2.0	2.0
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	57.7	59.6	59.8
Land Forces	22.1	22.6	22.8
Tactical Air Forces	14.9	16.1	16.1
Naval Forces	0.7	0.8	0.8
Mobility Forces	20.0	20.2	20.1
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	92.2	92.2	92.9
Intelligence	6.6	7.1	7.8
Centrally Managed Communications	11.0	10.9	10.8
Research and Development	64.4	63.8	63.5
Geophysical Activities	10.2	10.4	10.7
<u>Support Activities</u>	859.0	871.9	872.9
Base Operating Support	350.2	354.5	345.1
Medical Support	21.0	21.0	20.8
Personnel Support	20.8	22.9	22.8
Individual Training	20.8	21.4	21.5
Force Support Training	5.2	5.4	5.2
Central Logistics	349.6	351.9	361.0
Centralized Support Activities	55.3	56.9	58.4
Management Headquarters	36.2	37.9	38.0
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total</u>	1,019.5	1,033.8	1,035.5

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

\* Fewer than 50.



III ARMY

CHAPTER III  
ARMY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

I. Introduction

A. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes the Army's manpower requirements in terms of its active military, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and civilian manpower components for FY 1983. The Army's manpower requirements are derived from the force structure required to accomplish its missions within the national military strategy and the civilians required to help sustain this force.

This chapter contains information on the major force structure changes affecting the active, reserve, and civilian components and the manpower requirements essential to accommodate these changes. Significant program highlights are discussed for each component with the Commercial Activities (CA), Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM), and civilian substitution programs discussed separately.

The Army request for active military, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1983 and FY 1984 is as follows:

<u>Army Manpower Requirements</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Active Military	783.8	783.8
Selected Reserve		
Army National Guard	417.0	435.9
Army Reserve <sup>1/</sup>	268.5	286.2
Civilian	386.4	387.9

<sup>1/</sup> Includes 8.6 Individual Mobilization Augmentees in FY 1983 and 10.8 in FY 1984.

The Army needs a manpower base sufficient to:

- Recruit, train, and maintain the total Army during peacetime for wartime responsiveness.
- Provide for timely and rapid expansion up to and including full mobilization and full deployment of the total Army in support of combat operations.

- Permit rapid expansion to support the deployed force and accommodate a mobilization surge, if necessary, to increase the force beyond 24 divisions for total mobilization.

An analysis of these requirements above indicates that:

- Aggregate trained military manpower available in the event of mobilization remains inadequate. Selected Reserve actual strength for end FY 1981 was 614,200, which is significantly below the wartime requirement of 739,400 for FY 1981. This shortfall underlines the need for special emphasis on recruiting and retaining the necessary manpower in the active Army, Selected Reserve, and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to achieve the required levels.

- The Army's ability to meet the full spectrum of defense objectives for the 1980s may be difficult to achieve due to civilian end strength adjustments in response to monetary constraints. The readiness of today's Army depends heavily on its civilian component. Civilian manpower is a critical resource considering the realities of the constraints of a no-draft environment. It is one resource that can be used selectively and quickly as new mission and readiness needs dictate. It can be an invaluable resource to help accomplish force structure changes, relieve manning shortfalls, improve training, assist the modernization process, and provide the basis for mobilization and sustainability. During the period FY 1974 through FY 1980, civilian strength decreased by 12 percent (approximately 50,000). While a portion of this decrease is attributable to consolidations and productivity increases, the Army's support work load increased as a result of force structure increases, force modernization, all-volunteer Army support, and new missions. To meet the resulting shortfall in civilians, the Army turned to the use of soldiers borrowed daily from their units to perform duties in the support base that civilians should have performed had they been available. The FY 1981 Budget Supplemental and the FY 1982 Budget Amendment were based on the Army's need to improve near-term readiness in the depot maintenance, procurement, and supply and contract administration areas and to reduce Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM) to an acceptable level based on current projections for end FY 1982. Constraints on civilian end strength continue to have a direct impact on force readiness and soldier's quality of life. The Army will seek further increases in the size of its civilian work force in FY 1983 to continue prior year force improvement initiatives, provide increased support for force modernization, improve military construction support, and initiate a modest civilian substitution program.

## B. Major FY 1983 Force Structure Changes

### 1. Active Component

In Europe, we will complete in FY 1983 the enhancements to the Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) capability begun in FY 1980 by activating two corps-level Military Intelligence Groups (CEWI) and a MI company (CEWI) for each of the two armored cavalry

regiments. We will also activate one combat support aviation company, a petroleum truck company, and a tactical satellite company. Two armor battalions and two cavalry squadrons will receive the M1 Abrams tank, three aviation battalions will convert to BLACKHAWK aircraft, and one division will receive a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battery. We will inactivate five air defense batteries in preparation for PATRIOT fielding and will introduce the Bradley Fighting Vehicle into the theater. The Army will continue the reduction of manpower authorizations in divisional units started in FY 1982.

In CONUS, we will activate in FY 1983 an additional MI Battalion (CEWI), one MI company (CEWI), a PATRIOT battalion, a petroleum supply company, a chemical company, and an aviation company. We will continue the conversion of the 101st Division to a new unit design (started in FY 1982). Two mechanized infantry battalions will receive the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and one division will receive a MLRS battery. We will inactivate three air defense batteries and will reduce manpower authorizations in the 24th Division from authorized level of organization (ALO) 1 to ALO 2 and also reduce ALOs in some combat service support units.

In the Pacific we will activate a divisional military intelligence battalion (CEWI) and a chemical company.

## 2. Reserve Components

### a. United States Army Reserve (USAR)

The Army Reserve will activate three divisional CEWI battalions and five separate brigade CEWI companies in FY 1983. Five combat support hospitals are scheduled to reorganize to mobile army surgical hospitals (MASH), and five light/medium truck companies will be converted to petroleum truck companies in FY 1983.

### b. Army National Guard (ARNG)

In FY 1983 the Army National Guard (ARNG) will activate a construction support engineer company, a petroleum supply company, two quartermaster companies, and three light equipment maintenance companies. During the same year, the ARNG will convert a military police group headquarters company to a brigade headquarters company, two 105 mm field artillery battalions to 155mm towed battalions, eleven forward direct support maintenance companies to non-divisional maintenance companies, one light/medium truck company to a petroleum supply quartermaster company, a combat support hospital to a MASH unit, and a combat support hospital to an evacuation hospital. In addition, one tank battalion and two engineer companies will convert to a new interim design Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE).

## II. Manpower Requirements Determination

### A. General.

Army manpower requirements are derived from analysis of wartime combat and support structures and essential peacetime support requirements. In meeting these requirements, the manning levels, the mix of units among active and reserve component forces, and the mix of military and civilian personnel are established within the constraints of resource availability. Within the Army, all manpower requirements fall within three categories: TOE units, Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units, and the Individuals account.

1. Manpower Requirements Within TOE Units. Manpower requirements for Army units are developed through analytical techniques that consider the nature of the mission. The Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) provide manpower and equipment levels for standard unit wartime mission accomplishment. The manpower requirements for a TOE unit are determined as follows:

- The mission and desired capabilities of the unit are determined, and the organizational entities required for mission accomplishment (e.g., firing sections, rifle squads, maintenance teams, mess teams) are identified.

- The number of combat type positions required in a TOE is dictated by tactical and organizational doctrine, the firepower desired, and/or the number of weapons included. Each weapon has a specified number of operators. Rifle squads or firing sections are aggregated into units to produce the optimal combat capability with a manageable span of control.

- The number of personnel required for TOE service and support activities (mess, maintenance, supply) is determined by the application of standard staffing criteria. These criteria are based on engineering data, tests, and experience. They are based on the assumption that in the wartime environment individuals will be available for duty twelve hours per day, seven days per week. Standard staffing criteria are revised and updated on a three-year cycle.

A TOE prescribes the required structure, manpower, and equipment for five organizational options (from full manning to cadre levels) for a particular type of unit. These options provide a model for fielding the unit at full or reduced capability. A unit organized at full TOE capability is defined as having the minimum essential personnel and equipment for sustained operations. The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) is the authorization document for an actual unit. It shows the actual organizational option selected from the TOE, as amended by changes, to fit the unit to a specific geographical or operational environment and reflects manpower and equipment constraints. The approved MTOE document is the authorization for the unit to requisition personnel and equipment.

2. Manpower Requirements Within TDA Units. Organizations developed to accomplish specific local support missions for which no appropriate TOE is available are displayed in Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDA). TDA units are usually non-deployable units organized to fulfill mission, functional, and work load obligations at a fixed support establishment in CONUS or overseas.

The organizational structures of TDA units are developed to attain minimum essential staffing, the most effective use of personnel, and the most efficient operational capability. TDA units, unlike TOE units, may include civilian manpower.

Manpower requirements in TDA units are validated by manpower surveys conducted at least once every four years. Survey teams use functional analyses that relate performance to current functions and work load, organizational analyses to eliminate organizations that duplicate functions or interrupt a sequential flow of actions, and position analyses that use engineered standards to address the essentiality of the type and number of positions for the job to be accomplished.

TDA authorizations may be equal to or less than the recognized requirements as determined by the allocation of available resources. When authorizations are less than requirements, the reduced capability is defined in the unit's capability statement. Personnel and equipment requisitioning is based on authorizations, as it is in TOE units.

The structure of most TDA activities changes substantially upon mobilization; therefore, a new authorization document, a mobilization (MOB) TDA, is required. Mobilization TDAs reflect increased or decreased work loads due to new missions. Savings in manpower are due to reduced or eliminated functions, longer work weeks, and the use of such additional assets as Mobilization Designees, Mobilization Augmentees, and (borrowed) military manpower diverted from uncommitted or late deploying units. Unless otherwise stated in the mobilization order, MOB TDAs replace their peacetime counterparts upon mobilization.

### 3. Operating Strength and Individuals Accounts

Operating strength is the number of soldiers assigned to the MTOE and TDA units of the active Army at any specified time. Operating strength is measured or forecast for each month in the Active Army Manpower Program. More important than the month-end or year-end snapshot, however, is the average, or manyears, of operating strength during a fiscal year. The units of the active Army may be undermanned at year-end, but, manned on the average throughout the year.

Individuals consist of those soldiers not assigned to units at any specified time. They include trainees, transients, holdees, students, and cadets (TTHS). Although these personnel are not under the direct control of unit commanders, they are not unwanted "overhead". Every soldier in the individuals accounts is there because the Army wants him there to be trained,

to be moved to a new assignment, to get well, or to serve a sentence imposed by a court-martial. They are necessary in order to sustain the operations of the Army.

The number of people required in the individuals accounts is forecasted based upon history and projected policy changes that are input to a computer-generated model called the trainees, transients, holdees, and students model. More specifically, the magnitude of individuals in these accounts is a result of the number of personnel leaving, entering, or receiving initial entry training; moving; attending school; being placed in a hospital or prison; or separating from the military.

The TTHS Forecasting System operates in conjunction with the Enlisted Loss Inventory Model-Computation of Manpower Programs Using Linear Programming (ELIM-COMPLIP) system. The ELIM-COMPLIP is the Army program to project Army manpower requirements through the budget execution and program years. Both systems provide and accept data to forecast the number of individuals (trainees, transients, holdees, and students) for the Active Army Manpower Program.

End strength is the sum of operating strength and the individuals accounts. The end strength authorized by Congress each year fixes the yearend snapshot that the Army manages towards throughout the year.

#### 4. Active Army Military Manpower Program

The Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP) permits the Army to examine alternative combinations of such factors as force structure fill, recruiting goals, training base utilization, and personnel costs in order to arrive at an optimal manpower program considering a large number of real world constraints. The Army uses an automated, goal programming model, ELIM-COMPLIP, that produces the AAMMP using a historical data base and state-of-the-art mathematical techniques to project enlisted force dynamics for the current, budget, and five program years. The AAMMP is used in budgeting, planning the use of the training base, setting recruiting objectives, and examining the fill and content of the force structure. Each year the Army makes refinements to ELIM-COMPLIP that improve enlisted loss projections and enlisted force management. Although a highly successful tool, ELIM-COMPLIP is limited in that it actually models only the enlisted force and cannot discriminate by grade or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Officer computations are done externally and are manually entered into the ELIM-COMPLIP system so that they are available for the AAMMP that the system produces.

## B. Manpower Management Improvements

1. General. GAO has been critical of the Army's manpower management procedures, in particular its manpower requirements determination program, and has emphasized the success of the functionally oriented, standards-based, manpower management systems of the Air Force and Navy. The following paragraphs discuss initiatives that respond to these criticisms and improve the manpower requirements determination process and other managerial procedures.

### 2. Requirements Determination Initiatives

a. Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3). In response to GAO criticism, the Functional Army Manpower Evaluation (FAME) study was begun in October 1979 to test the Army's capability to develop and implement functional standards. This evaluation resulted in staffing standards being developed for the civilian personnel administration functions. A contract was awarded in September 1980 to develop an organization and procedures for a new Army manpower requirements determination and management system. From an analysis of FAME, the contract report, and manpower management systems of the Air Force and Navy, a new manpower requirements determination and management system for TDA organizations was developed. This new system, the Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3), is based on industrial engineering and other scientific management techniques that directly tie objective work load factors to manpower requirements. The process to be employed in the new system not only has been successfully tested in the civilian personnel administration function throughout the Army but also has a history of credibility and success in the Air Force, Navy, and industry. The use of a standards-based manpower requirements determination process will improve the accuracy of program and budget estimates and requests.

During the early stages of the introduction of MS-3, the Army will apply standards developed by the other Services and, in some cases, civilian industry to determine manpower requirements. These standards will allow for a more rapid transition to MS-3 since all standards will not have to be redeveloped by the Army. Approximately 40,000 spaces can be validated in the near term under this borrowed standards program.

b. Functional Dictionary. An initiative is underway to develop a manpower-oriented functional coding system that will be the common language for the Army manpower requirements determination process. Modeled on the Air Force and Navy functional dictionaries, it will provide detailed descriptions of each function and a common numbering structure for manpower from work center to Army headquarters level. Developing such an index will allow "cross-walk" to the Army Management Structure, the Financial Management, and the Planning, Programming, and Budget System (PPBS) systems. This coding system will also provide the Army with a tool to aggregate manpower by function and to evaluate



system impacts due to program changes. Thus, the functional dictionary will be the common data base used to schedule, develop, maintain, and apply functional staffing standards developed in MS-3 in a manner that will permit manpower requirements to be validated.

c. Updated Availability Factors. The Army will initiate a study in FY 1982 to update the manpower availability factors used throughout the Army to determine manpower requirements in both TOE and TDA units. Availability factors describe productive time that can be devoted to perform work after allowances for sickness, leave, training, and other essential duties or time demands are deducted. Accurate factors are one of the keys to a valid determination of manpower requirements.

d. Support Baseline. A study was begun in FY 1982 to develop broad work load indicators (estimating equations) and macro-level justification for over 600,000 manpower spaces in the Army's support base (e.g., depots, installations, schools, training centers, and administrative headquarters). The results of this study will be used until such time as MS-3 is able to address the functions within this support base in a more systematic and detailed manner.

e. Improvements to the Manpower Authorization Criteria (MACRIT). Manpower requirements in TOE units are determined by tactical considerations, doctrine, and MACRIT. MACRIT provide manpower standards that address the minimum numbers of non-supervisory manpower (enlisted) requirements necessary to perform essential wartime work loads in combat support (CS) or combat service support (CSS) functions in TOE units. MACRIT are derived by dividing the time required to perform a measurable work load function by the time the soldier is available to perform that function in a wartime environment. The available time is presently based upon a 12-hour day, 7 day week for a total of 4,380 hours per year. A non-available time factor and a unit movement time factor are deducted from the total and yield the net time available for work requirements. As discussed in last year's report, the Army Training and Doctrine Command initiated a study project to evaluate more accurately the impact of the wartime environment, wartime scenario, and other battlefield variables. This study uses a multitude of wartime work load factors, battlefield simulations, operations research techniques, and computer modeling to produce a required MACRIT process. This process provides a credible, systematic, and scientific method to justify wartime requirements and to develop effective TOE and force structures. The project will be completed in June 1982 with the application of a new scenario- and maintenance-driven model to develop and test the concept of deriving manpower requirements for operational (TOE) units. This application should demonstrate the potential to produce, on a continuing basis, valid manpower requirements criteria. The model would provide TOE manpower standards and develop a means of analyzing the effect of many additional variables that are part of the MACRIT process.

f. Improved Techniques for Identifying Positions as Military or Civilian. A procedure to develop quantitative techniques for identifying spaces as military or civilian was completed in FY 1981. Objective criteria were also provided to determine whether the military positions should be enlisted, warrant, or commissioned officer. These techniques and criteria were consolidated in a draft Position Identification Handbook that was tested on a limited number of positions in FY 1981. A one-year test will be conducted during FY 1982-FY 1983 on a larger sample of positions to validate the methodology prior to final implementation.

### 3. Manpower Management Initiatives

a. Command Grade Ceilings (CGC). Currently, Army authorization documents permit 4,000 more field-grade officer positions than the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) allows. CGC are being developed, for implementation in FY 1983, to bring the Army's authorized commissioned officer position grade structure into line with DOPMA. These ceilings will cause a closer alignment of positions and people, which in turn will better enable Army commands to plan on the people who will be available to meet their needs.

b. FORDIMS Manpower Management System. The newly automated Force Development Integrated Management System (FORDIMS) is currently undergoing development and test. The key objective of FORDIMS is to provide a method for establishing a logical relationship among manpower data in the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP), budget exhibits, program budget guidance to the field, the master force maintained by the Army, and authorization documents prepared by the field to ensure that manpower directives are implemented and manpower is used as programmed and budgeted (by identity, function, and fiscal year). This objective will be accomplished by combining four major management information systems, the Army Force Program (AFP), the Civilian Budgeting System (CBS), the Force Accounting System (FAS), and the Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) into three subsystems: the Program/Budget Subsystem (P/BS), the Force Accounting Subsystem (FAS Revised), and the Authorization Subsystem (AS). The concept within FORDIMS is that these three subsystems interface to form the Army's manpower authorization and document system.

FORDIMS will improve the ability of Army manpower management to monitor subordinate commands' use of manpower against the requirements for which it was provided, improve the management information available, and increase the timeliness and accuracy of data.

c. Automated Identification of Documents for Review (AIDR). AIDR complements FORDIMS by providing an automated and flexible system to determine the degree to which Army commands' authorization documents comply with specific quantitative and qualitative guidance and criteria such as command grade ceilings, civilian high grade controls, Top-2 NCO grade constraints, or other managerial controls. Results of this com-

puter evaluation are used to focus managerial attention on critical problem areas and to bring specific cases of apparent non-compliance to the attention of field commanders for reevaluation and corrective action as appropriate. Whereas FORDIMS, for example, might allocate ten officer spaces to a command, ADIR will automatically check to determine if that command has exceeded its grade ceilings in using those spaces.

d. The Manpower Evaluation Tracking System (METS). While FORDIMS and ADIR deal primarily with the allocation and documentation of spaces, METS monitors the use of manpower resources. METS determines whether the spaces allocated have been filled with a person by comparing data from the Army's manpower, personnel, and financial accounting systems. As such, it is a personnel-manpower-dollar interface system. This system will allow the Army to validate that manpower and related dollars are being used for the purposes for which they were justified and authorized. METS is being developed in three phases. During Phase I, which was completed in FY 1980, the essential system structure was established to demonstrate both the feasibility and the capability of the METS project. In Phase II, scheduled for completion by the end of FY 1982, METS will provide data to manage the manpower-related resources of the total Army's manned units, to include data for the active military at the grade/skill level and for civilians at the cost/work hour level. During Phase III, METS will be expanded to provide automated, remote access to the system by major commands and interested agencies.

e. FORECAST. Active Army military manpower is currently programmed at an aggregate of officer and enlisted levels using ELIM-COMPLIP. Although a highly successful tool, ELIM-COMPLIP is limited in that it actually models only the enlisted force and cannot discriminate by grade or MOS. Officer computations are done externally and are manually entered into the ELIM-COMPLIP system so that they are available for the various reports the system produces. A five-year project is underway to develop a more comprehensive system called FORECAST -- a multi-level, modular, integrated ADP system--that will make possible the projection of active Army military strength (officer and enlisted) both in aggregate terms and by grade, skill, and unit. Whereas FORDIMS and METS are concerned with today's manpower requirements and personnel availability, the FORECAST projection system will be able to estimate future requirements and the availability of personnel to fill them. The system will provide an integrated approach for improved planning, programming, and budgeting and will better enable the Army to test the effects of alternative policies on the force. The system will be capable of modeling peacetime, partial mobilization, and full mobilization scenarios. As of end FY 1981, a prototype of the Enlisted MOS Level Subsystem was completed and tested. During FY 1982, the production version of the MOS Level Subsystem will be completed. This new module will be placed in operation in FY 1983 and will provide detailed skill and grade information. Also in FY 1981, contracts were let to develop the Mobilization (Enlisted) Subsystem, the Unit Level Subsystem, and the Officer Subsystem. These subsystems are scheduled to be operational

between FY 1983 and FY 1987 and when combined with the existing capabilities of FORECAST will enable the active Army to both project peacetime strengths (officers and enlisted) and plan for and project strengths under mobilization conditions.

f. Establishment of an Officer Manpower Management Career Field. Several GAO reports in recent years have criticized Army manpower management practices to include the training, identification, and development of professional manpower management personnel. As a partial response to this criticism, the Army started a study in FY 1980 to determine the feasibility of establishing a separate officer manpower management specialty. As a result of this study, approximately 200 to 250 officer positions will be reclassified into a new manpower specialty in September 1982. Officers in this specialty will have repetitive assignments in these positions and will participate in specialized formal training to produce effective supervisors and managers of the Army's manpower and force management systems.

4. Personnel Mobilization Process. Several plans, systems, and initiatives that directly affect the mobilization process are undergoing further development and refinement.

a. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS). During MOBEX 78, mobilization planning efforts were determined to be uncoordinated, duplicative, and not responsive to operational requirements. To correct this deficiency, AMOPS was developed. AMOPS is a short-range planning system that provides disciplined planning procedures for the conduct of mobilization and deployment planning and execution. It provides the guidance necessary for detailed planning to expand Army forces, CONUS base operations, and the industrial base; it also consolidates Army policies, procedures, and plans for the development, coordination, dissemination, review, and approval of mobilization and deployment activities.

b. Mobilization Personnel System (MOBPERS). The rapid and expeditious call up and assignment of reserve component personnel to active duty during mobilization is critical. These personnel will serve as fillers and casualty replacements for soldiers/units that are awaiting deployment into the theater of operation or already engaged in combat, suffering casualties. The Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS) is a set of procedures by which the reserve components are ordered to active duty and added to the active Army data bases under either partial mobilization (contingencies) or full mobilization (general war). Under MOBPERS the data needed to assign reserve component personnel (unit and/or individuals) to the active Army data bases are prepositioned at mobilization stations. Each mobilization station has the specific personnel data for those reserve component units and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members who will mobilize at that installation. This system greatly improves the Army's ability to rapidly mobilize its forces by identifying personnel requirements during peacetime and earmarking reservists for mobilization assignment.

c. Preassignment. The Army is preassigning retired personnel to meet mobilization needs. Ordering retirees to active duty in primarily CONUS positions during a mobilization contributes to the efficient operation of CONUS installations and activities under surge conditions. It also permits reassignment of significant numbers of younger persons for deployment or other necessary tasks not appropriate for retired personnel. Preassignment orders for approximately 85,000 selected retired Army personnel were mailed in November and December 1981.

### III. Significant Program Highlights

#### A. Active Component

1. General. The active Army entered FY 1981 with an authorized end strength of 775,300 later increased to 780,000. By the end of the first quarter, the Army had fully recovered from the operating strength shortfall of FY 1979. During the year, the Army realized that it was meeting its overall recruiting goals and was exceeding its retention goals. To capitalize on this trend and provide a better ramp to the FY 1982 initially programmed end strength of 786,300, the Army requested and received Congressional authorization to increase the FY 1981 end strength to 780,000. In spite of last quarter management actions, the Army actually achieved an end strength of 781,042, or 1,042 above the final authorization and 5,742 above the initial authorization of 775,300. The active military end strength requested in the FY 1983 budget is 784,400 for FY 1982 and 783,800 for FY 1983. This request provides for manning of a slightly increased force structure at a lower end strength than that programmed in the FY 1982 President's Budget due to retention above that anticipated in FY 1981.

2. Enlisted. FY 1981 was a good year for the enlisted force. The Army achieved its enlisted end strength goal of 675,083. Recruiting and retention results were some of the best since the beginning of the All Volunteer Force. The critical NCO shortage diminished, and with Congressional help, the Army is ameliorating the problem of short tours in the United States caused by the number of spaces in certain skills overseas being greater than those in CONUS. Some challenges, however, still lie ahead. The quality content of the accessions must increase in FY 1982 and FY 1983 to meet Congressional restrictions, and the Army must solve specific skill imbalances in its noncommissioned officer force.

a. Accessions. The active Army exceeded the Congressional guidance of 65 percent non-prior service (NPS) male high school graduates and came within 6 percent (30 percent) of meeting the Congressional goal of 25 percent mental category IV accessions. These successes are largely attributable to increases in pay, better recruiting resources and management, a variety of training and assignment enlistment options, enhanced educational benefits, and growing support of the American public. With continuing support of the Congress and the American people, the Army should be able to continue to recruit and retain sufficient volunteers.

In FY 1981 the Army instituted the Total Army Enlisted Accession Objectives to increase the high school diploma graduate (HSDG) content, improve the quality content of accessions, and reduce cohort attrition. Significantly, HSDG accessions in FY 1981 were 80.3 percent of all active Army NPS accessions, a level higher than anytime during the all volunteer era. The number of Category I-IIIa accessions rose by 12.6 percent, and Category IVs declined by 56 percent. These quality improvements will dramatically improve unit stability and cohesiveness in FY 1982 and beyond. FY 1983, however, will be a more difficult recruiting period because recruiting goals are increasing and the quality constraints are tightening from 25 percent to 20 percent mental category IV. To offset this situation the Army will use increased enlistment bonuses as necessary to achieve the Congressionally mandated constraint of 20 percent mental category IV non-prior service enlistments and to recruit approximately 61,100 mental category I-III male high school diploma graduates. The table below show the actual active Army recruiting and retention results and projected requirements.

<u>Enlisted Strength Plan</u> (Numbers in 000s)				
	<u>FY 1981</u>		<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	20.0	20.0	10.0	14.0
Non-Prior Service				
Male	98.5	99.3	105.0	119.1
(Male-I-IIIa)	-	39.8	51.1	58.3
(HSDG)	77.0	77.5	85.2	85.5
(HSDG I-IIIa)	-	31.9	39.1	42.0
Female	18.3	18.2	15.6	17.2
(Female I-IIIa)	-	7.3	9.0	9.9
(HSDG)	17.3	17.2	15.6	17.2
(HSDG I-IIIa)	-	6.8	9.0	9.9
<u>Reenlistments</u>				
Initial Term	29.2	34.4	35.5	29.4
Mid Term	28.0	24.6	30.5	34.5
Career	<u>19.8</u>	<u>19.1</u>	<u>20.3</u>	<u>23.0</u>
Total	77.0	78.1	86.3	86.9

b. Quality. As shown, the Army will continue its objective of increasing the number of people of high quality to increase the readiness of the force.

According to the National Science Foundation (1979), "The disparity between the level of training in science and mathematics of an average Soviet skilled worker or military recruit... and an average member of our all-volunteer force is so great that comparisons are meaningless," and a quality comparison shows the US secondary school graduate to be less prepared for a technological society than his Soviet counterpart.

To fight outnumbered and win, the Army must maintain the momentum it gained in FY 1981 in providing the proper type of accessions to enable it to man the force and provide adequate input into the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) Corps. Having done this, it will lower attrition, thus promoting cohesiveness and combat readiness.

c. Retention. The Army achieved its retention objectives for FY 1981 in aggregate numbers, although NCO shortages continued in combat arms, intelligence, and high technology skills. The objectives of the FY 1982 program are to retain competent soldiers in the skills required, and to realign soldier's skills with Army needs. This program includes incentives for soldiers to reenlist and reclassify into skills in which there are shortages and disincentives for soldiers to remain in overcrowded skills. In the past, promotion scores permitted soldiers with very high scores to be promoted regardless of the over strength status of the Military Occupational Speciality. Starting in January 1982, promotion to grades E-5 and E-6 are geared more strictly to the status of each MOS. Selective Reenlistment Bonuses continue to be monitored carefully so that adjustments may be made to lower bonus levels as skills become filled and to raise levels in skills where the reenlistment rate is insufficient to remedy shortfalls.

Although the reenlistment rates required to achieve end strength and career content goals appear higher than they have been, the propensity to reenlist remains even higher. The Army is taking steps to control reenlistments to ensure that it can enlist sufficient numbers to sustain the force in the outyears while remaining within end strength constraints.

d. NCO Shortages. One of the keys to an effective fighting force is having a qualified NCO of the right grade and MOS in every position. As the Army implements its planned force modernization and supports such new requirements as full-time manning, the need for NCOs in the top five grades will increase. However, as the chart below shows, the Army's chronic shortage in the top five enlisted grades will be virtually eliminated in FY 1983.

Top 5 Enlisted Strength  
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1981</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
Authorizations	264.8	266.1	273.8	274.4
End strength	256.1	263.5	268.0	274.4

Recent changes to the Army's promotion, reenlistment, reclassification, and prior service enlistment policies are designed to improve skill match, eliminate poor performers, retain good soldiers, and support modernization.

e. Space Imbalanced Military Occupational Specialties (SIMOS) Program. About 15,000 soldiers in 37 skills mainly related to missile, nuclear, or electronic warfare operations and maintenance fields are SIMOS. Congress enacted Public Law 96-579 in December 1980 to assist in solving the space imbalanced military occupational specialty problem. The law offered either \$50 a month or a period of rest or recuperative absence if the individual extends his overseas tour for at least one year. Data indicate that this incentive is working. Tour extensions for space imbalanced military occupational specialty personnel tripled for the first six months of 1981 compared to a similar period in 1979 (323 to 1,008).

3. Officer. As in the enlisted force, FY 1981 was a successful year for the officer corps. Although the Army fell 329 officers short of its accession goal, the number of officers rose by 3,259 to achieve an end strength of 101,477; retention, particularly in the lieutenant and captain grades, was excellent; and the transition to modernize the officer management system as required by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act was begun. These successes are largely attributable to the increases in pay and the passage of legislation to equalize aviation careers incentive pay between commissioned and warrant officers.

Despite these successes, a number of challenges remain ahead. In FY 1981 there were 1,100 authorized officer jobs unfilled. This shortage is projected to increase in FY 1982 to about 3,100 but be eliminated in FY 1983 when authorizations and projected end strength rise to 104,707. In the technical area, the Army still experiences shortages in some engineer and scientific/technical skills and specialties and in the warrant officer aviation skills. Congress has authorized continuation pay to improve the retention of scientists and engineers. Faced with increasing trends in modernization and technology, the Army may yet request that money be appropriated to retain more of these important officers.

Procurement goals for active commissioned and warrant officers are shown below:

<u>Active Officer Procurement Goals</u>			
	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Programmed	11,523	10,403	10,174
Actual	11,194		



Much of the future leadership of this country is on the college campus. The Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Expand the Base Program extends Army ROTC to 315 host campuses by FY 1983. To achieve this increase the most productive of the 87 extension centers previously established will be elevated to host status.

The Army ROTC scholarship is an incentive that generates interest and attracts people of high quality to the ROTC program. Congress, recognizing the success of Army ROTC scholarships, increased the Army's scholarship authorization from 6,500 to 12,000. The Army awarded the first 1,035 of these scholarships as two-year awards in FY 1981 and plans to award an additional 965 in FY 1982 and the remainder in FY 1983.

Between FY 1981 and FY 1982, ROTC average enrollment increased from 69,436 to 71,341, a 2.7 percent increase. The Army expects further increases over the next several years. In FY 1981, 6,174 officers were produced. In FY 1982 and FY 1983, projections indicate that the Army will commission 9,162 and 7,821 officers, respectively, through ROTC. By FY 1985, Army ROTC has been given the goal of producing 10,500 officers per year.

In FY 1982 the Army will implement the total Army Officer Force Management Plan, which will establish the officer objective force for the 1980s. Also in FY 1982 the Army is programmed to reach the new DOPMA grade levels.

4. Women in the Army. The Department of the Army differs from the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force in that there are no statutory constraints on the utilization of women. The Army operates under a combat exclusion policy established by the office of the Secretary of the Army. This policy provides women the opportunity to serve in 92 percent of all officer, warrant officer, and enlisted specialties. Women may be assigned to all units except battalion, squadron, and smaller size units of Infantry, Armor, Cannon Field Artillery, Low Air Defense Artillery, and Combat Engineers. This policy acknowledges that women will serve throughout the battlefield and will have the same risk of injury, death, or capture as their male counterparts serving in those same combat support or combat service support units. To prepare our soldiers to face the dangers of the modern battlefield, women and men are given identical initial entry training and advanced skill training, including weapons qualification.

The active component of the Army was initially programmed to achieve a female end strength of 87,500 enlisted women by FY 1986. In February 1981, the Army decided to pause at a level of 65,000 active enlisted women until policies and programs for the utilization of women were reviewed. After eight years of greatly expanding the number and role of female soldiers, there was a need to assess the impact of this expansion on the combat readiness of the force. In April 1981, a Women in the

Army Policy Review Group was formed, under the direction of a general officer, to review the Army's policies on and programs for women and their impact on readiness. The Women in the Army Policy Review Group provided an initial assessment to the Army Chief of Staff in December 1981. Work continues on several important issues, including physical demands analysis for every enlisted MOS and other initiatives that will be used to help determine the force mix.

The active component of the Army is approximately 9 percent women, while the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve troop units are about 5 percent and 15 percent respectively. The decision to stabilize the active Army's female content pending review does not affect the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, but any policy revisions resulting from the analysis of the Women in the Army Policy Review Group will include these components.

The current Army program is to achieve and maintain an active Army end strength of 65,000 enlisted women and to commission specific numbers of female officers each fiscal year through FY 1987. The combined female officer/warrant officer actual and projected strengths appear in the following table.

Women in the Army  
Commissioned and Warrant Officers

	<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Active Army	8,385	9,034	9,651	12,196
USAR				
Individual Ready Reserve	3,025	3,188	3,252	3,512
Selected Reserve	4,354	4,610	5,060	6,806
ARNG Selected Reserve	1,653	1,871	2,120	2,613
TOTAL	17,417	18,703	20,083	25,127

The actual and programmed female enlisted end strengths for the Army appear in the following table.

Women in the Army  
Enlisted Women

	<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Active Army	64,884	65,000	65,000	65,000
USAR				
Individual Ready Reserve	11,691	16,068	19,671	34,085
Selected Reserve	30,548	32,664	37,664	53,262
ARNG Selected Reserve	17,968	18,849	20,000	20,000
TOTAL	125,091	132,581	142,335	172,347

Since the All Volunteer Force began in 1972, the Army has been in the vanguard in opening up career fields to women. Females in the Army have quintupled over the past nine years. The number of women in traditional jobs has increased by 26 percent since FY 1978. The increase in non-traditional jobs has been 22 percent. A chart depicting the active Army enlisted female population by traditionality grouping appears below:

Active Army Enlisted Women  
Traditionality Grouping 1/

FY	<u>Traditional 2/</u>	<u>Less Traditional 3/</u>	<u>Non Traditional 4/</u>	<u>Total</u>
78	19,025	13,302	17,965	50,292
79	22,258	13,579	18,981	54,818
80	23,719	13,743	23,889	61,351
81	25,773	16,116	22,982	64,871

- 1/ Traditionality grouping by career management field (CMF)  
 2/ Traditional CMF - Administrative and Medical  
 3/ Less Traditional CMF - Automated Data Processing, Supply, Audiovisual, Cook, Military Police, Intelligence  
 4/ Non Traditional CMF - Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery (ADA), Maintenance, Signal Maintenance, Construction Engineer, Nuclear Biological and Chemical, Ammunition, Track Maintenance, Wheel Vehicle Operator, Helicopter Maintenance, Reenlistment, Drafting, Intelligence

5. New Manning System. The Army's new manning system emphasizes unit rotation instead of individual replacement. This system will stabilize soldiers together with their leaders in units in an effort to improve combat effectiveness, cohesion, and small-unit leadership by giving soldiers a more stable environment and reducing personnel turbulence. The objective of this system is to have first-term soldiers stay together during the full term of their enlistment and to have career soldiers spend from three to six years together in the same unit.

A company-level overseas rotation plan is already under way. Specially recruited companies are going through initial entry training and unit training together and will spend 18 to 24 months in the continental United States before moving overseas for 12 to 18 months, keeping leaders and soldiers together throughout the three-year period. These companies will begin rotating overseas in 1982.

The next step of the program is to have other stabilized companies rotate with their counterparts overseas. Infantry, tank, and cannon field artillery units will be the first involved in the program, along with certain combat engineer and air-defense artillery units. Combat support and combat service support units will be considered later since their varied makeup requires special consideration.

The overseas rotation of battalion-level units is expected to begin in 1984. The Army plans to begin matching stateside battalions with overseas battalions having the same equipment, organization, and ranges of military occupational specialties. Units will be rotated within the same regiment. The Army expects to begin grouping battalions into regiments during FY 1982. Soldiers affiliated with a regiment can expect recurring assignments to battalions within a same regiment throughout their careers.

The Army is also considering a form of "home-basing" that would involve units regularly returning from overseas to the same installation from which they departed.

6. Personnel Support of Force Modernization. The Army is undergoing a period of more intense change than it has experienced in recent years. Not only is it fielding a large and diverse number of modern weapons and other hardware systems, but also it is reorganizing to integrate the unique capabilities of these new systems into units to achieve the maximum benefit of the force modernization effort.

These force modernization initiatives are demanding dramatic changes to the personnel composition of the force and to the Army's personnel management process. In the near term, the Army is responding to this challenge through extensive personal involvement by the Army's top level personnel managers in the modernization process. Concurrently, the Army is developing an automated system that will provide the capability to make on-line, aggregate and marginal personnel supportability assessments of each change to the force. Once this capability is achieved and a base line is established, credible supportability analyses can be performed for any change in the programmed force caused by organizational, material systems or force structure revisions.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Selected Reserve

a. Strength Trends

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR)

In FY 1979, the strength of the USAR stopped shrinking and began to grow. This growth continued through FY 1981 with the Selected Reserve showing an increase in end strength of approximately 18,500 over FY 1980. These significant gains are in large part directly related to Congressional support of the Selected Reserve Incentives Program (SRIP) and other initiatives including the use of full-time personnel and policies that assist recruiting and retention. Full-time reservists have a major impact on the daily function of units that translates into better training, better administration, better logistics and improved retention. They also assist in the management of existing resources and provide planning for future assets and are the direct link to the civilian communities that provide the soldiers for the USAR units.

A policy change on overstrength will capitalize on this trend to increase strength. This policy, begun in FY 1981, allows for personnel overstrength in selected USAR units. The policy, which provides for a 25 percent overstrength in selected battalion and smaller units, is viewed as an opportunity to capitalize on recruiting success in specific areas of the country and should assist in the attainment of end strengths in FY 1982 and FY 1983. In FY 1982 and FY 1983, we expect the USAR to achieve a total Selected Reserve end strength (including Individual Mobilization Augmentees) of 251,849 and 268,531, respectively. While these end strengths remain below the required wartime strengths, they are attainable and in line with the strength ramp designed to attain the wartime strength by FY 1987. Shown below are the FY 1978-FY 1983 strengths for the USAR Selected Reserve.

Selected Reserve Strength

<u>FY</u>	<u>Congressionally Authorized Average Paid Strength</u>	<u>Actual Average Paid Strength</u>	<u>Actual End of Year Paid Strength</u>
1978	211,300	188,880	185,753
1979	195,750	186,843	192,539
1980	197,400	197,546 <sup>1/</sup>	206,626
1981	204,500	216,688	225,214
1982	235,300 <sup>1/</sup>		
1983	258,700 (requested)		

<sup>1/</sup> Last year's report cited incorrect data. The above numbers are the corrected figures.

(2) Army National Guard (ARNG).

In FY 1971 the ARNG strength was about 400,000. By FY 1978, due largely to the Army's inability to replace people who joined in the late 1960s and early 1970s (many of whom were draft motivated), this strength declined to 341,000. The ARNG showed significant increases in strength in FY 1980 and FY 1981. In FY 1983 the ARNG will remain below the required wartime units strength levels of 447,600.

<u>FY</u>	<u>Congress Authorized Average Paid Strength</u>	<u>ARNG Actual Average Paid Strength</u>	<u>Actual End of Year Paid Strength</u>
1978	382,000	347,646	340,996
1979	362,200	343,677	345,528
1980	355,700	353,189	366,585
1981	371,300	376, 827	389,009
1982	392,800		
1983	407,400 (requested)		

The overstrength policy will also help the ARNG. Selected ARNG units are permitted to exceed normal unit authorization by up to 25 percent. This policy is designed to take advantage of recruiting successes in particular geographical areas.

b. Enlisted

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR)

One of the keystones for the USAR Selected Reserve strength gains is the Selected Reserve Incentive Program. Targeted on both accessions and retention, this program has provided the flexibility needed to focus both monetary bonuses and educational incentives on high priority units and critical skills. The program, which began in FY 1979, has been modified over the past two years to ensure the incentives value remained consistent with inflation rates and the requirement to fill high priority units and critical skills. In FY 1982, SRIP modifications increased the bonus for critical skills from \$1,500 to \$2,000 for a six-year enlistment and expanded the bonuses to additional critical skills. In FY 1983 the number of units that can receive the incentive entitlements may be increased.

Actual USAR recruiting and retention performance and projected requirements are shown below.

	<u>FY 1981</u>		<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	33,464	34,760	33,668	31,429
Non-Prior Service	30,277	31,879	33,995	34,320
Male	22,520	22,103	24,769	25,209
(HSDG)	12,046	12,151	16,130	16,285
Female	7,757	9,776	9,226	9,111
(HSDG)	4,453	7,429	4,924	5,994
<u>Reenlistment</u>				
First Term	5,000	5,555	9,669	7,361
Career	28,172	28,876	21,262	34,443

The execution of the USAR Accessions Plan depends upon the recruiting command and the recruiters assigned to it. These people, who are part of the Full-Time Support program, provide the direct contact with the civilian or prior service person being recruited. In FY 1981 these recruiters enlisted 66,600 personnel for the USAR units. In FY 1982 approximately 1,500 recruiters will be in the field, and in FY 1983 that number will increase to approximately 1,800.

The retention program also contributed to enlisted strength gains by strong command involvement from the very highest level down. To maintain this momentum in FY 1983, the number of man-day spaces authorized for use by unit members will be increased to give them more time to reenlist more people. Full-time retention personnel at the major unit level will coordinate the overall effort.

## (2) Army National Guard (ARNG)

The close of FY 1981 marked another successful year for the Army National Guard in the achievement of strength objectives, both quantity and quality. Actual enlisted strength at the end of FY 1981 was 350,645 soldiers, which is 1,301 soldiers above the program strength of 349,344. Of the total non-prior service personnel enlisted in the ARNG during FY 1981, only 13.2 percent were in mental category IV. This was 1.2 percent above the ARNG goal, but 16.8 percent below the total Army goal of 30 percent. Within the same total of NPS enlistees, 63.3 percent were high school diploma graduates (HSDG), which is 3.3 percent above the total Army goal.

The continued success of the ARNG in manning the force, both in quantity and quality, can be attributed to efforts at all levels within the Army National Guard and the continuing support of the Congress for ARNG manpower-oriented programs such as the Selected Reserve Incentive Program. This program continues to be the driving factor not only in achieving ARNG strength gains but also in retaining quality within the force. Of equal significance is the marked growth in critical skills versus non-critical skills. In FY 1980 ARNG strength in critical skills increased by only 4.9 percent whereas in FY 1981 it increased by 8.7 percent. This change can be compared to increases in all other skills of 7.4 percent in FY 1980 and 5.8 percent in FY 1981. This sharp turnaround can be largely attributed to the increase in the educational assistance bonus from \$2,000 to \$4,000 for a six-year enlistment initiated on October 1981.

In addition to the cash bonuses and educational assistance under SRIP, shorter optional enlistment terms; incremental initial active-duty training options (split training); and increased use of full-time support, people to enhance training, administration, and maintenance at unit level have all contributed to the success of recruiting and retaining quality soldiers during FY 1981. These assets have proved invaluable but will be severely taxed by the challenges of the 1980s. The projected strength challenges of the near term indicate a need to expand the full-time recruiting force and relieve small unit commanders of this burden. They will then be able to devote more time to meeting the training and discipline requirements associated with a growing force. The following table shows the ARNG actual and projected strength plan.

Enlisted Strength Plan  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1982</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 1983</u> <u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	45.1	43.1	44.5	49.0
Non-Prior Service				
Male	45.1	47.7	45.2	49.8
(HSDG)	(27.1)	(28.8)	(32.2)	(35.4)
Female	5.5	4.7	5.0	5.4
(HSDG)	(3.3)	(4.6)	(3.6)	(3.6)
<u>Reenlistements</u>				
First Term	10.2	10.0	13.9	14.8
Career	64.6	63.2	61.1	67.8

Extensions of enlistments within the ARNG totaled 73,193 during FY 1981, representing an achievement of 102 percent of program goals. The reenlistment portion of the SRIP was expanded in FY 1981 to include critical skills in units not previously authorized bonus incentives. Similarly, expansion of the enlistment bonus for critical skills to \$2,000, effective October 1, 1981, will further increase the bonus coverage eligibility from the 1981 level of 54 percent of the ARNG structure strength to 72 percent by the end of FY 1982. With the continuing support of all concerned, these percentages will continue to improve through FY 1987. The strength of the ARNG can be increased not only by increasing enlistments or reenlistments, but also by reducing losses. The ARNG has made significant strides in reducing both ETS (expiration of term of service) and non-ETS losses through vigorous attrition management initiatives described in last year's report. This program will be continued.

Although FY 1981 was a bonus year for strength and quality gains in the ARNG, the need for a continuing balanced program to attain readiness goals is recognized. The growing force must be equipped, trained, and sustained to form the nucleus for the growing numbers of combat-ready units needed to meet mobilization requirements. With the continuing support of all concerned, the ARNG is well suited to conquer this challenge by seizing upon near-term opportunities to grow both in strength and quality. Such an opportunity exists in the FY 1982-1983 timeframe with the current and projected state the economy and foreseeable expansion of enlistment opportunities in the ARNG. With limited additional funding, it is anticipated that the ARNG can surpass program objectives by 12,000 additional net gains in FY 1982. These projected gains will create additional training base support requirements and create limited shortfalls in individual and organizational clothing and equipment. These shortfalls notwithstanding, the opportunity to achieve near-term strength growths will enable the ARNG to maintain the recruiting and retention momentum achieved during FY 1980 and 1981, and place the ARNG in excellent position to achieve its wartime structure strength prior to the currently programmed year of FY 1987.



c. Officer

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR). The number of officers in units grew by approximately 720 in FY 1981. The goal is to increase further the number of officers by 830 in FY 1982 and another 580 in FY 1983. These increases are significantly below the required wartime strength but are based upon a strength ramp that will attain the required strength by FY 1987. Unlike active component officers, the USAR officer accessions come from a number of sources which are not controlled by the USAR. Accessions from the USAR units come from ROTC, OCS, direct appointments, and transfer from the Individual Ready Reserve, which includes officers being released from active duty. The accessions from ROTC vary based upon the needs of the active component. This variation makes programming accessions from USAR units heavily dependent upon the remaining sources. The most significant source for accessions for units is the IRR transfer. To assist in this area, Forces Command began a program in FY 1981 that requires the interview of each officer being released from active duty. This program assists us in placing officers, reduces time lag in processing paperwork from the installations to the Reserve Components Personnel Administration Center (RCPAC), and assists efforts in developing personal contact between the officer and his points of contact at RCPAC. This program will continue in FY 1982 and FY 1983.

(2) Army National Guard (ARNG). The Army National Guard closed FY 1981 with a combined officer/warrant officer strength of 38,364, the highest officer strength level ever achieved in the history of the ARNG. In FY 1982 this strength is projected to grow to 38,788 and to further increase in FY 1983 to 39,739 as the ARNG moves to achieve its authorized officer strength of 45,124 by FY 1986.

During FY 1981, 5,860 commissioned officers and 1,249 warrant officers were appointed in the ARNG, of which 41 percent were state OCS graduates and 15 percent were from ROTC. Although State OCS will remain the primary source of ARNG officers through FY 1983, ROTC is becoming an important source of new lieutenants entering the ARNG. The assignment of 51 ARNG officers to ROTC detachments under the Expand the Base (ETB) Program, and additional funding of ROTC scholarships for the Selected Reserve are significant factors in the current and projected increase of officer accessions from ROTC. However, some problems remain. ROTC gains to the ARNG have tended to fluctuate markedly in the past and are difficult to forecast. Attempts by the ARNG to add more certainty to officer accessions from the simultaneous membership program through increased use of Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty contracts have been unsuccessful thus far.

The recruitment and retention of medical corps officers, physician's assistants, chaplains, and warrant officer aviators remain a concern. The continued use of various programs will be necessary to recruit and retain these people. These initiatives will be

especially important in offsetting the impact of DOPMA provisions that limit the amount of credit for constructive service given when determining grade upon appointment. The most significant of these initiatives are:

- The application of policies governing overstrength, constructive service credit, relaxation of maximum age limitations, elimination of military education requirements, and/or removal of grade constraints for personnel with critical specialties.

- The attachment to a unit in their locality of individuals who possess special skills but, because of geographic constraints, are unable to train with their unit of assignment during inactive duty training.

- The tasking of an expanded ARNG Full-Time Army Medical Department (AMEDD) Recruiting Force to increase AMEDD strength to 100 percent, with emphasis on physician recruitment and retention. This force will publicize the Medical/Dental Student Commissioning Program, the Continuing Health Education Program, which permits AMEDD personnel to attend professional conferences and seminars under National Guard auspices, flexible management and training policies for Medical Corps officers, and potential attendance of enlisted medics at the USAF Physician's Assistant Course.

- The use of the Chaplain Candidate Program in an effort to alleviate chaplain shortages.

- Interchangeably filling (dependent upon availability) of aviator positions by rated commissioned and warrant officers.

- The recruitment of personnel below age 27½ to attend the Officer/Warrant Officer Rotary Wing Aviator Course, which lowers the median age of ARNG aviators while simultaneously increasing assigned strength.

Another problem of significance to the ARNG is the inability to promote active duty Guard/Reserve officers. At present these officers must complete their active duty tour before accepting a promotion because of the limitations of Section 3380, 10 US Code. Legislation has been proposed to correct this inequity.

2. Initiatives to Improve the Management of Reserve Component Manpower Assets. The Army is improving the management of its manpower assets in FY 1982 through the following actions:

- Programming additional positions for the Reserve Components Personnel Administration Center to be filled by members of the Individual Ready Reserve. This change results in better and more training opportunities and professional development for IRR personnel.

- Increasing full-time manning toward a goal of 8 percent of the authorized strength to provide resources for improved management, administration, and planning of training. This increase allows units to make maximum use of unit assemblies for training. As part of the Army's Full-Time Support Program, reserve component personnel in full-time military status will continue to be added during FY 1982 in accordance with the priorities established in the Reserve Component Resource Priority List to improve readiness and response time. Active component military are also included in this program.

- In accordance with OSD directions, the Army implemented an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program. The purpose of the IMA program is to preassign individual reservists with active component units in peacetime to train for their wartime duties. Effective October 1, 1981, the Mobilization Designation (MOBDES) program was redesignated as the IMA program, and its members (still called MOBDES) were transferred from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to the Selected Reserve. That transfer provides the option of including individuals, as well as units, in the Presidential 100,000 call-up.

Assignment policies under the IMA program have been modified to allow the assignment of MOBDES to active component wartime required positions not authorized at peacetime levels of organization. Priority of position assignment will be in early-deploying active component units. However, MOBDES will continue to be assigned with installation and support activities that will expand operations during a mobilization.

Modification of assignment policies has greatly increased the number of mobilization manpower positions eligible for fill by MOBDES. As those positions are filled, training funds allocated to the program must be increased.

3. Full-Time Manning. The Full-Time Manning (FTM) program for the reserve components will grow from 3,627 active duty Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel and 1,554 active Army personnel in FY 1981 to a total of 9,540 positions in FY 1983 as shown below.

	<u>FY 1981</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
USAR	1,641	2,089	3,588
ARNG	1,986	2,409	4,398
Active Army			
with USAR	770	770	770
with ARNG	784	784	784
TOTAL	5,181	6,052	9,540

4. Technician Conversion Program. During FY 1982, the USAR plans to convert 357 spaces and the ARNG 166 spaces. During FY 1983 an additional 600 ARNG spaces are programmed to be filled by full-time active duty Guardsmen. These people will be assigned to battalion-sized units and below.

5. Mobilization and Wartime Trained Manpower Sustainability.  
 In the event of a major conflict, the active component would require substantial, early augmentation by reserve component units. In addition, both active and reserve component units would require significant augmentation by trained individual reservists to achieve full wartime strength. Large numbers of pretrained individual manpower (PIM) would also be required as casualty replacements until inductees could be trained and transported to the theater of operations. Since the output of trained inductees from the training base cannot begin until approximately 100 days after the receipt of inductees (with peacetime registration, first inductees will be received at M+13 - output begins at M+113), heavy reliance must be placed on PIM. Because the strength of active and reserve component units are much less than full wartime required levels and PIM inventories will not be large enough to overcome the difference and replace casualties, there will continue to be a mobilization and wartime trained military manpower shortfall.

(a) Mobilization & Wartime Trained Military Manpower Shortfall

The following table shows the Army mobilization and wartime requirements and supply of trained military manpower for a NATO/WARSAW Pact war in Europe during the peak shortage periods. The FY 1981 column uses actual, year-end FY 1981 data; the FY 1983 column shows the situation at the end of FY 1983, assuming all planned programs are approved, fully resourced, and totally successful.

TRAINED MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS VERSUS SUPPLY (000s)		
	FY 81 (M+90)	FY 83 (M+120)
<u>Total Requirements</u> (Structure, overhead, casualties)	1,770	1,902
<u>Supply</u>		
Active Component	752	755
Guard & Reserve Units	566	649
New Volunteers & Inductees	0	30
Individual Accounts	23	25
<u>Remaining Requirements</u>	429	443
<u>Available PIM</u> <sup>1/</sup>	250	292
Shortfall	179	151

1/ PIM: Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Inactive National Guard (ING), Standby Reserve, and Recalled Military Retirees.

(b) Pretrained Individual Manpower Projections. The following paragraphs discuss the current and projected inventories of the various PIM pools.

(1) Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). This category is discussed in Section IV (Defense Planning and Programming Categories) later in this chapter.

(2) Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Administrative and management actions, beginning in 1978, have stemmed the decline in IRR strength caused by the end of the draft era and the reduction of active force strength after the Vietnam conflict, and have provided for an increase in strength of 76,900 by the end of FY 1981. A reenlistment bonus program was authorized for FY 1981. However, delay in the FY 1981 authorization, coupled with an insufficient bonus amount, resulted in achievement of only 3815 IRR reenlistees in FY 1981. The program was not authorized for FY 1982 although experience gained during FY 1981 indicates excellent potential for retention of trained, experienced reservists in the IRR should the program be reinstated.

The Army will begin an IRR direct enlistment program in FY 1983. This program will provide for individuals to join the Army, attend initial entry training, and then either opt for service on active duty or in the Selected Reserve, or return to the IRR to complete their service obligation. A modest enlistment bonus is proposed for this program. Extended IRR service would require some periodic refresher training to retain skill proficiency.

The discontinuance of the IRR reenlistment program prior to the start up of the direct enlistment program, coupled with the transfer of the MOBDES to the Selected Reserve during FY 1982, will limit growth in IRR strength during FY 1982. Actual and projected strengths of the IRR as of the end of FY 1981 are shown below:

	<u>IRR</u> (000s)	
<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
212.9	212.0	242.4

(3) Inactive National Guard (ING). ING strength will continue modest growth as a result of attrition management by the Army National Guard. Actual and projected strengths of the ING as of the end of FY 1981 are shown below (does not include training/pay category L):

	<u>ING</u> (000s)	
<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
8.9	14.3	15.4

(4) Standby Reserve. The strength of the Standby Reserve is being managed to place the optimum number of eligible reservists in the Ready Reserve. Starting in 1978, enlisted personnel were no longer automatically transferred from the IRR to the Standby Reserve when they completed the fifth year of their military service obligation. During 1981, officers in the Standby Reserve were screened to transfer eligible officers to the Ready Reserve. Actual and projected strengths of the Standby Reserve as of the end of FY 1981 are shown below:

<u>Standby Reserve</u> (000s)		
<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
5.0	0.8	0.8

(5) Recalled Retirees. Upon mobilization, Regular Army retirees and members of the Retired Reserve who match mobilization requirements would be recalled. As both the data base on recallable retirees and the requirements are refined, the number of retirees that could be recalled and used during mobilization has increased. The number of retirees planned for recall in the event of mobilization is shown below:

<u>Retirees</u> (000s)		
<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
80	100	100

(c) Pretrained Individual Manpower Management and Training

In the event of mobilization large numbers of pre-trained individuals are required to augment active and reserve component units as well as to provide casualty replacements until inductees can be trained. Management of the Individual Ready Reserve is the foundation from which this pretrained manpower will be provided. Improved management of the IRR is intended to improve mobilization responsiveness by having personnel identified, located, and screened for availability to meet PIM inventory objectives. Management also encourages IRR participation by offering training opportunities in Active, Guard, and Reserve Units; school attendance and participation in exercises and other training activities to insure proficiency in mobilization skills.

C. Civilian Component

1. Manpower Requirements and Trends

The Army seeks the best use of its military, civilian, and contract labor manning to support mission accomplishment. Army policy has

been to use civilians or cost-effective contract services rather than military personnel except where prohibited by law or where military personnel are required for training, discipline, rotation base, or combat effectiveness. Reductions of Army civilian manpower to meet budgetary constraints have made this policy difficult to implement.

For FY 1981, actual civilian end strength, which included 226 temporaries for Cuban Refugee Support and 536 summer hires, was 372,111. The authorized level for FY 1981 was 372,533, which included a one-year restoral of 1,900 spaces for Commercial Activities based on inability to contract out. While the direct hire, full-time permanent employment level was 289,156 or 544 below the adjusted authorization of 289,700, total direct hires exceeded authorizations by 2,734. The FY 1982 civilian strength is currently budgeted at 383,259. This level represents an increase over the FY 1981 level to reduce Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM) to acceptable levels based on current projections for end FY 1982 and to increase near-term readiness. The FY 1983 civilian strength is currently budgeted at 386,444. To continue the initiatives of the FY 1982 program without major staffing difficulties, these additional 3,185 civilian spaces are required for FY 1983.

Civilians are an essential component of the total Army force. They provide vital support for readiness, sustainability, and mobilization capabilities in such areas as intelligence, communications, research and development, training, administration, medical, logistical, and reserve component support. The bulk of installation operations, essential depot maintenance, and distribution of equipment is performed by civilians in support of the peacetime, mobilization, and wartime Army mission areas. Current Army data indicate that there are reduced capabilities in these areas due to a combination of funding constraints and anticipated civilian manpower ceiling constraints. These shortfalls not only reduce support of near-term readiness but also may have an adverse impact on the ability of the Army to carry out its peacetime mission and transition to war, if required.

In the past, the Army often accommodated inadequate civilian personnel programs by making across-the-board reductions in authorized hiring levels. When this was done, the reductions generally flowed to the lowest operational level in the structure--the point at which they could not be passed on to subordinate activities. At this level, base operations functions absorbed the largest share of personnel reductions without corresponding reductions in the required level of support and services. These reductions were absorbed without any apparent impact for an obvious reason: the local tactical unit commander filled validated requirements by diverting troop labor to do the jobs.

The FY 1981 Budget Supplemental and FY 1982 Budget Amendment recognized and addressed the need to eliminate this historical problem of borrowing military manpower. In this budget some programs have been adjusted internally to retain the FY 1982 improvements. The readiness

of our forces mandates the retention of our available soldiers in their units for training and mission accomplishment.

Real program growth, force structure initiatives, and modernization over the next five years will create additional demands for civilians in selected areas despite productivity and contracting initiatives. Further, additional civilian manpower will be required to meet mobilization needs.

2. Civilian Position Management. In efforts to enhance effective manpower management and to reduce or conserve labor costs, the Army undertook several initiatives to improve position management and to prevent overgrading of civilian positions.

The Army continues its "stop grade escalation" policy that requires commands to monitor average grade trends against FY 1979 levels to ensure that increases are fully justified. In addition, grade reduction targets for ten occupations have been established that require review of positions to validate grade levels or to correct positions improperly graded.

Civilian Personnel Regulation 501(C6) and Army Regulation 690-500-501(C3) provide commanders guidance on more aggressive position management actions. Army's leadership in position management was recognized by the General Accounting Office in its report to the Congress, "Employment Trends and Grade Controls In The DoD General Schedule Work" (28 July 1981).

Army implemented a biennial survey of civilian positions that requires an intensified review of grade accuracy and effective position management. Two Office of Personnel Management classification reviews of departments and agencies have recognized that over 91 percent of Army grades were found accurate in the 1979 review (overall rate of the Executive Branch departments was 85 percent). In the 1981 review, Army grade accuracy was 90.7 percent, substantially higher than the overall Executive Branch rate. Army success in maintaining standards results from effective training of supervisors and managers in job classification and effective support by position classification specialists.

### 3. Civilian Mobilization Manpower Requirements

The Army bases its plans for military force build-up, deployment, employment, and sustainment--and, thus, its projected military manpower requirements--on the assumption that an adequate civilian work force will be available when needed to accomplish the Department of Defense generated work load. Executing many contingency operations, particularly those involving the mobilization of all or part of the Reserves, will require the "mobilization" of additional civilian employees to bring the civilian work force up to the levels required by the conflict scenario.



Before M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower is represented by the peacetime authorized civilian work force. The FY 1982 civilian strength is currently budgeted at 383,259. On M-Day, the termination of peacetime activities that are not required in wartime and the assumption of some wartime activities by military manpower reduce the theater of operation requirement for civilian manpower. Concurrently, the worldwide (non-theater of operation) requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with the mobilization activities of the total military force structure. Accordingly, on M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower surges drastically to 534,000. After M-Day, the requirement further increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for employment/deployment. By M+10 days the requirement reaches 557,000 and remains at that level until M+60 days, whereupon the requirement increases to 576,000 and continues to rise incrementally, peaking at 579,000 at approximately M+120 days.

On M-Day, the only component of civilian manpower supply is the peacetime work force. With a FY 1982 peacetime civilian strength of about 383,000, there would be an immediate shortfall of 151,000 on M-Day. This shortfall would be compounded, almost immediately, by the loss of borrowed military manpower as well as civilian employees subject to call-up as reservists, retired military, and draftees. To alleviate this problem of double counting, the Army is screening individuals who hold critical civilian positions in the Federal government who are also members of the Ready Reserve and is examining the problem with respect to preassigned retired personnel. Even with emergency hiring authority and favorable labor market conditions, it would be impossible to meet the initial shortfall between peacetime strength and the requirements on M-Day. One way to reduce this gap is to increase the peacetime civilian strength to the number required to meet current and projected peacetime needs. The Army's currently programmed FY 1987 civilian end strength of 390,484 leaves a shortfall on M-Day of about 144,000 (less any savings as a result of contracting out, increased productivity, Defense Retail Interservice Support, or other management efficiencies).

Army's plans for offsetting the shortfall in civilian manpower after M-Day include using (1) approximately half of the 20,000 civilians evacuated from overseas, (2) individuals pre-recruited as National Emergency Standby Reserves and members of the National Defense Executive Reserve, and (3) immediately available new-hires provided by local public employment offices in response to pre-positioned recruitment requests. Additionally, the Army is studying the possibility of using its retirees to further reduce the civilian manpower mobilization shortfall. Simulated recruitment conducted during PROUD SPIRIT/MOBEX 80 indicated that approximately 68,000 positions could be filled by M+5 days through means other than using evacuees from overseas. Assuming the additional resource of approximately 10,000 evacuees and based on FY 1983 end strength, at M+5 days the total civilian strength would be about 464,000. The shortfall, at that time, in the peak

civilian mobilization manpower requirements of 579,000 projected for M+120 days would be about 115,000. This shortfall could be met by filling an average of 6,800 positions per week. To minimize mobilization shortfalls, the Army must have its civilian manpower ceiling raised to fully support its peacetime mission of preparedness.

D. Commercial Activities (CA) Program. The CA Program implements OMB Circular A-76. That implementation requires the review of all commercial activities in the Army. Those activities that are not required to be performed in-house (i.e., by Government employees) are to be subjected to rigorous cost comparison with contractors in the private sector of our economy to determine the most cost-efficient method of performance. After this comparison is made, the activity either converts to contract or remains in-house, based on the cost comparison outcome.

In the past three fiscal years approximately 62 percent of the spaces cost studied were contracted out as shown below.

Civilian Spaces Contained in CA Decisions

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Spaces Studied</u>	<u>Final Decisions</u>		
		<u>Remain In-House</u>	<u>Convert to Contract</u>	<u>Percentage Contracted</u>
1979	705	264	441	63%
1980	3,291	993	2,298	70%
1981	<u>2,103</u>	<u>1,056</u>	<u>1,047</u>	50%
Total	6,099	2,313	3,786	62%

The cost studies completed in FY 1979 through 1981 resulted in cost advantages to the Government over a three-year period of \$110.7 million, returned 1,337 soldiers to military duties, eliminated all borrowed military manpower previously used in those activities, and released 3,786 civilian spaces for other Army initiatives. In addition, those activities that remained in-house had to streamline and operate in this more efficient mode. For these reasons, pursuing the Commercial Activities Program aggressively is in the Army's best interest.

Recent significant accomplishments within the CA Program include:

- Developing prototype Performance Work Statements (PWS). Thirty-four PWS have been distributed to the field and 15 more are in the development stage.
- Drafting a new Commercial Activities Army regulation that will be published and distributed to the field in March 1982.
- Developing Management Study Guidelines.
- Developing a Management Study Course at the Army Logistics Management Center at Fort Lee, Va.

The table below provides data on the CA cost study program for FY 1981 and the projected data for FY 1982 and FY 1983.

#### COST COMPARISON STUDIES

	Number of Studies	End Strength Contained in Studies			Number Converted or Expect to Be Converted to Contract				Projected Annual Cost Advantage to Government
		Civ	Mil	Total	Cost Studies	Civ	Mil	Total	
FY 1981									
(actual)	74	2,103	663	2,766	28	1,047	341	1,388	\$15.4 M
FY 1982	191	8,064	1,750	9,814	85	4,000	1,392	5,392	Unavailable
FY 1983	200	11,539	1,937	13,476	92	4,400	1,558	5,958	Unavailable

Although the CA program has had problems and has been the subject of a great deal of controversy, the Army has made significant strides in training of CA personnel and in bringing the benefits of the program to the attention of senior Army leaders. The experience and knowledge gained in the last few years allow the Army to be optimistic that the OMB mandate to review/cost study all CA by the end of FY 1985 will be met, and that many benefits will derive from execution of the program.

E. Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM). Since 1974, the Army civilian end strength has been reduced by approximately 50,000 without a concurrent reduction in work load. This history of insufficient civilian authorizations to meet Army manpower requirements has required commanders to divert or borrow soldiers from their assigned jobs primarily in tactical units to fill this work load shortfall.

Troop diversions are divided into two categories: BMM and other troop diversions. BMM are tactical soldiers used to perform base operation/installation support functions for which documented requirements exist but for which manpower authorizations or assigned personnel are lacking. These tasks are normally repetitive in nature and are of a long-term duration. "Other troop diversions" perform those other peacetime support tasks commanders determine must be accomplished but which are undocumented as requirements. A majority of these other troop diversions perform nonrepetitive, short duration tasks or tasks that may require some military experience to accomplish and thus could never be officially recognized as valid civilian requirements.

Within these general categories of troop diversions, a small portion of tasks directly contribute to soldiers developing skills associated with a particular MOS, do not detract from individual/unit readiness, and provide useful and necessary services for the entire military community. Examples of these functions include: finance and accounting clerks working in the finance office, unit medical personnel working in the base/installation hospitals, and ammunition storage specialists working in the post ammunition storage area. These jobs could be performed by civilians. However, in wartime these same type of jobs must be performed

by soldiers in a theater of operations. Therefore, unless soldiers perform these civilian-type functions in peacetime, they will not retain the skills necessary to be able to perform them in wartime. Nevertheless, the vast majority of BMM and other troop diversions perform tasks that adversely affect military readiness, both individual/unit training and mobilization/deployment capability. Individual/unit training and readiness suffer when soldiers are unable to maintain individual combat skills, particularly when they are required to perform tasks that are unrelated to their MOS or combat mission (e.g., the combat infantryman who works as a bus/truck driver or as a member of a building or utility repair team). Unit cohesion and efficiency are also affected by this constant turmoil of personnel. Upon mobilization diverted and borrowed soldiers would return to their units. The positions that these soldiers occupy will not be immediately filled by civilians which hampers the base operations support required for the augmentation and deployment of combat forces.

At the beginning of FY 1981, on an average daily basis, 26,000-28,000 soldiers were being used as troop diversions. Of this total, 12,000-14,000 met the BMM definition. Congress provided in the FY 1981 Budget Supplemental/FY 1982 Budget Amendment approximately 17,000 civilian spaces to reduce BMM/troop diversions, return soldiers to their units, and improve near-term readiness. The Army programmed these spaces to replace existing BMM/troop diversions that have the greatest impact on near-term readiness. The Army established formal guidelines to report and document this process. At the end of FY 1981, about 6,000 civilians were hired and 5,400 soldiers were returned to their units. In FY 1982, the Army estimates it will hire an additional 11,000 civilians to reduce further the remaining 7,800 BMM and those other 4,800 troop diversions that can be subsequently documented as valid civilian requirements. The Army provided to Congress on February 1, 1982 a full report on the use of the civilian increase.

F. Civilian Substitution Program. DOD and Army policy is to use civilian personnel in positions that do not require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, career progression, or combat readiness; that do not require a military background for successful performance of the duties involved; and that do not entail unusual hours not normally associated or compatible with civilian employment. There are two techniques that can be used to increase the effective use of civilians in lieu of military.

Civilian substitution retains the programmed military authorizations and end strength while increasing readiness through the conversion of military TDA positions to civilian positions and the assignment of released military personnel to other higher priority force structure needs.

Civilianization is the reduction of programmed military end strength, including accessions, by corresponding civilian increase through the conversion of military TDA positions.

While both programs increase civilian end strength, only civilianization reduces the military end strength. The Army supports civilian substitution not civilianization. Any reduction in military spaces will have an adverse effect on readiness, the rotation base, the mobilization base potential, and the training base.

The FY 1983 President's Budget contains a modest civilian substitution conversion program beginning with the conversion of 1,000 active military manpower positions in TDA units in FY 1983, 3,000 spaces in FY 1984, and 4,000 spaces in FY 1985-FY 1987. Civilian manpower to fill these spaces is programmed to be obtained from Commercial Activities Program savings of 4,400 civilian spaces in FY 1983 with additional savings anticipated in the outyears.

IV. Army Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

The following tables display Army manpower by DPPC for FY 1981 through FY 1983. Undermanning and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are also shown. Selected Reserve strengths throughout this chapter include reservists on full-time active duty for administration and training of the reserves.

ACTIVE ARMY MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>475.0</u>	<u>477.5</u>	<u>477.6</u>
Land Forces	<u>474.9</u>	<u>477.3</u>	<u>477.4</u>
Division Forces	(435.0)	(439.0)	(440.0)
Theater Forces	(39.8)	(38.3)	(37.3)
Mobility Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>24.2</u>	<u>24.4</u>
Intelligence	8.0	8.2	8.6
Centrally Managed Communications	9.8	9.9	10.0
Research and Development	5.4	6.0	5.7
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>175.2</u>	<u>173.7</u>	<u>172.7</u>
Base Operating Support	62.1	58.0	56.1
Medical Support	17.6	17.1	17.1
Personnel Support	13.4	13.2	13.1
Individual Training	40.4	41.6	42.1
Force Support Training	2.6	3.3	3.3
Central Logistics	7.5	8.4	8.5
Centralized Support Activities	21.9	21.6	21.8
Management Headquarters	9.6	10.5	10.5
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.2	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>674.1</u>	<u>675.9</u>	<u>675.2</u>
<u>Undermanning</u>		-3.8	-0.1
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>107.0</u>	<u>112.3</u>	<u>108.7</u>
Transients	26.0	27.7	28.3
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	7.6	7.3	5.1
Students, Trainees	68.9	72.8	70.8
Cadets	4.5	4.4	4.4
<u>Total</u>	<u>781.0</u>	<u>784.4</u>	<u>783.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

ARMY SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (ARNG)  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1982</u> <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1983</u> <u></u>
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>339.1</u>	<u>344.1</u>	<u>366.7</u>
Land Forces	339.1	344.1	366.7
Division Forces	(326.4)	(331.1)	(353.0)
Theater Forces	(12.7)	(12.9)	(13.7)
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	-	-
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>32.5</u>	<u>34.3</u>	<u>30.3</u>
Base Operating Support	17.6	18.0	19.1
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
Personnel Support	1.9	2.1	2.3
Individual Training	3.6	3.7	3.9
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	9.1	10.4	4.8
Management Headquarters	*	*	0.1
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>371.6</u>	<u>378.4</u>	<u>397.0</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>17.4</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>20.0</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	17.4	19.6	20.0
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>389.0</u>	<u>398.0</u>	<u>417.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

\* Fewer than 50 spaces.

ARMY SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (USAR)  
(End Strength in Thousands) \*\*

	FY 1981 Actual	FY 1982 FY 1983 Budget	FY 1983 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>156.7</u>	<u>162.9</u>	<u>172.9</u>
Land Forces	155.7	161.9	171.8
Division Forces	(142.5)	(147.2)	(156.0)
Theater Forces	(13.2)	(14.7)	(15.9)
Mobility Forces	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Intelligence	0.5	0.5	0.5
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>60.4</u>	<u>66.3</u>	<u>69.8</u>
Base Operating Support	4.3	4.3	4.3
Medical Support	6.0	6.5	8.4
Personnel Support	1.6	1.8	2.0
Individual Training	45.1	49.9	50.6
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	3.1	3.4	4.1
Management Headquarters	0.1	0.1	0.1
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>217.7</u>	<u>229.9</u>	<u>243.3</u>
<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees</u>	(7.0)*	8.6**	8.6
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>16.5</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	7.5	13.4	16.5
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>225.2</u>	<u>251.8</u>	<u>268.5</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

\* Non-add.

\*\* Included in Authorization request for the first time in FY 1982.



ARMY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	*	*	*
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	23.4	24.0	24.2
Land Forces	22.1	22.6	22.8
Division Forces	(21.1)	(21.3)	(21.7)
Theater Forces	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.1)
Mobility Forces	1.2	1.5	1.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	26.9	26.0	26.1
Intelligence	1.4	1.5	1.7
Centrally Managed Communications	4.4	4.3	4.3
Research and Development	21.0	20.2	20.1
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*
<u>Support Activities</u>	321.7	333.2	336.0
Base Operating Support	162.2	168.8	167.8
Medical Support	13.9	14.1	14.0
Personnel Support	7.7	8.2	8.4
Individual Training	11.4	11.8	12.1
Force Support Training	1.8	1.9	1.6
Central Logistics	79.2	81.1	84.4
Centralized Support Activities	32.0	31.9	32.6
Management Headquarters	13.5	15.2	15.2
Federal Agency Support	-	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>372.1</u>	<u>383.3</u>	<u>386.4</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

\* Fewer than 50 spaces.

A. Strategic Forces

1. Defensive Strategic Forces

Defensive Strategic Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

\* Fewer than 50 spaces

2. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1

B. Tactical/Mobility Forces

1. Land Forces

a. Division Forces

Division Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	435.0	439.0	440.0
Reserve Components			
ARNG	326.4	331.1	353.0
USAR	142.5	147.2	156.0
<u>Civilian</u>	21.1	21.3	21.7

Manpower is assigned to or in support of the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, regiments, and tactical support units.

The increase in active military in FY 1982 results from a combination of increases of 200 spaces to support the introduction of the M1 tank into the force structure, 1,100 to increase unit manning, 119 to activate a multiple launch rocket training battery, 1,050 to increase manning of Forces Command rifle companies, 547 to activate an intelligence support unit, and 1,817 to increase the manning of existing tactical support units (TSU) and the activation of new TSUs; and decreases of 600 to reduce manning of European divisions, 300 for combat service support restructures, and 300 for miscellaneous reasons.

The National Guard increases represent the net effects of force structure changes, change of manpower accounting from centralized support activities, and an increase in paid drill strength to support improved force readiness.

The USAR increases in FY 1982 and FY 1983 are a part of the increased total paid strength to improve readiness.

The civilian increase in FY 1983 is a result of a 1,000 space increase to tactical support forces and a decrease of 600 National Guard technician spaces converted to military.

The following table shows active and reserve combined arms organizations programmed for end FY 1983.

Combined Arms Organizations In Division Forces End FY 1983

	<u>Active Army</u>	<u>Reserve Components</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Divisions (Brigades)</u>			
Armored	4 (12)	2 ( 6)	6 (18)
Mechanized	6 (16)	1 ( 3)	7 (19)
Infantry	4 (10)	5 (15)	9 (25)
Air Assault	1 ( 3)		1 ( 3)
Airborne	1 ( 3)		1 ( 3)
	<u>16 (44)</u>	<u>8 (24)</u>	<u>24 (68)</u>
<u>Separate Combat Brigades</u> 1/ 2/			
Armored	1	4	5
Mechanized	1	9	10
Infantry	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>
	2	20	22
<u>Cavalry Brigade</u>			
Air Combat	1	0	1
<u>Cavalry Regiments</u>			
Armored	3	4	7

1/ Includes four reserve component separate brigades that round-out two light infantry and two infantry (Mech) divisions in the active component.

2/ Excludes the 33rd Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) provided for school support and three active and four reserve infantry brigades that are part of theater forces.

b. Theater Forces

Theater Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	39.8	38.3	37.3
Reserve Components			
ARNG	12.7	12.9	13.7
USAR	13.2	14.7	15.9
<u>Civilian</u>	1.1	1.2	1.1

Manpower is assigned to theater-wide and specialized units such as three active and four reserve component separate infantry brigades, and one scout group; certain supply, maintenance, and security activities in support of NATO; and theater-level psychological warfare and civil affairs units and related support.

The decrease of active military in FY 1982 results from the inactivation of air defense artillery batteries (200 spaces), realignment of military resources (600), and conversion of HAWK/Hercules to the replacement PATRIOT System (1,000). The decrease of active military in FY 1983 results from a realignment of military resources (100), restructuring actions for TSI/CSS units (700), and increases of 300 spaces to establish I Corps headquarters, and 300 to support tactical satellite communications systems.

The USAR and ARNG increases are part of the increase in paid drill strength to improve readiness.

The decrease in civilians in FY 1983 is for miscellaneous reasons.

2. Mobility Forces

Mobility Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2
Reserve Component			
USAR	1.0	1.0	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.5	1.4

Manpower included in this category supports CONUS ocean terminal operations, DoD traffic management and engineering services, and accountability and maintenance of the Defense Railway Interchange Fleet.

The civilian decrease in FY 1983 results from productivity improvements in the port terminal operations and traffic management areas.

C. Auxiliary Activities.

1. Intelligence

	<u>Intelligence Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.0	8.2	8.6
Reserve Components			
USAR	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.4	1.5	1.7

Manpower supports Consolidated Cryptologic Activities, the General Defense Intelligence Program, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

The increase in active military in FY 1983 is due to an increase of spaces in the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). Additional information is contained in classified budget support data provided to the appropriate congressional committees.

The increase of 200 civilian personnel in FY 1983 supports the NFIP.

2. Centrally Managed Communications

	<u>Centrally Managed Communications Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.8	9.9	10.0
<u>Civilian</u>	4.4	4.3	4.3

Manpower supports defense consolidated telecommunications and the worldwide command and control systems and excludes support of tactical units (included under Land Forces) and installations (included in Base Operations Support).

The increase in active military in FY 1983 results from increases to support the Defense Satellite Communication System Operations Centers, new communications systems, and the reorganization of CEWI units.

### 3. Research and Development Activities

#### Research and Development Activities (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.4	6.0	5.7
<u>Civilian</u>	21.0	20.2	20.1

Manpower directs contractor efforts and in-house programs in areas of basic and applied research and exploratory, advanced and engineering development.

The decrease in active military in FY 1983 is due to converting 166 meteorological support spaces and 55 other spaces from military to civilian.

The civilian personnel decrease in FY 1983 is due to miscellaneous changes which result in a net rounding decrease.

### 4. Geophysical Activities

#### Geophysical Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2
Civilian	*	*	*

\* Fewer than 50 spaces.

Manpower is assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency.

### D. Support Activities

#### 1. Base Operations Support

Base Operating Support Manpower  
Combat Installations  
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	24.1	24.8	23.9
<u>Civilian</u>	80.2	87.8	90.4

Manpower supports the Army's combat mission commands: US Army Europe, US Army Japan, Eighth US Army-Korea, US Army Forces Command, and the US Army Western Command.

The decrease in the active military in FY 1983 results from decreases of 121 in tactical support increment, 317 in the National Training Center, 227 for civilian substitution, 183 for contracting out, and 35 for miscellaneous reasons.

The increase in civilians in FY 1982 results from increases in real property maintenance (RPMA) to improve troop living and working conditions in Europe (600 spaces), Pacific (200 spaces), and CONUS (100 spaces); the hiring of 6,100 civilians to return borrowed military personnel to their units; a realignment of 200 spaces from management headquarters accounts; 2,000 spaces to improve base operations in forces command (FORSCOM); and a decrease of 600 spaces in CONUS base communications. The increase for FY 1983 is a result of an additional 2,200 space increase to improve base operations in FORSCOM, an additional 600 for RPMA in Europe, and a decrease in RPMA in CONUS of 600 spaces.

Base Operating Support Manpower  
Support Installations  
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	38.1	33.2	32.3
Reserve Component			
ARNG	17.6	18.0	19.1
USAR	4.3	4.3	4.3
<u>Civilian</u>	82.1	80.9	77.5

Manpower is for Army support-oriented commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, US Army Communications Command, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, US Army Military District of Washington, and US Army Health Services Command.

The decrease in active military in FY 1982 results from decreases of 428 to tactical support increment units; 921 to continued military support; 81 to commercial activities; 3,139 to differences between actuals and programmed for base operations (training); 375 to re-alignment between medical centers, station hospitals, and other health activities; and an increase of 416 for civilian substitution. The decrease in active military in FY 1983 results from 1,020 spaces contracted out and an increase of 125 physicians authorized.

The increase in ARNG in FY 1983 results from an increase in paid drill strength to support improved force readiness.

The decrease of 1,200 civilian personnel in FY 1982 is attributed to the FY 1982 contracting out program. The civilian personnel decrease for FY 1983 totals 3,400 spaces. Included are cuts because of contracting out commercial activities (-3,100), transfer of the Personnel Security Investigative Service to DLA (-100) spaces, and reduction to health care at station hospitals (-200 spaces).

## 2. Medical Support Activities

### Medical Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	17.6	17.1	17.1
Reserve Components			
ARNG	0.2	0.2	0.2
USAR	6.0	6.5	8.4
<u>Civilian</u>	13.9	14.1	14.0

Manpower supports all Army non-tactical health care activities.

Increases in US Army Reserve strength in FY 1983 are part of total increases in paid strength to improve readiness.

A civilian decrease of 100 in FY 1983 reduces the capability to provide health care to military personnel and other authorized recipients.

## 3. Personnel Support Activities



Personnel Support Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	13.4	13.2	13.1
Reserve Components			
ARNG	1.9	2.1	2.3
USAR	1.6	1.8	2.0
<u>Civilian</u>	7.7	8.2	8.4

Manpower is used in the US Army Recruiting Command, the Army Junior ROTC program, counterintelligence and investigative activities, Army personnel processing activities, and off duty education programs.

The decrease in active military personnel in FY 1983 is due to adjustments to recruiters and the institutional testing program.

The Army Reserve increase in FY 1983 reflects an increase in full-time recruiters to support increased paid drill strength.

Army National Guard increases are due to an increase in recruiting personnel to recruit the additional authorized drill strength and to aid in retention of experienced personnel who are approaching their expiration of term of service.

The civilian end strength increase in FY 1983 reflects increased human factors engineering support to new systems development (100 spaces) and increased support to the correctional systems program (100 spaces).

4. Individual Training Activities

Individual Training Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	40.4	41.6	42.1
Reserve Components			
ARNG	3.6	3.7	3.9
USAR	45.1	49.9	50.6
<u>Civilian</u>	11.4	11.8	12.1

Manpower supports the conduct of individual training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the student/trainee and cadets portions of the Individuals account.

The FY 1982 increase of 1,200 active military supports increased aviator production in both undergraduate and advanced pilot training (+200 spaces), expanded one station unit training program (500 spaces), and the training of people to man new weapon systems and equipment coming into the force structure (500 spaces). The FY 1983 active military manpower increase of 500 spaces provides for the training of additional reserve component aviators, Selective Reserve and IRR direct enlistment people, and people to man new systems that are entering the force structure.

Reserve component strength increases reflect part of the total increases in paid drill strength to improve readiness.

The increase in civilian personnel in FY 1983 is a combination of an increase of 300 spaces to support the training of people to man new systems coming into the inventory and a decrease of 70 spaces at the Military Academy as a result of contracting out functions and non-appropriated fund employee conversions.

5. Force Support Training Activities

Force Support Training Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.6	3.3	3.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.8	1.9	1.6

Manpower supports the Army's Jungle Warfare School in Panama, the Northern Warfare Training Command in Alaska, and the Seventh Army Training Center in Germany.

The decrease in civilians in FY 1983 is due to decreased training support work load.

# 6. Central Logistics Activities

## Central Logistics Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.5	8.4	8.5
<u>Civilian</u>	79.2	81.1	84.4

Manpower in this category serves in supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities worldwide, with the largest strength concentration in the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command and United States Army Europe.

The increase in active military in FY 1983 is a result of an increase of 135 spaces to support logistically the introduction of new systems into the force structure.

The civilian personnel increase in FY 1982 is a result of a combination of increases of 900 to support the construction planning and design for the MX missile program, 500 increase to depot maintenance, 200 to support new systems logistically; and a decrease of 300 spaces as a result of contracting out commercial activity functions. The increase in civilians in FY 1983 is a result of increases to the MX program of 1,500 and 1,800 to support new systems coming into the force structure.

# 7. Centralized Support Activities

## Centralized Support Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.9	21.6	21.8
Reserve Components			
ARNG	9.1	10.4	4.8
USAR	3.1	3.4	4.1
<u>Civilian</u>	32.0	31.9	32.6

Manpower supports joint and international activities (less management headquarters), combat development, counterintelligence reserve activities, public affairs, personnel administration, criminal investigations, OSD activities, and foreign military sales.

The increase in active military in FY 1983 is a result of an increase of 214 spaces to support the combat development of new systems.

The ARNG decrease in FY 1983 is a result of a change in manpower accounting. The manpower is now accounted for in Division Forces.

The USAR increases support the overall increase in paid strength.

The increase in civilians in FY 1983 reflects increases in administrative support in Europe (300), foreign military sales support (130), and combat development of new systems (100).

#### 8. Management Headquarters Activities

##### Management Headquarters Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.6	10.5	10.5
Reserve Component			
ARNG	*	*	0.1
USAR	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	13.5	15.2	15.2

\* Fewer than 50 spaces

Manpower is assigned to defense agencies, international military organizations, unified commands, service support-combat commands, and service support-support commands.

The increase in active military in FY 1982 is a result of additional organizations being defined as departmental staff support in accordance with a revised DoD directive. These spaces were formerly accounted for in other personnel categories.

#### 9. Federal Agency Support Activities

Federal Agency Support Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.1	0.2	0.2
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.2	0.2	0.2
Civilian	-	*	*

\* Fewer than 50 spaces.

Manpower is assigned to DoD and non-DoD agencies in support of various functions. Assignments are normally on a reimbursable basis unless they support the mission of DoD.

E. Undermanning

Undermanning  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active		-3.8	-0.1

Undermanning is the number of spaces in the force structure (units) that are not filled primarily because of the seasonal or cyclic nature of gains and losses.

The reason the force is more undermanned at the end of FY 1982 than FY 1983 is that the Army plans to bring in more new accessions than usual early in FY 1983, which will both reduce the end year impact on the training base and provide more soldiers to man units at year-end.

F. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Reserve Components			
USAR	7.0 <sup>1/</sup>	8.6	8.6

<sup>1/</sup> Program created at beginning of FY 1982; 7,028 MOBDES transferred to Selected Reserve on October 1, 1981.

The IMA program will permit rapid fill and increased operational capability of active Army units in an emergency. Personnel will be assigned to active unit wartime-required positions not authorized at peacetime levels of organization. IMAs will be available under the President's authority to mobilize units and members of the Selected Reserve (100,000 call-up). The 1,600 personnel increase in FY 1982 provides for mobilization readiness and training for individual reservists.

#### G. Individuals

The Individuals accounts are estimates of manpower required for transients, holdees (patients, prisoners, separatees), trainees, students, and US Military Academy cadets.

##### 1. Transients

#### Transients Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	26.0	27.7	28.3

Transient strengths are based on the projected levels of non-prior service accessions; separations; retirements; and operational, rotational, and training moves.

The military increase in FY 1982 and FY 1983 provides the increased transient spaces to support the reduction in the European tour length to 18 months for unaccompanied first term three-year enlistees.

##### 2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

#### Patients, Prisoners and Holdees (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.6	7.3	5.1

The 2,100 decrease in FY 1983 is the result of applying the Dropped From Strength (DFS) instructions in DoDI 1120.11.

### 3. Trainees, Students, Cadets

#### Trainees, Students, and Cadets (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Trainees/Students	68.9	72.8	70.8
Cadets	4.5	4.4	4.4
Reserve Component Trainees/Students			
ARNG	17.4	19.6	20.0
USAR	7.5	13.4	16.5

Active military and reserve components increases are a reflection of the increased trainee strength needed to permit the extension of initial entry enlisted training from seven to eight weeks, as well as increased accessions who are still in training at the end of FY 1981 to support the FY 1982 strength increase. The decline in the account from FY 1982 to FY 1983 is due to new accessions being brought in earlier in the year, reducing the end year impact on the training base.

IV NAVY



CHAPTER IV  
NAVY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

I. Introduction

A. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes the Navy's manpower requirements for FY 1983. These requirements derive from the force structure required to accomplish Navy missions within the scope of the national political and military strategy.

The Navy requests resources for active military, reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1983 and FY 1984 as follows:

<u>Navy Manpower Requirements</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>		
Active	569.2	581.3
Active-duty Reserve <sup>1/</sup>	12.0	12.6
Drilling Reservists and Trainees	92.7	92.3
IMAs-(Pay Category A)	.5	.8
(Pay Category D)	.6	.7
<u>Civilian</u>	299.9	299.6

<sup>1/</sup> Includes nearly 12,000 active-duty Reservists in the Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) program and 200 active-duty officers assigned to billets pursuant to Section 265, U.S. Code, Title 10. Prior to FY 1983, TARs were included in the active category.

B. Major Force Structure Changes

As explained in Chapter II of this report, the Navy developed a new methodology for counting ships during the past year, to display force assets in terms of whether the ships were "Battle Force" or "Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support," according to their relative combat readiness. The new method categorizes ships as follows:

Total Battle Forces

- Strategic Forces
- Battle Forces

- Support Forces
- Mobilization Category "A"

Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support

- Auxiliaries and Sealift
- Mobilization Category "B"

1. Total Battle Forces. In FY 1983, the Battle Forces will be 535 ships, an increase of 21 from the previous year. Of the FY 1983 number, 40 will be in the Strategic Forces, an increase of one from FY 1982 as a new TRIDENT is commissioned. Mobile logistic ships and support ships in the Strategic Forces will remain at four and two, respectively, for both years.

Battle Force ships will grow from 421 to 437 between FY 1982 and FY 1983. The number of carriers in this category will remain at 13 in both years, but a net gain of 11 surface combatants will occur during FY 1983. Ten new frigates, one destroyer, and one guided-missile cruiser will come from new construction, and a battleship will be reactivated from decommissioned status.

Four FF-1052 Class frigates will transfer from Battle Forces into Mobilization Category "A," when they enter the Naval Reserve Forces in FY 1982, and two more frigates will follow in FY 1983.

Attack submarines will gain four new SSN-688 vessels from new construction but will lose one older SSN, leaving the net total at 99 in FY 1983. Five new patrol combatants will be added during FY 1982, for a total of six. Amphibious warfare ships will increase from 59 to 60 between FY 1982 and FY 1983, with the redesignation of one AGF to LPD configuration. Mine warfare ships in the Battle Forces category will remain at three during both years, but mobile logistics ships will increase from 51 to 52, with commissioning of a fleet oiler.

The number of battle support forces will increase by two vessels, from 43 to 45, with the commissioning of a destroyer tender and one Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force ship.

Mobilization Force Category "A" ships increase by a net of two ships, with the aforementioned transfer of two FF-1052s in FY 1983.

2. Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces. These force levels remain at 22 ships during both years. Mobilization Forces Category "B" falls from 33 to 24, with the decommissioning of nine ships.

3. Naval Aviation Forces. A total of 81 Navy active and reserve tactical squadrons will be operating during FY 1982 and 83 in FY 1983. There will be 48 active and reserve fixed-wing antisubmarine patrol squadrons in both FY 1982 and 1983. The Navy will continue to operate 23 helicopter squadrons (21 antisubmarine, two light attack) during both years. Major growth will occur in the Navy's aviation forces in FY 1983 when the new carrier VINSON (CVN-70) is delivered, requiring addition of the Navy's thirteenth air wing.

## II. Manpower Requirements Determination

### A. Manpower Management Systems

1. Operating Forces. Operating force manpower requirements are determined through the Navy's Ship and Squadron Manpower Document systems.

The Ship Manpower Document (SMD) program identifies manpower requirements for individual ships, predicated on ship configuration, computed work load, required operational capabilities, and projected operational environment. It determines the level of manpower essential to the operation, maintenance, and support of a ship under stated conditions of readiness. The SMD program covered 92 percent of all ships at the end of FY 1981, with coverage to continue at that level during FY 1982.

The Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) program documents requirements for aviation squadrons, based on manpower staffing standards that relate work load to the operating tempo defined in the Required Operational Capability and Projected Operational Environment statements. Initial documentation has been completed for all active-duty aviation squadrons. The SQMD program schedule provides for annual updates of Fleet Readiness Squadrons and certain miscellaneous squadrons, with biennial updates for all other squadrons.

2. Shore Support Establishment. The Shore Requirements, Standards, and Manpower Planning System (SHORSTAMPS) determines requirements for military and civilian manpower in the shore support establishment. By the end of FY 1983, SHORSTAMPS will cover approximately 48 percent of the shore establishment; 35 percent is presently covered. Future coverage goals are as follows:

	<u>Percent of Coverage</u>	<u>Number of Spaces Covered (000s)</u>
FY 1983	48	256.8
FY 1984	55	294.2
FY 1985	62	331.7
FY 1986	68	363.8
FY 1987	70	372.3

3. Manpower Requirements and Hardware Procurement (HARDMAN). The Military Manpower/Hardware Integration (HARDMAN) Development Program has completed the fourth year of a seven-year development effort. The principal objective of this program is to integrate manpower, personnel, and training fully into weapons system design and acquisition.

Application of HARDMAN tools and methodologies to systems currently in the Weapons System Acquisition Process is in progress. In addition, a HARDMAN methodology has been developed to identify MPT requirements during the concept phase of system design. This methodology is being applied to the Undergraduate Jet Flight Training System (VTXTS), Guided Missile Destroyer (DDGX), LSD-41, and Advanced Lightweight Torpedo (ALWT). In FY 1982, the methodology will be extended to the Submarine Advanced Combat System (SUBACS) Program. A Training Requirements Determination Methodology (TRDM) also has been developed.

4. Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS). The Navy Manpower Mobilization System is used to plan and program reserve manpower. The system defines and identifies full mobilization manpower requirements, quantitatively and qualitatively. NAMMOS requirements are reviewed annually with regard to specific functional categories, changes in the scenario and force structure, mobilization training requirements, and impact of host-nation support agreements. When the review is completed, it is possible to evaluate whether the existing Naval Reserve inventory (Selected Reserve plus Pretrained Individual Manpower) is staffed--quantitatively and qualitatively--to meet the projected mobilization requirements.

5. Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). The Wartime Manpower Planning System is a DoD-wide data base for computing, compiling, projecting, and displaying military and civilian wartime manpower requirements and supply. WARMAPS estimates of Navy wartime manpower requirements and assets are based upon a set of policies and assumptions consistent with the Navy Manpower Mobilization System. The Department of the Navy uses WARMAPS data to prepare and review manpower mobilization plans, the Program Objectives Memoranda (POM), budget estimates and justification, Congressional reports and testimony, and responses to Congressional and other inquiries.

#### B. Manpower Management Improvements

The goals of the Navy's manpower and personnel management system are maximum personnel readiness, maximum manpower cost effectiveness, and career satisfaction for military people and their dependents. Initiatives seek to enhance recruiting, training, education, development and use of people, family well-being, and appropriate compensation. Navy management emphasizes respectable quality-of-life benefits to encourage retention.

The human dimension of military service is highly pertinent to the recruitment, discipline, morale, job satisfaction, retention, and readiness of military members. The Quality of Life (QOL) program is designed to show service members that the Navy is committed to "taking care of its own."

1. Voluntary Education. Opportunity to improve educationally is a significant factor in attracting quality recruits. Educational programs provided by civilian colleges and universities offer an important in-service quality-of-life benefit for Navy people. The Navy's voluntary education program, Navy Campus, served 20 percent of the total active-duty force in FY 1981. Over 100,000 Navy men and women participated in high-school completion, certificate, and college-degree programs during off-duty time. Some of these pursued vocational or academic programs on board ship under the Program for Afloat College Education (PACE).

2. Family Service Centers. Twenty years ago, 30 percent of Navy people were married. Today, about 55 percent of them are married, with more than 650,000 primary dependents. Family Service Centers (FSCs) are designed to improve support services by providing comprehensive assistance in response to the changing and increasing needs of married and single people--needs that if left unsatisfied will negatively affect retention. The centers (twenty-two are funded in FY 1982.) will bring about better coordination and use of existing family-related resources; serve as an information, referral, and follow-up system; provide direct assistance via short-term personal and financial counseling; and support command-sponsored personnel programs. The FSC program is scheduled for continued expansion throughout the 1980s, with 62 centers programmed by FY 1984.

3. Child-Care Programs. In the past, the primary user of Navy-operated child care centers was the traditional family: husband in the Service and wife in the home. Recent years have seen considerable growth in other family types needing child care, such as dual-career (and dual-military-career) couples and single parents. Frequently, the civilian community cannot meet the child-care needs of the Navy population. Expanding child-care service through low cost, quality child-care programs has become an important Navy objective.

4. Temporary Additional Duty (TDY) for House Hunting. A TDY house hunting policy was instituted in July 1981 to offset temporary living costs and reduce the instability associated with a change of duty. This program allows service members with permanent change-of-station orders up to five working days of administrative absence to locate housing in the new duty area. Space-available travel on government carriers is authorized for house-hunters. Several disparities still exist between treatment of civilian government employees and military personnel on government-ordered transfers; military people suffer an inequitable out-of-pocket cost for relocation expenses and real estate costs. TDY house hunting, in conjunction with the temporary lodging expenses reimbursement that will take effect on April 1, 1982, is a step toward comparability.

5. Shipboard Habitability Program. Shipboard habitability is one of the strongest and most direct influences on morale, performance, and retention. Improvements to living conditions on board ship have received increased priority and funding since FY 1979. Conditions during

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overhaul have been given particular attention. Retention declines when crewmembers must remain on board ship in spaces made uninhabitable by industrial work during overhaul. The Navy is improving overhaul accommodations through rehabilitation and construction of berthing craft and government quarters, and reimbursement for non-government quarters.

### III. Significant Program Highlights

#### A. Active

1. Manpower for a Growing Navy. FY 1983 continues significant expansion of the nation's naval forces. Substantial growth is programmed in the numbers of ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, bringing increased requirements for manpower. Beginning in FY 1983 and continuing throughout the remainder of the decade, the Navy must expand its manpower resources to support and operate the growing fleet depicted in Figures IV-1 and IV-2.

As can be seen in Figures IV-3 and IV-4, active-duty manpower requirements will increase comparable to growth of ship and aircraft forces. The keys to meeting the increased manpower requirements for active military are improved continuation rates, better retention, and sustained recruiting.

# TOTAL BATTLE FORCE SHIPS




FIGURE IV-1

# TOTAL PAA AIRCRAFT-USN

FY72-FY87





FIGURE IV-2



# OFFICER MANPOWER PROFILE

FY72 TO FY87



— INVENTORY  
- - - AUTHORIZATIONS


FISCAL YEAR

FIGURE IV-3

NOTE: INCLUDES FULL-TIME  
ACTIVE-DUTY RESERVISTS  
("TARS")

# ENLISTED MANPOWER PROFILE

FY72 TO FY87



— INVENTORY  
- - - AUTHORIZATIONS

FISCAL YEAR

FIGURE IV-4

NOTE: INCLUDES FULL-TIME  
ACTIVE-DUTY RESERVISTS  
("TARS")

The Navy plans to man the expanded fleet with volunteers. Compensation and career satisfaction remain the most desirable and effective way to obtain the quantity and quality of personnel needed for the 1980s and beyond. Increased pay and bonuses, together with improved training, living conditions, and family services, can make a Navy career attractive.

Planning for active military support of a growing Navy is based on a combination of related factors:

- Significant increases in continuation and retention rates, based on past compensation improvements plus periodic cost-of-living adjustments, to keep military pay levels competitive with civilian opportunities.
- Successful recruiting of approximately 12,000 prior-service enlisted veterans per year.
- Accession of non-prior-service enlisted personnel at annual rates in excess of 90,000.
- Moderate increases in the number of women in the Navy (within the constraints of Section 6015 of U.S. Code, Title 10).

The Navy's various inventory projection models repeatedly predict that it can achieve required end strengths under these planning factors. Economic considerations are the major factor, as demonstrated by modeling and confirmed by actual experience. Compensation issues are central to meeting expanding Navy manpower requirements; this requirement is true for civilians and members of the Selected Reserve as well as for active-duty personnel.

To meet the Navy's expanding manpower needs only in numbers is not enough; manning a growing naval force has a qualitative dimension as well. The types of skills required depend on the composition of the naval force to be manned.

The distribution of military manpower during the expansion period reflects the growth not only in the number of ships and squadrons but also in the support elements of the force. Figures IV-5 and IV-6 depict the growth profiles for officers and enlisted, as currently programmed. The right-hand column shows growth planned for each of four categories over the seven-year period ending in FY 1988. The specific figures may change as a result of annual budget decisions; however, the general proportions should remain relatively stable.

As can be seen in Figures IV-5 and IV-6, the bulk of the added active-duty manpower is programmed for ships and squadrons (over 60 percent of enlisted additions, nearly 49 percent of officer). Increasing the number of ships and aircraft dictates increases in support activities as well. Support requirements (base operating support, personnel support, individual training, logistics, etc.) account for approximately 18 percent of the enlisted and 12 percent of the officer

OFFICER GROWTH DISTRIBUTION  
(000'S)

	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FYs</u> <u>82-87</u>
• SHIPS/SODNS	23.1	23.9	24.6	25.5	26.2	26.4	+3.3
• INTELL/R&D/COMM GEOPHYSICAL	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	+ .2
• MEDICAL/TRNG/ PERS SPT/LOG	30.4	31.6	32.0	32.9	32.8	33.0	+2.6
• INDIVIDUALS	<u>10.5</u>	<u>11.3</u>	<u>11.5</u>	<u>12.3</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>+1.9</u>
TOTALS	67.2	70.1	71.4	74.1	74.8	75.2	+8.0

NOTE: INCLUDES FULL-TIME ACTIVE-DUTY RESERVISTS ("TARS"), EXCEPT FOR THOSE IN  
BILLETTS PURSUANT TO 10 U.S.C. 265

FIGURE IV-5

ENLISTED GROWTH DISTRIBUTION  
(000'S)

	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FYs</u> <u>82-87</u>
• SHIPS/SODNS	262.2	271.8	279.1	286.5	293.3	294.9	+32.7
• INTELL/R&D/COMM GEOPHYSICAL	19.9	20.2	20.3	20.5	21.0	21.2	+1.3
• MEDICAL/TRNG/ PERS SPT/LOG	121.4	125.4	128.2	132.1	131.2	130.7	+9.3
• INDIVIDUALS	<u>77.7</u>	<u>89.0</u>	<u>90.2</u>	<u>90.8</u>	<u>90.1</u>	<u>90.2</u>	<u>+12.5</u>
TOTALS	481.3	506.4	517.8	529.8	535.6	537.0	+55.8

NOTE: INCLUDES FULL-TIME ACTIVE-DUTY RESERVISTS ("TARS")

FIGURE IV-6

growth. This category includes a significant number assigned to man the fleet readiness squadrons to support the thirteenth air wing. Relatively small increases will occur in intelligence, research and development, communications, and geophysical activities (approximately 3 percent of both officer and enlisted additions). The growth in students, transients, and trainees reflects the numbers necessary to keep undermanning of fleet units at a minimum. In the past, the Navy has reported undermanning at levels of 11,000 to 12,000 annually because of inadequate numbers programmed for transients and students.

One problem facing the Navy during the expansion period is the shortage of mid-grade surface, submarine, and air warfare officers of the Unrestricted Line. As can be seen in Figure IV-7, inventory lagged below authorizations throughout the 1970s. Recent improvements in compensation and quality of service life have helped stem the outflowing tide of junior and mid-grade officers; however, the Navy cannot enjoy for some years a complete recovery from the mid-grade shortages that reached critical proportions as the 1970s ended. The inventory curve in the figure reflects the improved continuation in senior grades and improved retention in junior grades experienced recently and assumes that cost-of-living raises and currently funded bonus plans will continue throughout the 1980s. Officer recruiting and retention during the FY 1983 budget cycle are covered in detail later in the chapter.

The Navy has indicated that the ceilings imposed by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) on the number of officers the Navy may have in grades 04 through 06 are too restrictive (Figure IV-8). The argument is that the numbers do not take into account recent improvements in officer retention or the need for additional field-grade officers to meet the requirements of an expanding Navy. The Navy's requirements are being evaluated in terms of promotion flow points and opportunities, and legislation may be submitted later if the results of the evaluation indicate that relief from the DOPMA constraints is necessary.

As with the officer community, the Navy's enlisted force is faced with current manpower shortages, particularly among trained petty officers who constitute the vital supervisory and skilled experience necessary to fleet operations. As seen in Figure IV-9, the inventory of the Navy's "Top-Six" petty officers (pay grades E-4 through E-9) has lagged below authorized strength throughout the 1970s, with the worst shortfalls only now being corrected. Continued attention to compensation issues and quality-of-life improvements will help ease the problem, reducing the petty officer shortfall to approximately 8,000 by the end of FY 1987.

The problem has a qualitative as well as a quantitative dimension. Certain occupational specialities--that is, Navy ratings--suffer greater shortfalls. These are the "critical ratings" vital to the operation of ships and aircraft. Career force inventories in many of these ratings currently lag 10 to 25 percent (and in some cases more) below requirements; as a result, sea-to-shore rotation for these sailors must be adjusted, keeping people at sea for unacceptably long periods.

SUMMARY OF URL WARFARE INVENTORY VS AUTHORIZATIONS  
LT, LCDR, CDR-FY72 TO FY87




FIGURE IV-7

DOPMA CEILINGS VS INVENTORY, REQUIREMENTS AND AUTHORIZATIONS  
84-86 AGGREGATE BY FISCAL YEAR




FIGURE IV-8


The Navy's ability to expand the personnel inventory is due in large measure to compensation legislation passed by the 96th and 97th Congresses. Petty officer growth is also dependent on increasing skill-specific incentives available in the current pay structure, such as the Selective Reenlistment Bonus. The Navy's FY 1983 manpower program seeks to provide for petty officer inventory needs cost effectively, while addressing shortfalls in specific critical skills. Congressional support is needed for these planned targeted incentives as well as a sound foundation of basic pay and benefits.

Expansion of the Naval Reserve is integral to expansion of the Total Force Navy. Increases in Selected Reserve manpower will be distributed among the four categories previously discussed for active duty officer and enlisted, as seen in Figure IV-10. As with the active-duty forces, the bulk of additional end strength in the Selected Reserve is programmed for assignment to ships and squadrons and the forces necessary to support them.

Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of the Navy's manpower resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees are directly related to readiness posture. Over half of the Navy's civilians work in industrial fund activities, which are primarily engaged in depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, missiles, and associated equipment. Many of the civilians perform essential readiness support in supply centers, ship repair facilities, and air stations. The remainder of the Navy's civilians provide vital support in training, medical, engineering, development, and acquisition, all of which have a longer-range effect on readiness. The Navy civilian end strength for FY 1983, 299,900, reflects a profile that is essentially level over the budget period of FY 1981 to FY 1983. This includes growth for expanded activity related to readiness, especially in Naval Shipyards, Air Rework Facilities, SupShips, ordnance, industrial research, fleet activities, and central supply activities. These increases are offset by budgeted economies and efficiencies, primarily from contracting and a proposal to convert commissary store jobs from civil service to non-appropriated fund employee positions. Figure IV-11 illustrates the current plan for civilian manpower resources during the period through FY 1987, reflecting the increase in contracting.

# ENLISTED SUMMARY

## TOP-6 INVENTORY VS AUTHORIZATIONS



— INVENTORY  
- - - AUTHORIZATIONS

FISCAL YEAR  
FIGURE IV-9

NOTE: INCLUDES FULL-TIME  
ACTIVE-DUTY RESERVISTS  
("TAP'S")

## SELECTED RESERVE GROWTH (000'S)

	FYs						
	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	82-87
• SHIPS/SQDNS	65.1	63.4	62.4	61.0	62.3	64.5	- .6
• INTELL/R&D/COMM GEOPHYSICAL	5.0	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.3	5.5	+ .5
• MEDICAL/TRNG/ PERS SPT/LOG	22.3	23.4	24.5	25.9	26.9	27.8	+5.5
• INDIVIDUALS	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	.9	.9	- .1
TOTALS	93.4	93.3	93.2	93.1	95.4	98.7	+5.3

FIGURE IV-10

## 2. Enlisted

a. Enlisted Recruiting. The Navy achieved its "One Navy" recruiting goal in FY 1981, a 6,971 increase in total accessions over FY 1980. Total new contracts declined in 1981, however, and the Navy had to draw down the Delayed Entry Pool to obtain the required accessions. September 1981 was the twenty-second consecutive month in which the Navy attained its recruiting goal. The Navy has had noteworthy success in the prior-service market, as well as in achieving qualitative goals. The 12,314 prior-service veterans recruited in FY 1981 represented a 26.8 percent increase over FY 1980 levels. Navy veterans, of whom 77.2 percent were petty officers available for immediate assignment to the fleet, accounted for 74 percent (9,054) of the prior-service accessions. With respect to quality, the Navy exceeded its target of 72 percent non-prior-service (NPS) male high-school diploma graduates (HSDG) by 1.7 percent and its 60 percent NPS male Mental Group I-IIIU goal by 4.2 percent. The Navy was 0.1 percent below its 13 percent NPS male Mental Group IV ceiling, and all MG IV recruits were high-school diploma graduates. The MG IV attainment was well under the Congressionally mandated ceiling for FY 1983 of 20 percent MG IV NPS males.

The Navy's recruiting success in FY 1981 is attributable to adequate resource allocation, sound management, and the national economic situation. However, the FY 1981 success should not trigger undue optimism. While the Navy anticipates achieving its FY 1982 and FY 1983 goals, as shown in the Enlisted Strength Plan table on page IV-16, recruiting activities may be strained. This will occur if the economy improves and civilian employment opportunities increase. The declining proportion of young males will intensify competition for quality youth.

In addition to the projected decline in market size and expected improvement in the national economy, another pivotal indicator signals future recruiting obstacles: the status of the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) pool. In FY 1981, the Navy's new contracts declined: 105,162 total new contracts were written in FY 1981, compared to 108,114 in FY 1980. As a result, the Navy experienced a significant drawdown in the DEP pool. A large DEP is an invaluable aid to recruiters. Consequently, the Navy is programming personnel and fiscal resources to provide for continued attainment of annual accession goals, increasing the DEP to approximately half the objective requirements. This initiative will make possible attainment of Navy manpower needs through more efficient recruiting and should lead to improved accession quality, reduced attrition, and lower replacement and training costs.

Improved retention due to the raise in FY 1982, the anticipated yield from the Navy's Selective Reenlistment Bonus program, and conditions in the national economy caused fewer people to leave the Navy than anticipated. Consequently, the FY 1982 "One Navy" accession goal has been reduced, as shown in the Enlisted Strength Plan table on page IV-16.



The Navy is improving its quality goals for MG I-IIIU NPS males by increasing the goal from 60 percent in FY 1981 to 62 percent in FY 1982, and by reducing its MG-IV ceiling from 13 percent in FY 1981 to 12 percent in FY 1982. This adjustment is expected to yield 73 percent NPS male HSDGs, instead of the 72 percent expected in FY 1981. This should result in improved quality, satisfying the twofold Navy quality criterion of trainability, as measured by Mental Group, and survivability, as measured by Mental Group, HSDG status, and age. Additionally, the Navy plans to increase the Delayed Entry Program by 5,943 in FY 1982 and by 5,188 in FY 1983. This adjustment will recover losses to the DEP experienced in FY 1981 and will help recruiters accommodate improvements in the economy and the declining youth market. Budgeting essential resources to the recruiting effort is critical to attaining these goals.

Enlisted Strength Plan  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>		<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>		
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
<u>End strength</u> (000s):	470.8	470.2	485.6	506.4 (10.6 TARs)
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service:	12,232	12,314	11,307	12,000
Non-Prior Service:	91,998	91,998	82,011	93,994 (726 TARs)
Male	81,926	81,926	73,629	83,546 (640 TARs)
HSDG	58,987 (72)	60,394 (73.7)	53,749	60,989 (461 TARs)
MGI-IIIU	49,156	52,587 (64.2)	45,650	51,799 (397 TARs)
Female	10,072	10,072	8,382	10,448 ( 86 TARs)
HSDG	9,065 (90)	9,350 (92.8)	7,544 (90)	9,403 ( 77 TARs) (90)

Retention (by percent)

First Term	44	41.7	47	47
Second Term	52.3	56.9	67	67
Third Term	94	94.1	98	98

b. Enlisted Retention. Retention improvement is the cornerstone of the Navy's program to man a growing force. The Navy made substantial progress in FY 1981 in retaining experienced people, improving retention for all three terms of service. For the second term, the Navy exceeded its goals, although first-term retention fell short. Optimistic but obtainable retention goals have been programmed for FY 1982 and 1983, based on Congressionally authorized compensation improvements in FY 1981 and FY 1982 and the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program. The key to future success in retention is continued Congressional support for pay comparability in FY 1983 and beyond, coupled with additional compensation adjustments commensurate with the Navy's unique problems (for example, SRB program needs). Without these initiatives, the Navy's ability to man a growing force will be severely constrained.

c. Enlisted Attrition. First-term attrition increased in FY 1981 (to 10.4 percent) for the first time in three years, because of a special discharge program used to eliminate marginal performers. If the figures resulting from that program had been excluded, end-of-year attrition would have been 8.9 percent, a lower rate than in FY 1980.

d. Enlisted Desertion. The desertion rate continued to decline in FY 1981 for the fourth consecutive year, but remains unacceptably high at 21.7 percent. However, the 19-percent improvement over FY 1980 indicates efforts to correct the desertion problem are having a positive effect.

### 3. Officers

a. Officer Accessions. Active officer procurement goals and attainment for the FY 1983 budget period are as follows:

	<u>Active Navy Officer Procurement Goals</u>		
	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Plan	7,297	7,619	8,499
Actual	7,714		

Accessions to the Navy officer corps come from regular and reserve officer commissioning sources. Most regular officers are commissioned from the US Naval Academy (USNA) and the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC). In FY 1981, the USNA and NROTC supplied 842 and 741 officers, respectively.

The Navy also recruits officers via reserve officer programs. Naval reserve officer recruiting in FY 1981 resulted in more accessions than in any previous year since commencement of the All Volunteer Force. Continued emphasis on officer recruiting, improved training, and an uncertain economy were factors in the Navy's achieving 100 percent (4,767) of its FY 1981 reserve officer goal.

For comparison, Navy achieved 90 percent of its officer recruiting goal (3,789 of 4,333) in FY 1980 and 86 percent of goal (3,266 of 3,794) in FY 1979. The additional 1,364 officer accessions for FY 1981 came from recalls, direct procurement, and commission of enlisted.

Despite the success in meeting overall officer requirements, the Navy continued to experience a shortfall in recruiting Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidates (NUPOCS) in FY 1981. Although 23 percent of officer recruiter assets were dedicated solely to the NUPOC program, only 318 applicants were recruited, against a goal of 384. However, the Navy is becoming more competitive with civilian industry entry-level salaries for engineers, mathematicians, and science majors, as a result of recent Congressional actions such as the nuclear accession bonus. Such initiatives are expected to improve NUPOC program recruiting in FY 1982.

Recruiting surface warfare nuclear power officers has become as difficult as recruiting submarine nuclear power officers. In FY 1981, recruiters attained only 54 percent (56 of 103) of the surface warfare nuclear power requirement. As a result, the NUPOC program was expanded to include surface warfare nuclear power officers near the end of FY 1981. Extending the nuclear power accession bonus to surface warfare nuclear power trainees also should improve FY 1982 goal attainment.

The following data portray the Navy's relative success in officer accessions by program:

Major Officer Program Attainment  
(Percent)

Program	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate	46	44	49
Nuclear Power Instructor	29	31	57
Aviation Officer Candidate	102	97	104
Naval Flight Officer Candidate	47	102	105
Surface Warfare Officer	100	91	103
Supply Officer	102	90	104
General Unrestricted Line	93	105	102
Civil Engineer Corps Officer	32	79	101
Physicians	70	77	141
Nurses	100	100	100

Future goals for officer programs remain high. However, as long as military compensation initiatives continue to keep Navy careers competitive in the national economy, the economy improves at no more than its projected rate, and adequate resources are devoted to the effort, the prognosis for future Navy officer recruiting is favorable.

b. Officer Retention. FY 1981 marked an improvement in overall retention among officers. Retention progressed toward required levels in the aviation and surface warfare communities and remained at a healthy level for naval flight officers. However, the submarine community remains a source of significant concern. An encouraging retention indicator is that total officer resignations decreased by 474 in FY 1981.

Most encouraging is the improvement in pilot retention. In the past fiscal year, pilot retention rose to 42 percent, from 30 percent in FY 1980. The upward trend is largely attributable to increased compensation, particularly the Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) that took effect on July 1, 1981. Eighty-five percent of pilots and 94 percent of Naval Flight Officers in the retention-critical sixth through ninth years of service have applied for the bonus; 69 percent (2,346) have made four-year commitments. As successful as the AOCP program has been, a shortage of 2,350 aviation officers (pay grades O-3 through O-5) remained at the end of FY 1981. The bonus program is essential through FY 1987 to correct the pilot shortages.

Steady improvement in Surface Warfare officer retention has occurred over the last two fiscal years. However, a subcategory of the surface community, the surface warfare nuclear power officers, is experiencing significant retention problems in addition to its recruiting difficulties. The surface nuclear power community claimed only a 33 percent retention rate in FY 1981, and projections for FY 1982 are much worse. Private-sector demand for this group has been difficult to overcome.

Submarine officer retention (33 percent in FY 1981) continues to be a major problem. Although retention was higher than originally projected for FY 1981, the Navy's submarine community ended the year with a shortage of 1,040 officers. Extended sea tours and the ready market in civilian nuclear industry for their expertise combine to draw many of these officers from naval service. However, the number of submarine officer resignations submitted in FY 1981 was down 71 from the previous fiscal year. The direct result is that the number of years a submarine officer must spend at sea during the first 20 years of service decreased from 15 to 14.

The following data show relative success in retention among the Navy's Unrestricted Line communities.

Unrestricted Line Officer Retention Rates  
(Percent)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>Steady-State</u> <u>1/ Goal 1/ 2/</u>
Surface Warfare	31	39	42	47	52
Surface Nuclear	50	42	33	22	45
Pilot	31	30	42	45	57
Naval Flight Officer	60	71	65	68	50
Nuclear Submarine	42	36	33	37	45

NOTES

1/ Projected rates as of October 26, 1981

2/ The rate required to maintain the size and experience mix of the officer corps. Relatively high rates are required to make up current shortages of mid-grade officers.

Improving retention will be critical throughout the 1980s and will remain the central manpower focus. The improved FY 1981 rates are an important beginning in alleviating officer shortages and enabling force structure expansion. The Navy will require 8,600 more officers by FY 1987. These requirements can be attained through the synergetic effects of sustaining competitive pay levels and the Navy's continuing focus on retention issues.

4. Navy Women. FY 1981 marked steady progress toward reaching the Navy's goal of 45,000 enlisted women and 6,400 female officers on active duty by FY 1985.

In FY 1979, the Navy's Enlisted Women's Utilization Study developed a methodology for determining the maximum number of women that could be used effectively without adversely affecting sea/shore rotation Navywide and still provide a career path and upward mobility for the women. The study showed that the Navy can use about 45,000 enlisted women and projected that goal would be reached in FY 1985. It also projected end strengths for the interim years, as shown below.

End Strength: Enlisted Women

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
FY 80 Plan	-	29,806	35,423	39,349	41,950
FY 81 Plan	-	29,806	33,605	36,672	40,027
Actual	5,723	29,806	34,348	-	-
Percentage of all Navy enlisted	1.1	6.7	7.3	7.6	7.8

The study was updated in March 1981 and, while the end strength goal of 45,000 remains the same, the interim years were adjusted down somewhat to provide for a more realistic growth pattern. The Navy exceeded the revised FY 1981 goal by 743 women, as the number of enlisted women on active duty rose from 29,806 (6.5 percent of the active-duty enlisted force) to 34,348 (7.3 percent).

Progress also continued during FY 1981 to increase the number of enlisted women in non-traditional skills (occupations other than medical, administration, and service).

Enlisted Women  
Traditional/Non-traditional Skills

	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Traditional	11,623	12,829	14,660	17,496
Percentage	56	52	49	51
Non-traditional	4,173	5,389	6,521	7,762
Percentage	20	22	22	22
Non-designated	5,141	6,633	8,625	9,090
Percentage	24	26	29	26

Thus far, the Navy generally has been able to recruit and retain the number of women it requires in non-traditional skills, and migration from non-traditional to traditional jobs has not been a problem. However, for the Navy to reach its goal of 45,000 enlisted women, it must be able to recruit and retain women in the non-traditional skills; this task will become increasingly difficult as the numbers of women in the traditional skills reach maximum levels.

Growth was also attained in FY 1981 in the number of female officers:

End Strength: Female Officers

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Planned End Strength	-	4,730	5,117	5,680	5,946
Actual End Strength	3,185	4,877	5,345	-	-
Percentage of Navy Officers	4.3	7.7	8.2	8.5	8.6

As these figures show, the number of female officers increased by 468 between FY 1980 and FY 1981, exceeding the plan by 228. As a proportion of all officers, women improved, from 7.7 to 8.2 percent. The current goal for female officers is 6,400 by the end of FY 1985. This goal is based on studies of each officer community, which have determined the number of women who can be used given current legal constraints on their assignment.

Navy policy is to employ women to the fullest extent possible, assigning them to legally acceptable jobs commensurate with their expertise and capabilities. Under the provisions of Section 6015, of the U.S. Code, Title 10, the Navy may not assign women permanently to ships or aircraft having a combat mission. Consequently, 13 of the Navy's 100 enlisted occupational specialties are closed to women because these are found almost exclusively on board combat ships and aircraft. Because of their combat relationship, two officer communities, Submarine Warfare and Special Warfare, also are closed to women. However, women are assigned to non-combat ships and to aircraft in force support and training squadrons and are now deploying regularly to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific. Beginning in FY 1982, women will also be assigned to Diego Garcia.

As of the end of FY 1981, 1,458 enlisted women were on board 17 ships, compared to 694 on board 10 ships in FY 1980. In FY 1980, 120 female officers were serving in 27 ships; by the end of FY 1981, the number had risen to 150 on 29 ships. Current plans call for 5,000 enlisted women and 190 female officers to be at sea by FY 1985. The number of women in aviation also continued to increase last year. At the end of FY 1981, 49 women were pilots versus 39 in FY 1980, and the first woman had been designated as a naval flight officer. About 15 percent of enlisted women were in aviation occupations.

B. Reserve

1. General. The Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) states the Selected Reserve (SELRES) manpower requirement at 113,406 for

fiscal year 1983. At the present strength level, Naval Reserve Force combat ships and squadrons will be manned at 88 percent of requirements, combat service support at 78 percent, and other support activities as low as 73 percent. Figure IV-12 shows programmed SELRES growth (excluding TARs) and the NAMMOS requirement.

Congress has appropriated funds to support a strength of 94,000 for FY 1982. A Selected Reserve unit strength of 92,740 will be requested for FY 1983 and 92,440 for FY 1984. The FY 1983 authorization request will also include 500 pay category A and 550 pay category "D" personnel in the expanding Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program, 11,828 TAR personnel on active duty for full-time support of the Naval Reserve, and 210 other active-duty reservists assigned to headquarters billets in accordance with Section 265 of the U.S. Code, Title 10, bringing the total personnel request for the Naval Reserve to 105,828.

The IMA program increase of 230 occurs in a new medical program to meet support requirements of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The 964 increase in the number of reservists on full-time active duty in support of the Naval Reserve is primarily the result of the expansion of the program associated with the transfer of several FF-1052 class frigates to the Naval Reserve Force.

The Navy will request a slight increase in the number of TARs for FY 1984, which will bring the total reserve personnel request to 106,515. The distribution of SELRES strength among the force structure was shown in Figure IV-10.

Although the request appears to constitute a significant increase in people for the Naval Reserve, the major portion of the apparent growth is the result of a change in funding source and associated accounting procedures for TAR personnel. Before FY 1983, the Navy funded and accounted for these personnel (with the exception of the approximately 200 who were assigned to headquarters billets in accordance with Section 265 of U.S. Code, Title 10) as active-duty personnel. In response to Congressional direction, TARs will be funded from the Reserve Personnel, Navy (RPN) appropriation beginning in FY 1983.



# CIVPERS SUMMARY

(000'S)




FIGURE IV-11

# SELECTED RESERVES




FIGURE IV-12

### Reserve Component Authorization Request

<u>Inactive duty</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Selected Reserve Units and trainees	93,440	92,740	92,440
IMAs (Pay Category A) (Pay Category "D")	352	500 550	800 650
<u>Active duty</u>			
TARs <sup>1/</sup>	--	11,828	12,415
AGR <sup>1/</sup>	208	210	210
<u>Total Selected Reserve</u>	94,000	105,828	106,515

<sup>1/</sup> Members on active duty in support of Guard and Reserve, in accordance with 10 USC 265.

2. Enlisted Retention. To analyze retention within the Selected Reserve, it is important to review retention data for those people who have been affiliated with a unit for less than one year separately from that for those who have been affiliated for more than one year. Many Selected Reservists are non-obligors who may cease to participate at any time. The breakdown by length of affiliation allows the gaining units to direct special retention efforts toward newer enlistees.

### Retention by Percent

<u>Affiliated</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 81</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Less than one year	75	78.4	75	75
More than one year	80	84.2	85	85

3. Incentive Programs. Two bonus programs are presently employed to upgrade enlisted quality in the Selected Reserve:

- Reenlistment Selected Reserve: A bonus of \$900 or \$1,800 for either a three-year or six-year reenlistment of SELRES personnel with fewer than nine years of service.
- Selective Affiliation for Selected Reservists: A bonus directed toward active personnel in the "4X6" program, who entered the Navy under an enlistment agreement requiring a total six-year obligation, the first four years of which are served on active duty. These people are eligible for a bonus if they affiliate in the Selected Reserve at a point between 4 and 5 1/2 years of initial obligated service. The individual payment equals \$25 for each month of remaining obligated service.

One bonus program that proved particularly effective in retaining Reservists in the IRR expired September 30, 1981. Because of its success rate (an average of 100 reenlistments per month), the Navy supports its reinstitution in FY 1983.

4. Officers. Local commands conduct Naval Reserve officer recruiting. Accessions are limited, since the number of Reserve officers exceeds the number of available SELRES billets, requiring officers to enter units on a one-out/one-in basis. Retention data are not available for prior years. Collection has been initiated, and these data should be available early in FY 1983.

5. Introduction of KNOX Class Frigates. In connection with the FY 1981 Appropriations Act, the Congress directed certain changes to the Naval Reserve Force mission, ship manning, ship maintenance, and ship operation.

The plan calls for introduction into the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) of twelve KNOX-Class (FF-1052) frigates by the end of FY 1986. Four ships will be phased in during FY 1982; two more will be introduced each year for fiscal years 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. As the FF-1052s are brought into the NRF, the remaining NRF FRAM destroyers (1940s era ships) will be decommissioned according to a schedule that will maintain a combined NRF destroyer/frigate force level of at least eight ships. Generally, a FRAM destroyer will not be decommissioned earlier than the second anniversary of its last overhaul.

Since the active-duty manning of the ships is to be reduced to 50 percent of the total crew, a portion of the maintenance requirement will be transferred from the ships to co-located Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities-Naval Reserve Maintenance Facilities (SIMA(NRMFs)). Therefore, supporting the NRF frigates will require an increased SIMA (NRMF) capability. Most of the people recruited for the surface TAR program (which is being expanded to accommodate TAR manning of 50 percent of the active-duty crew billets on each ship) will perform their shore-duty tours at the SIMA(NRMF)s. Additional civilian billets will be required to manage the increased contractor support for these ships that will result from the reduced active-duty manning.

The Chief of Naval Reserve (CNAVRES) will assume responsibility for overseeing preparation of employment schedules and approving NRF frigate operating schedules. He will also share responsibility for developing the ships' readiness training programs for the combined active/Selected Reserve crews. CNAVRES also will monitor material and personnel readiness of the ships, as well as their funding. Operating tempo of the NRF ships will be limited to the level necessary to ensure proper crew training, operational reliability, and safety.

The key elements of this plan assign the Naval Reserve an increased role in the Navy's wartime antisubmarine warfare mission and provide the NRF with assets to augment wartime escort forces. The plan

increases the authority of the Chief of Naval Reserve to ensure that NRF frigates are responsive to reserve readiness training for mobilization. The plan further involves the Naval Reserve to a much greater degree in the role of fleet operations through the expanded use of TAR and Selected Reserve personnel in both the NRF frigates and supporting SIMA(NRMF)s.

### C. Civilian

1. End Strength. The FY 1983 Navy civilian end strength request of 299.9 thousand reflects an essentially level profile over the budget years FY 1981 to FY 1983. This level of stability will allow civilian end strength growth of about 9.8 thousand for expanded readiness-related activity, primarily in Naval Shipyards, Naval Air Rework Facilities, SupShips, Ordnance, industrial research, fleet, and central supply activities. These increases are offset by decreases of about 8.9 thousand, resulting from budgeted economies and efficiencies such as contracting out of various commercial functions and a proposed conversion of jobs at commissary stores from civilian service employees to non-appropriated fund employees. The Navy is making a concerted effort to accelerate the commercial activities review program, and realize projected efficiencies by performing commercial industrial functions on the most economical basis, either in-house or on contract. Accordingly, the FY 1983 budgeted end strength reflects additional initiatives in contracting-out of various commercial functions and a proposed conversion of jobs at commissary stores from civil service employees to non-appropriated fund employees. The Navy is making a concerted effort to accelerate the commercial activities review program and realize projected efficiencies by performing commercial industrial functions on the most basis, either in-house or on contract. Accordingly, the FY 1983 budgeted end strength reflects additional initiatives in contracting-out, with further contracting-out programmed for the outyears. The resulting civilian end strength represents a realistic program that provides for essential readiness increases, while reflecting a strong commitment to increasing economies and efficiencies.

2. Compensation. The Navy reports difficulty recruiting entry-level engineers, because of the disparity between Federal and private-sector entry-level salaries. The private sector now pays annual salaries averaging \$4-5,000 more to these people. A DoD task force is investigating this problem.

Congressional action to raise the pay cap effective January 1, 1982, provides immediate and significant temporary relief to problems of executive-level pay compression. Over the past three years, the pay cap on senior executive-level salaries has had a dramatic negative impact on retention of retirement-eligible employees. This impact is evidenced by the large number of civilian executive vacancies that exist. Options to provide a much-needed permanent solution to the pay compression problem include discontinuing the link between Congressional and Executive Level II salaries, allowing annual adjustments in pay rates, and restructuring current benefits to compensate for the declining value of upper-level salaries.

#### D. Commercial Activities Program

The Navy strongly supports the Administration's effort to achieve significant economies and efficiencies throughout the Federal Government. This is especially critical within the Department of Defense, where substantial increases in material readiness are required to meet defense commitments. While the magnitude of those increases is such that a sizeable increase in total defense spending is required, the Navy has a responsibility to strive constantly to ensure that goods and services are obtained at the least cost to the taxpayer.

Under the Commercial Activities (CA) Program, the Navy is conducting cost studies of functions using OMB Circular A-76 procedures to determine whether those functions are more cost-effective when performed in-house or on contract. To date, results have been less than expected primarily due to a lack of trained personnel to develop performance work statements and conduct cost studies. For instance, in the FY 1982 President's Budget, the Navy assumed cost-effective conversion of 10,300 civilian positions. The FY 1983 President's Budget restored 5,100 of that end strength pending completion of cost studies. In FY 1983, cost-effective contracting of 6,900 additional positions is projected, including those deferred from FY 1982. The cumulative end strength reduction through FY 1983 is 12,100.

The Navy is taking aggressive action to improve accomplishment under the Commercial Activities Program. Trained people are now providing assistance in the review process, with efforts concentrating on large functions where performance work statements are applicable and large pay-offs possible. The Navy is also working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Office of Management and Budget to develop streamlined cost-comparison procedures to facilitate the review procedure and minimize the administrative burden, while permitting more accurate comparisons.

Two CA functions evaluated during FY 1981 at Naval Supply Center, Oakland, are good examples of the Navy's effort. The guard service function was retained in-house, at a savings of \$152,000 annually. Sixty-nine civilian personnel are involved in this function, which was placed in competition with a minority contractor on a small business set-aside basis. The data entry function at NSC Oakland was evaluated in open competition. In this case, a contractor was successful and has assumed the function; it previously was performed by 29 civilian personnel. The contracting-out will result in an annual savings to the government of \$125,000.

Cost Comparison Studies  
In House or Contract Decisions

<u>Number of Studies Completed</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Studies Planned</u>			<u>Number of Activities to be Converted to Contract</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Activities to be Converted</u>			<u>Projected Annual Cost Advantage to Government</u>
	<u>Civ.</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Total</u>		<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Total</u>	
FY 81: 18	330	17	347	7	0	152	152	\$866,000

Cost Comparison Studies Projected in Budget Estimate

<u>Number of Studies Completed</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Studies Planned</u>			<u>Number Estimated to be Converted to Contract</u>				
	<u>Civ.</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Activities</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 82: 400	16,000	800	16,800	150		7,421	0	7,426
FY 83: 500	16,000	1,200	17,200	270		6,892	0	6,892

IV. Navy Manpower Requirements By Defense Planning and Programming  
Categories (DPPC)

This section summarizes changes in Navy's manpower totals in terms of force and program changes resulting in year-to-year adjustments in overall Navy strength. The summary tables on pages IV-30 through IV-32 display Navy active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian manpower by DPPC over the period FY 1981 through FY 1983. Following these tables, each subcategory is discussed separately.

NAVY ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1981 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1982 FY 1983 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>18.8</u>	<u>18.8</u>	<u>19.7</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	17.4	17.2	17.9
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.4	1.6	1.8
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>245.0</u>	<u>267.5</u>	<u>270.4</u>
Land Forces	2.8	3.3	3.6
Tactical Air Forces	60.4	66.1	65.2
Naval Forces	181.6	197.7	201.4
Mobility Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>20.1</u>	<u>23.2</u>	<u>23.6</u>
Intelligence	7.2	8.0	8.4
Centrally Managed Communications	5.8	7.1	7.3
Research and Development	5.2	6.2	6.0
Geophysical Activities	2.0	2.0	2.0
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>145.9</u>	<u>152.2</u>	<u>150.4</u>
Base Operating Support	66.3	68.3	62.8
Medical Support	10.9	10.8	11.1
Personnel Support	7.7	7.8	8.4
Individual Training	26.6	28.5	29.5
Force Support Training	12.3	13.9	15.3
Central Logistics	6.3	6.8	7.0
Centralized Support Activities	6.3	6.4	6.6
Management Headquarters	8.5	8.7	8.5
Federal Agency Support	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>429.9</u>	<u>461.8</u>	<u>464.1</u>
<u>Undermanning</u>	-	-7.0	-7.0
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>110.3</u>	<u>98.4</u>	<u>112.1</u>
Transients	27.3	25.3	31.4
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	6.8	5.6	5.4
Students, Trainees	71.6	62.9	70.8
Cadets	4.6	4.5	4.5
<u>Total</u>	<u>540.2</u>	<u>553.0</u>	<u>569.2</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

NAVY SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983 <sup>1/</sup> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>57.0</u>	<u>64.7</u>	<u>67.7</u>
Land Forces	1.5	2.0	2.0
Tactical Air Forces	3.3	4.6	6.1
Naval Forces	51.3	56.8	57.7
Mobility Forces	0.9	1.3	1.8
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5.4</u>
Intelligence	3.8	4.2	3.9
Centrally Managed Communications	1.8	0.4	1.0
Research and Development	0.2	0.1	0.3
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.3	0.2
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>23.1</u>	<u>22.3</u>	<u>30.6</u>
Base Operating Support	9.4	6.4	13.3
Medical Support	3.4	4.5	6.8
Personnel Support	0.7	0.8	0.8
Individual Training	0.2	0.5	0.3
Force Support Training	0.8	0.6	0.6
Central Logistics	4.0	4.9	4.6
Centralized Support Activities	1.3	1.2	1.0
Management Headquarters	3.3	3.3	3.1
Federal Agency Support	*	0.1	0.1
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>86.5</u>	<u>92.4</u>	<u>104.1</u>
<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.6</u>
<u>Active Guard and Reserve</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	1.1	1.0	1.0
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>87.9</u>	<u>94.0</u>	<u>105.8</u>

1/ TARs are counted in the Selected Reserve beginning in FY 1983.

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

\* Fewer than 50.



NAVY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.9</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	1.6	1.7	1.8
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>6.6</u>	<u>6.7</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3
Naval Forces	0.7	0.8	0.8
Mobility Forces	5.9	5.6	5.7
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>33.3</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>33.2</u>
Intelligence	1.1	1.3	1.4
Centrally Managed Communications	1.5	1.6	1.6
Research and Development	29.6	29.5	29.1
Geophysical Activities	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>259.1</u>	<u>257.1</u>	<u>258.1</u>
Base Operating Support	77.3	75.5	70.1
Medical Support	3.7	3.5	3.4
Personnel Support	1.3	1.7	1.7
Individual Training	3.4	3.4	3.3
Force Support Training	1.6	1.6	1.6
Central Logistics	156.7	156.0	162.2
Centralized Support Activities	6.3	6.5	6.8
Management Headquarters	8.7	8.9	9.0
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>301.1</u>	<u>299.0</u>	<u>299.9</u>

Note: Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

\* Fewer than 50.

#### A. Strategic

The Strategic category includes nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces having the fundamental objective of deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, its military forces, bases overseas, and allies. The majority of Navy manpower in this category are associated with the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) System, including both SSBNs and their tenders. The TRIDENT program, strategic operational headquarters, and communication/ADP support are also included.

#### Navy Strategic Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	18.8	18.8	19.7
Reserve Components	.4	.4	.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.8	1.9

Navy Strategic manpower requirements remain nearly static from FY 1981 to FY 1982, because the gains associated with new TRIDENT pre-commissioning and commissioning crews are offset by the losses of SSBN crews whose vessels are being transferred to the General Purpose forces. The approximate 900 increase from FY 1982 to FY 1983 is due to commissioning and pre-commissioning crews, for new submarines and those completing overhaul.

Civilian manpower increases through FY 1983 directly support the TRIDENT program, principally at the Refit Facility in Bangor, Washington.

#### B. Tactical/Mobility

The Tactical/Mobility manpower requirements are those associated with conventional warfare forces and their operational headquarters and supporting units.

1. Land Forces. Navy Land Forces include doctors, chaplains, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians assigned to Marine Corps divisions, regiments, and air stations.

Navy Land Forces  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.8	3.3	3.6
Reserve Components	1.5	2.0	2.0

The growth in the Marine Corps in both FY 1982 and 1983 requires active-duty Navy manpower increases to continue the current level of medical and dental care.

2. Tactical Air Forces. The Tactical Air Forces subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; multipurpose aircraft carriers; and tactical air operational headquarters units.

Navy Tactical Air Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	60.4	66.1	65.2
Reserve Components	3.3	4.6	6.1
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3

Navy Tactical Air Force manpower requirements increase significantly during FY 1982. Almost 5,000 of the 6,000 increase are crewing requirements for aircraft carriers. This includes 1,225 to complete manning USS CARL VINSON, 1,100 to recrew USS SARATOGA, and about 1,000 new billets to complete the 13th Air Wing for VINSON, as well as to man other air squadrons. In FY 1983, the carrier FORRESTAL will enter the Service Life Extension Program, resulting in a decrease of 1,350 active military manpower. However, that decrease will be more than offset by a continuing general build-up of forces in Tactical Air category. The apparent decrease of approximately 900 active manpower in FY 1983 is due to an accounting shift; these are TAR personnel, who are now included in Reserve Components.

The significant difference in Reserve manpower between FY 1981 and FY 1982 was a result of the inability to man units recently established to augment aircraft carriers. Twelve hundred of the increase of 1,500 between FY 1982 and FY 1983 is due to the accounting change for TARs; the other 300 are to improve manning in the multi-purpose carriers.

3. Naval Forces. This subcategory includes manpower for anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and support forces. It is the largest subcategory of active military and Selected Reserve manpower in the Navy. Naval Forces include virtually all ship manpower requirements except the fleet ballistic missile manpower in the Strategic category and the carrier manpower in Tactical Air Forces.

Naval Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	181.6	197.7	201.4
Reserve Components	51.3	56.8	57.7
<u>Civilian</u>	0.7	0.8	0.8

The Navy is improving fleet manning to bring manpower up to authorized levels, with improvement particularly evident in the 16,000 increase from FY 1981 to FY 1982. Included in this figure are more than 3,500 billets to man new surface combatants. In the submarine community, FY 1982 gains from new 688-Class SSNs and from conversions of SSBNs are cancelled out by losses from a retiring tender.

Of the 3,650 increase in FY 1983, 2,800 will man new surface combatants. The submarine community will require an additional 800 men in FY 1983 for new 688-Class SSNs.

Increased manpower funding allows an increase of 5,500 Selected Reservists between FY 1981 and FY 1982, which will allow strengths in many categories to grow closer to NAMMOS requirements. However, increases in active-duty ship/squadron billets in FY 1983 reduce the Selected Reserve requirements by 2,400. Thirty-three hundred TARs are shown in the reserve increase.

The civilian increase in FY 1982 reflects minor adjustments primarily in the Ship Support Improvement Program, which provides increased intermediate maintenance support.

4. Mobility Forces. This subcategory includes Navy strength for airlift and sealift capability, plus port terminal and traffic management operations.

Navy Mobility Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.4	.4	.4
Reserve Components	.9	1.3	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	5.9	5.6	5.7

Active Navy manpower requirements in this category increased slightly during FY 1982 to keep pace with fleet manning levels. There will be little increase during FY 1983.

Similarly, the 500 increase in Selected Reserve manpower between FY 1982 and FY 1983 represents enhanced manning.

Civilians in this category are the mariners who operate ships of the Military Sealift Command. The mariner decrease in FY 1982 represents a reduction in the number of ships scheduled for operation during the year. Civilian mariners increase in FY 1983 due to an increase in NFAF ships.

C. Auxiliary Activities

The Auxiliary Activities category includes manpower associated with Department of the Navy programs under centralized DoD control. These programs include Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development, and Geophysical Activities.

1. Intelligence. This category includes strength for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities within the Department of Defense (the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), including intelligence communications).

Navy Intelligence Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u> <sup>1/</sup>			
Active	7.2	8.0	8.4
Reserve Components	3.8	4.2	3.9
<u>Civilian</u>	1.1	1.3	1.4

1/ Totals do not include military personnel in combat-related intelligence units.

The 800 increase between FY 1981 and FY 1982 is due in part to seasonal undermanning at the end of FY 1981 and in part to SHORSTAMPS-generated requirements. The 400 increase in FY 1983 is due primarily to operational mission increases at several activities world-wide.

The 300 decrease in Selected Reserve Manpower between FY 1982 and FY 1983 results from additional active-duty personnel at intelligence support activities.

Civilian manpower increases support various intelligence-related activities.

2. Centrally Managed Communications. This subcategory includes strength associated with the Defense Communications System, internal Navy communications requirements, satellite communications systems, communications security, and other related communications units.

Navy Centrally Managed Communications  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.8	7.1	7.3
Reserve Components	1.8	0.4	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.6	1.6

The 1,360 billet increase for active military requirements in FY 1982 is the difference between the actual end strength as of September 1981 and the authorized end strength for the current fiscal year, which is being increased to meet expanded fleet communications needs. The further increase for FY 1983 is due to a continuing increase at numerous Navy communications sites.

The decrease in Selected Reservists between FY 1981 and FY 1982 is attributable to a shift to increased employment of satellite communications. The increase of 600 Selected Reservists from FY 1982 to FY 1983 is a result of funding mandated by the Congress.

The civilian increase in FY 1982 is largely due to filling vacancies in previously authorized and approved positions.

3. Research and Development. The Navy's R&D community comprises headquarters, laboratories, RDT&E project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices. The bulk of manpower is attached to R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, involving land, sea, air, and undersea operations. Work is performed at 31 Navy RDT&E installations, including 8 medical laboratories and 12 industrial fund facilities.

Navy Research and Development Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.2	6.2	6.0
Reserve Components	0.2	0.1	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	29.6	29.5	29.1

The decrease of 200 active duty manpower in this category for FY 1983 is due to minor reductions service-wide.

The increase of 200 Selected Reserves from FY 1982 to FY 1983 is a result of the overall increased funding level.

The majority of the civilian manpower reductions in both FY 1982 and FY 1983 are related to anticipated contracting-out in accordance with OMB Circular A-76 procedures. The FY 1983 adjustment includes an increase of approximately 300 civilians associated with improving industrial capability of research laboratories.

4. Geophysical Activities. The Navy's geophysical programs include the Naval Observatory and various oceanographic and meteorological activities. These employ professional meteorologists, oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians, engineers, and technical specialists, directed by a small headquarters staff.

Navy Geophysical Activities Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.0	2.0	2.0
Reserve Components	0.2	0.3	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	1.1	1.1	1.1

D. Support Activities

The Support Activities category includes strength associated with base operating support for combat and support installations. Also included are medical and personnel support; individual and force-support training; logistics, management headquarters, and federal agency support; and other centralized support activities.

1. Base Operating Support (BOS). Manpower in the BOS subcategory provides operation and maintenance of installations for both combat and support forces. Base Operating Support for combat forces covers strategic, tactical, and airlift and sealift commands, including base communications and air traffic control. Support forces BOS includes auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands.

Navy Base Operating Support Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	66.3	68.3	62.8
Reserve Components	9.4	6.4	13.3
<u>Civilian</u>	77.3	75.5	70.1

Active Navy manpower in this category increases significantly during both FY 1982 and FY 1983. However, during both fiscal years, Navy efforts to contract whenever possible prevent the increases from being even higher. BOS increases are in most part requirements to support increased force levels. Manpower at Naval Aviation activities overseas increases by almost 600 during FY 1982 and by almost 800 during FY 1983. Manpower for aircraft maintenance increases by almost 300 in FY 1982 and by about 100 in FY 1983. During FY 1982, requirements for base operations and other base support increase by more than 100 but remain about the same for FY 1983.

The decrease of 3,000 Selected Reservists from FY 1981 to FY 1982 is a result of changes required to man other Selected Reserve units. The change in military manpower in FY 1983 is largely due to the change in accounting for TARs, which transferred about 7,000 from the active to the reserve category.

Civilian adjustments in both FY 1982 and FY 1983 consists of reductions for projected contracting-out initiatives under OMB Circular A-76 procedures and the conversion of commissary store employee positions to non-appropriated employee positions. The reductions more than offset increases, which include staffing for Family Services Centers, child care facilities, fleet maintenance, fire inspection, and reduction of backlog in RPMA contract administration.

2. Medical Support. Navy manpower in this category provides medical care in DoD military medical facilities and to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities.



Navy Medical Support Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.9	10.8	11.1
Reserve Components	3.4	4.5	6.8
<u>Civilian</u>	3.7	3.5	3.4

A net reduction of approximately 180 active-duty Medical Support manpower will occur between FY 1981 and FY 1982 (a loss of 190 at Regional Defense Facilities, offset by a gain of 90 at other health activities, and a loss of 80 at Regional Dental Centers). Between FY 1982 and FY 1983, increases will occur at Regional Defense Facilities (+300) and Regional Dental Centers (+25). These increases will provide for military medical contingency response, and, during peacetime, for expanded health care delivery.

The Selected Reserve increases of 1,100 from FY 1981 to FY 1982 and 2,300 from FY 1982 to FY 1983 are the result of directing major effort toward manning medical support units.

Civilian manpower increases in FY 1982 in support of the Family Advocacy Program; however, this modest growth is more than offset by reductions through anticipated economical contracting-out under OMB Circular A-76 provisions. The FY 1983 reduction in civilian strength is entirely attributable to projected contracting-out initiatives.

3. Personnel Support. This subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy recruiting and examining, education of overseas dependents, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career-training and intern programs. The Personnel Support category also includes research and development manpower requirements for human factors and personnel development research.

Navy Personnel Support Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.7	7.8	8.4
Reserve Components	0.7	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.7	1.7

The increase of 600 for this category in active military requirement during FY 1983 primarily supports recruiting and recruiting related activities.

The FY 1982 increase in civilian manpower is primarily associated with so-called "Section VI" schools, operated for children of federal employees. Prior to FY 1982, the schools were operated by the Department of Education; however, the Congressional Reconciliation Act for FY 1982 reassigned responsibility to the Department of Defense.

4. Individual Training. This category includes manpower for formal military and technical training, as well as for professional education of military personnel conducted under the centralized control of service training commands. Training activities in this category include recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care, individual training, and training support activities.

Manpower in the Individual Training Category is dedicated to training of active Navy students and trainees and Naval Reservists on active duty for training. The students and trainees in permanent change of station status are carried in the Individuals subcategory; those in temporary additional duty status are included in the categories of their parent commands.

Navy Individual Training Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	26.6	28.5	29.5
Reserve Components	0.2	0.5	0.3
Civilian	3.4	3.4	3.3

The increase of active manpower in Individual Training between FY 1981, FY 1982, and FY 1983 continues to result from increases in instructor-intensive courses in support of new and more complex weapons systems, together with correcting long-standing shortages of military instructors.

The decrease of 200 Selected Reservists from FY 1982 to FY 1983 results from increased participation in the flight training program by active personnel.

The civilian decrease in FY 1983 is due to projected economical contracting-out under OMB Circular A-76 procedures.

5. Force Support Training. Force Support Training manpower supports units providing training to organized crews or teams in conjunction with performance of a specific mission. Civilian support in this area consists of maintenance and clerical support for fleet air training units.

Navy Force Support Training Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	12.3	13.9	15.3
Reserve Components	0.8	0.6	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	1.6	1.6	1.6

The manpower increases in active Force Support Training between FY 1981, FY 1982, and FY 1983 reflect continuing increases in instruction and maintenance requirements associated with the introduction of new flight simulators at various readiness training sites.

6. Central Logistics. Manpower in this subcategory is associated with supply, maintenance, operations and logistic support operations. This manpower provides critical support to the fleet and directly affects readiness.

Navy Central Logistics Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.3	6.8	7.0
Reserve Components	4.0	4.9	4.6
<u>Civilian</u>	156.7	156.0	162.2

The 200 increase in active manpower between FY 1982 and FY 1983 is due primarily to additional Civil Engineer Corps officers required to administer the significantly increased work loads in contracting for the Military Construction Program and projects for shore facility repair and maintenance, plus additional personnel required to improve the management of ships being overhauled in the private sector.

The decrease of 300 Selected Reservists from FY 1981 to FY 1983 is the result of reduced requirements identified by NAMMOS.

Civilian end strength adjustments are discussed separately by type of operation on the following pages. The following table summarizes Navy manpower by type of logistic operation during the period FY 1981 through FY 1983.

Central Logistics Manpower by Type of Operation  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
<u>Active</u>			
Supply Operations	1.6	1.9	1.9
Maintenance Operations	3.7	3.7	3.7
Logistic Support Operations	1.0	1.2	1.4
Total	6.3	6.8	7.0
<u>Selected Reserve</u>			
Supply Operations	0.9	1.8	1.7
Maintenance Operations	2.1	2.5	2.4
Logistic Support Operations	1.0	0.6	0.5
Total	4.0	4.9	4.6
<u>Civilian</u>			
Supply Operations	21.7	21.1	22.2
Maintenance Operations	121.6	121.3	126.3
Logistic Support Operations	13.4	13.6	13.7
Total	156.7	156.0	162.2

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

a. Supply Operations. Included are Supply Depots, Inventory Control Points and procurement operations activities (SUPSHIPS) that provide fleet support and contract expertise for ship and aircraft systems acquisition. The civilian decrease in FY 1982 is largely due to anticipated economical contracting-out under OMB Circular A-76 procedures. Increases in FY 1983 will provide for a significant improvement in initial material readiness, which will result from attaining 90 percent on-time requisition processing performance in the supply depots and the ICPs. Additional increases are also planned for SUPSHIPS, reflecting increases in private shipyard workload, primarily to reduce ship overhauls to an operationally constrained level. These increases are offset in part by savings through wholesale consolidations and projected economical contracting-out under the provisions of OMB Circular A-76.

b. Maintenance Operations

Naval Air Rework Facilities (NARFs). The air rework facilities perform depot-level maintenance of aircraft and components, manufacture critical nonavailable parts, and provide technical assistance to intermediate maintenance organizations. The FY 1983 budget emphasized the reduction of the current depot backlog by assigning significant resources to the Depot Maintenance Programs. The NARF civilian manning levels provide the necessary workforce to execute the funded aircraft maintenance rework program.

Naval Shipyards. The Naval shipyards provide logistic support for assigned ships and service craft, including work in connection with construction, conversion, overhaul, repair, alteration, drydocking, and outfitting ships and craft. Shipyards also provide for manufacturing research, development, and test work. The FY 1983 budget is based on reducing the backlog of ship overhauls to an operationally constrained level. This, coupled with a more complex mix of ships, requires an FY 1983 civilian manning level of about 76,300, up from 72,000 as of the end of FY 1981.

Ordnance Activities. Ordnance activities receive, renovate, maintain, store, and issue ammunition, explosives, expendable ordnance items, weapons, and ordnance material. These activities provide technical, engineering and logistics support for combat systems, components, and support systems and equipment, as well as proofing, testing, and evaluating underwater weapons. They manage underwater acoustic ranges and range equipment and provide engineering support for weapon system acquisition. The civilian manning for ordnance activities remains essentially level through FY 1983.

Maintenance Support Activities. The maintenance support activities plan, design, test, and deliver combat direction system computer programs for the operating forces. These activities also support fleet computer program development and maintenance and provide technical assistance to the shore establishment. Civilian manpower is essentially level through FY 1983.

c. Logistics Support Operations. Logistics support comprises a variety of logistics and technical support activities. Included are the Navy publications and Printing Service and technical and engineering support activities of the Naval Air, Sea, Facilities, and Electronics Systems Commands. Civilian increases in this category are primarily related to support for the contracting-out program and military construction contract execution requirements.

7. Centralized Support Activities. This subcategory includes non-management headquarters strength for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, counterintelligence, Reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, finance centers, criminal investigations, support of Defense agencies, and other miscellaneous support activities.

Navy Centralized Support Activities Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.3	6.4	6.6
Reserve Components	1.3	1.2	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	6.3	6.5	6.8

The increase for active-duty manpower between FY 1982 and FY 1983 is primarily due to continued increases in personnel administration.

Reserve readiness support decreases by 200 Selected Reserves from FY 1982 to FY 1983, as a result of mobilization requirements adjustments identified by NAMMOS.

Civilian increases in both FY 1982 and FY 1983 support management of the Direct Case Foreign Military reimbursable support, expansion of the deserter apprehension program and Naval Investigative Service, and increases for Audit Service validation of OMB Circular A-76 contract administration cost studies.

8. Management Headquarters. This subcategory includes management headquarters manpower required to support defense agencies; international military organizations; and unified, combat, and service commands.

Management Headquarters Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.5	8.7	8.5
Reserve Components	3.3	3.3	3.1
<u>Civilian</u>	8.7	8.9	9.0

The increase of active military manpower between FY 1981 and FY 1982 results from correction of undermanning experienced at the end of FY 1981, plus increased requirements in service support command headquarters (including Fleet and Type Commanders). The FY 1982 figure reflects a Congressional reduction of 100 from the original end strength requested. These 100 billets were deleted from the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces, Europe. In FY 1983, 299 TARs were transferred to the Reserve category.

A NAMMOS-identified reduction in requirements at Military Sealift Command headquarters accounts for the 400 decrease in Selected Reserve manpower between FY 1982 and FY 1983.

The civilian increase in FY 1982 is primarily due to filling vacancies in previously authorized and approved positions. Civilian increases in FY 1983 are primarily for administrative support of the contracting-out program.

9. Federal Agency Support. The Federal Agency Support subcategory includes Navy manpower assigned to other federal departments and agencies. Normally, such cross assignment is made on a reimbursable basis.

Navy Federal Agency Support Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.0	1.0	1.0
Reserve Components	*	.1	.1
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

\* Fewer than 50.

E. Undermanning. "Undermanning" accounts for the billets "lost" to force-structure units as a result of people in transient, student, trainee, patient, holdee, or prisoner status for some time during the fiscal year. Undermanning relates closely to the sizing of the Individuals account. In previous editions of this report, undermanning was discussed as "manning adjustments," and distributed proportionately among the force-structure DPPCs. Undermanning was as high as 12,000 in earlier fiscal years. For the FY 1983 manpower plan, undermanning has been reduced to about 7,000. The individuals account is sized properly for the budgeted PCS move plan and training work load. Updated factors for the average time-per-transient move, based on actual data for moves in FY 1979, and more accurate projections of trainee/student billets allowed more realistic programming of billets in the individuals account.

Undermanning  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1981</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
Active Military	N.A.	-7.0	-7.0

F. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). An IMA is an officer or enlisted person in the Ready Reserve who will fill an individual military manpower requirement occurring in the active force upon mobilization or shortly thereafter. Each IMA will be assigned to a mobilization billet within the active force and will train in that billet during peacetime. Prior to FY 1982, IMAs were not carried as Selected Reservists.

Approximately 56 percent of the IMAs will be in Training/Pay Category "D", which means they will not receive drill pay but will be paid for 12 days annual Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA). The remaining 44 percent of IMAs will be in training/pay category "A" and will receive both drill and ACDUTRA pay.

The majority of the IMA positions will be in the Medical/Dental programs. Those requirements are programmed as follows:

### Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Category A</u>		
Medical Officer	-	50
Medical Enlisted	-	450 <sup>1/</sup>
Subtotal:	<u>0</u>	<u>500</u>
 <u>Category D</u>		
Officer	352	350
Medical Officer	-	30
Medical Enlisted	-	170
Subtotal:	<u>352</u>	<u>550</u>
 Total IMAs:	<u>352</u>	<u>1,050</u>

<sup>1/</sup> Allocated among appropriate DPPC categories in the summary table.

#### G. Individuals

Active-duty manning is characterized by seasonal variations. Personnel are continuously entering and departing the Navy, and still others are not attached to force structure units for reasons such as travel, illness, instruction, "holding" status awaiting separation, or correctional custody. To offset manpower time "lost" to units due to such factors and thus maintain authorized average strength in the force structure throughout the course of the fiscal year, the Navy maintains the Individuals account. The account comprises estimates of the numbers of transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, trainees, students, and Naval Academy midshipmen. In one sense, the Individuals account may be considered a necessary "cost of doing business." Failure to allow adequate end strength for the account causes undermanning in force structure units.

The Individuals account is sized according to several factors. The number of students is related to overall end strength and the implicit training requirements (discussed in detail in the Military Manpower Training Report). The major portion of the transient strength requirement is projected by multiplying the average time to execute a move by the total number of moves scheduled in each year's Permanent Change of Station move program. Requirements for patients, prisoners, and personnel awaiting separation are derived similarly, based on actual monthly data from the previous year. Average Individuals account strength factors are multiplied by projected total end strength to produce the projected Individuals requirements.



### 1. Transients

#### Navy Transient Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	27.3	25.3	31.4

The decrease in active manpower between FY 1981 to FY 1982 was due to changes in the Navy's PCS move program. Of the increase between FY 1982 and FY 1983, approximately 5,000 is due to a recently introduced method of computing the number of transients more accurately. The remaining 1,000 increase in FY 1983 is attributable to increased total force levels.

### 2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

#### Navy Patients/Prisoners/Holdees Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.8	5.6	5.4

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods (30 days for members assigned to operating force units, 45 days for all others).

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

Holdees manpower spaces are provided to accommodate personnel who are dropped from their assigned units and are awaiting administrative discharge or separation from active duty.

The reduction of active Navy manpower in this category between each fiscal year reflects continued improvement in the quality of recruit accessions, resulting in fewer prisoners.

### 3. Trainees, Students, and Midshipmen

Trainees, students, and midshipmen manpower spaces represent present investment for future trained individuals. Trainees are individuals undergoing basic military and initial skill training. Students are individuals undergoing specialized, flight, and professional training. Midshipmen are individuals attending the United States Naval Academy. The number of trainee and student spaces is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans.

Navy Trainee/Student/Midshipmen Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Trainees/Students	71.6	62.9	70.8
Midshipmen	4.6	4.5	4.5
Total	76.2	67.4	75.3
Reserve Component			
Trainees/Students	1.1	1.0	1.0

The increase of active student/trainee manpower between FY 1982 and FY 1983 reflects substantial growth in recruit and initial skill training related to fluctuation in new accessions. Accession plans decreased from 104,000 in FY 1981 to approximately 93,300 in FY 1982 but will increase to 106,000 in FY 1983. Follow-on skill training will account for a small portion of the FY 1983 growth, with recruit and initial skill training related to new accessions accounting for the bulk of the increase.

V MARINE CORPS

## CHAPTER V

### MARINE CORPS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

#### 1. Introduction

##### A. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes Marine Corps active and reserve military and civilian manpower requirements, presents the manpower levels requested for FY 1983 and FY 1984, depicts manpower trends, discusses initiatives, and explains the changes from year to year.

The Marine Corps is unique among the four services because the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that the Marine Corps will consist of "...not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein... organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms...for service with the fleet..." Further, the Act states that the Marine Corps "...shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform other such duties as the President may direct." In addition, the Marine Corps furnishes guards for U.S. embassies as a result of a memorandum of agreement based on the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended.

The National Security Act of 1947 also requires that the Marine Corps provide rapidly deployable forces for contingency missions in support of the national strategy. The requirement to deploy forces rapidly has resulted in a Fleet Marine Force that provides a balance between strategic mobility and tactical capability and that is well suited to meet assigned Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) missions.

To support its missions and functions, the Marine Corps maintains a Fleet Marine Force posture as follows: one Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) composed of a command element, a Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing and a force service support group located on the East Coast of the United States with primary commitment to the defense of NATO; one MAF forward deployed and oriented to the Pacific area; and a third MAF stationed on the West Coast of the United States, which is capable of meeting worldwide contingency requirements or reinforcing forward deployed forces, including those committed to NATO. Elements from all three MAFs could be rapidly joined to provide a composite MAF for contingencies in Southwest Asia or elsewhere.

The Marine Corps Reserve provides the initial and primary source of trained units and individuals for augmentation and reinforcement of the active forces when additional capability beyond that available in the regular component is required. The Marine Corps Reserve is structured

as a Division/Wing Team that includes a force service support group. The unit structures and equipment types found in the Marine Corps Reserve complement those found in the active component, thus enhancing the Marine Corps Reserve's augmentation and reinforcement capabilities.

Although the National Defense Act of 1947 specifies that the Marine Corps will have a minimum of three wings and divisions with supporting units, it does not specify the size, composition, or manning of these units. These factors, as well as the nature, size, and composition of the supporting establishment, are matters of Marine Corps internal determination. As has been true since the Vietnam era, the manpower levels requested in FY 1983 and FY 1984 are less than required to support all contingency plans fully. The Marine Corps request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1983 and FY 1984 is as follows:

Marine Corps Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Active Military	194.6	196.4
Marine Corps Reserve	39.7	41.0
Civilian Personnel	20.6	20.9

Historically, except during wartime or mobilization, the active forces are manned at less than 100 percent of requirements. Inappropriateness in peacetime of some functions (such as graves registration), availability of personnel, and fiscal constraints all militate against fully manning the structure. The force structure is selectively manned to maximize combat capability while maintaining the minimum necessary acceptable support to the combat forces. Economy in management of base resources is facilitated by Fleet Marine Force augmentation personnel who fulfill a significant portion of the base operating support workload requirements. Additionally, on-the-job and field skill training programs which currently provide approximately 19 percent of Marine Corps' initial skill training reduce Individual Training manpower requirements. The number of Marines receiving the preferred formal school is continuing to increase.

The extent to which the active forces are selectively manned can be shown by the total number of people that would be required to man fully the force structure represented in the Unit Identity and Status Reporting System (UNITREP). The Joint Chiefs of Staff use this system to report the readiness of authorized forces. To man Marine Corps units and tables of organization fully in FY 1982 would require a strength of about 210,360, considerably more than the 192,100 currently authorized.

In addition to the majority of Fleet Marine Force units being manned at less than 100 percent of requirements during peacetime, selected units are reduced to zero manning. Unmanned units are not eliminated from the structure, however, because they would be activated and manned by reassigned active duty people or mobilized reserves in time of emergency.

#### B. Major Force Structure Changes

From FY 1982 to FY 1989 the Marine Corps will make several significant changes to its structure that will increase tactical mobility and firepower to meet the potential threat and requirements involved with RDJTF missions. In the area of ground combat and combat support, the artillery regiments in each division will reorganize to increase artillery pieces, both towed and self propelled. TOW anti-tank guided missile platoons will join the infantry regiments and three new light armored assault battations will form. Restructuring the Marine Corps' infantry battalions will offset much of this growth. In FY 1983 the structure changes planned include adding two TOW platoons, reorganizing one artillery regiment, and restructuring twelve infantry battalions, as well as establishing the first light armored vehicle company of the lead light armored assault battalion. The combat service support structure of the Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs) will complete transition from "reduced manning" tables of organization to "wartime requirement" tables of organization during FY 1982. In consonance with conversion to new tables of organization, many previously unmanned FSSG units are being manned. Aviation growth is concentrated in the ongoing activation and equipping of REDEYE and HAWK anti-aircraft missile units that are necessary to insure the Fleet Marine Forces are provided a minimally acceptable level of air defense.

### II. Manpower Requirements Determination

#### A. Manpower Management System

The first step in developing manpower requirements is to determine the general forces needed to accomplish Marine Corps roles and missions in the national military strategy. A "planning force" is then constructed within the Joint Strategic Planning System in terms of MAFs. The planning force is the force level necessary to execute the national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. The UNITREP readiness level is derived from planning force levels after considering the force structure requirements immediately necessary for war. The requested authorized strength represents Marine Corps decisions, in light of fiscal and manpower availability constraints and readiness requirements. Once the basic framework of the force structure has been decided, the structure of the infantry battalion determines manpower needs.

Design of the infantry battalion begins with analysis of the capabilities that are essential to accomplish the missions and functions of the Marine Corps. The analysis involves research on new weapons technology, equipment experiments, war games using manual and computer simulation techniques, field tests, and military judgment.

The infantry battalion structure and the number of such battalions, together with mission requirements, form the basis for determining the type and quantity of other combat, combat support, and combat service support units required to form the Marine division. The objective is to form a ground combat element consisting of infantry, tank, assault amphibian vehicle, artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, and command and control units, and to integrate this force with aviation and combat service support elements to produce Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) for amphibious or other combined arms operations.

Manpower needs for Marine aviation units derive from the support the ground combat forces require. Computer simulated war games, historical data, and military judgment are used to estimate the number of sorties required daily to support an infantry battalion in combat. Each aircraft type has a specific sortie capability that, when divided into the sortie requirement, determines the number of each type of aircraft required. The crew ratio (crews per aircraft in wartime) and the direct maintenance and ordnance support factors estimate the manpower required to fly and maintain each aircraft. Consideration of the necessary span of control, the geographic distribution of supported forces, and the available assets establish the number of aircraft to be assigned to each squadron. The number of aircraft per squadron provides the basis for determining the additional command and control and support manpower required in each squadron. Squadrons are then task organized into Marine aircraft groups and wings according to specific mission requirements.

The Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs) of the Fleet Marine Force are composed of specialized units, such as supply, maintenance, engineer, motor transport, landing support, dental, and medical battalions, which are essential to the combat service support of the MAF. When the size of the forces and the density of equipment of the task organized MAGTF have been established, the combat service support required is determined using criteria that incorporate maintenance, service, and supply concepts.

Determination of the manpower requirement for support activities is more complex because of the great variety of activities performed, the many one-of-a-kind situations that exist, and the interdependence of the military, civilian, and contractor portions of the work force. Specific details of the total force manpower requirements for support activities are contained in the discussion of the appropriate DPPC in Section IV of this chapter.

Total force manpower requirements of all organizations are critically examined on a regular cycle. Structure and manning reviews are conducted at both the Headquarters Marine Corps and field levels, and are verified by Headquarters Marine Corps on-site survey teams. This procedure assures that the structure and related manpower requirements support the national strategy to the fullest extent possible and that the constrained manpower levels permit the Marine Corps to meet its assigned missions at an identified level of risk.

#### B. Management Improvements

The Marine Corps continues to integrate military manpower management initiatives with those designed to enhance overall Fleet Marine Force readiness. The Marine Corps' unit deployment program, designed to enhance uniform readiness and reduce organizational and individual turbulence, permits Marines assigned to tactical aviation squadrons and infantry battalions to be homebased in CONUS or Hawaii while deploying for periods of approximately six months to meet a portion of the Western Pacific, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean commitments. The program is scheduled for full implementation by the end of FY 1983. This program has reduced requirements for individual replacements in the Western Pacific and the percentage of Marines on unaccompanied tours.

To support the unit deployment program, the Marine Corps is developing a computer-based planning and assignment system designed to provide cost effective, equitable allocation of first-term manpower resources among all units in the active structure and particularly in the Fleet Marine Force. Inventory projection and tour optimization models implemented in FY 1982 will provide improved readiness through a procedure that reconciles first-term requirements with first-term assets in a manner consistent with approved manning policies.

In addition to management actions that improve tour stability and support unit deployments, models dedicated to providing by-grade projections in specific skill areas and management of the career force are improving enlisted force management.

### III. Significant Program Highlights

#### A. Active Military Manpower

1. General. The Marine Corps requested an FY 1982 end strength of 192,100. During FY 1981, continued compensation improvements, including the attainment of relative pay comparability, economic factors, and the cumulative effects of continued improved recruitment and retention resulted in higher end strength. In light of this favorable accession/retention climate, the FY 1983 request is 194,600. This increase in end strength supports continued improved manning of Fleet Marine Force units.



2. Enlisted. The Marine Corps' FY 1981 enlisted end strength was 172,257, 99.9 percent of the authorized level of 172,447. Enlisted recruiting and retention plans are shown in the following table.

Enlisted Strength Plan

	<u>FY 1981</u>		<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>(Current Year)</u>	<u>(Budget Year)</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	2,200	3,071	2,700	2,700
Non-Prior Service	40,384	40,926	41,484	41,484
Male	38,100	38,580	38,500	38,500
(HSDG)	(28,575)	(30,418)	(28,875)	(28,875)
Female	2,284	2,346	2,984	2,984
(HSDG)	(2,284)	(2,346)	(2,984)	(2,984)
<u>Retention</u>				
First Term	6,337	7,098	7,247	7,473
Career	7,663	9,031	8,753	9,027

The Marine Corps achieved 103.3 percent of the combined prior service and non-prior service enlisted recruiting goals. The Marine Corps recruited 12,096 three-year, 28,655 four-year, and 175 six-year enlistees. Although there were 15 two-year test enlistments in FY 1981, for FY 1982 and beyond, all enlistments will be for three or more years, with a goal of 70 percent for four or more years.

The Marine Corps continues to emphasize quality accessions. In FY 1981 80 percent of non-prior service enlistees were high school diploma graduates. High school diploma graduates are the best source of quality manpower in terms of retention, trainability, and amenability to discipline. The Marine Corps remains committed to a goal of 75 percent male high school graduate non-prior service accessions. The goal for female non-prior service accessions is 100 percent high school graduates.

Significantly improved and expanded reenlistment bonuses combined with economic factors, an aggressive career planning effort, and compensation improvements markedly improved retention. The effect of the reenlistment bonuses was not only effective in increasing retention, but also in reducing critical skill shortages. Continued favorable retention trends are reflected in the higher FY 1982 and 1983 retention plan numbers. Because the reenlistment bonuses are now targeted at specific occupational specialties, the reenlistment bonus program will even more effectively address critical shortages.

3. Officer. Active officer procurement objectives are shown in the following table.

Active Marine Corps Officer Procurement Objectives

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Plan	1,898	2,048	2,396
Actual	1,879	-	-

Officer strength as a result of these procurement plans increases to 18,559 in FY 1982 and 19,096 in FY 1983. This increased strength will permit the Marine Corps to provide the necessary leadership for combat forces and training programs, while continuing to retain the most promising officers, maintain a normal promotion flow, and support the requirement for rapid expansion in time of emergency.

Overall officer retention and pilot retention, in particular, have improved. The improvement in pilot retention can be attributed to increased compensation, which includes the Aviation Officer Continuation Pay, and various management initiatives maximizing the amount of time junior pilots spend in flying duties.

4. Women in the Marine Corps. Female Marines are assigned to billets commensurate with their capabilities to the maximum extent practicable. Such use is based on both the roles and missions of the Marine Corps and the necessity to provide women with rewarding careers. The Marine Corps does not classify women in combatant Military Occupational Specialties and restricts the numbers of women who may be assigned to deployable combat units. Current policy is that female Marines will not exceed 10 percent of an FMF unit's manning level and are not assigned to infantry regiments or artillery and other combat support battalions. The Marine Corps continues this classification and assignment policy based upon the intent of USC 10 S.S. 6015 (which prohibits the assignment of women to ships or aircraft assigned combat missions).

Female Marine Strength  
Total (Enlisted/Officer)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Active	7,617 (7091/526)	8,191 (7645/546)	8,592 (8046/546)
Reserve Component	869 (826/43)	859 (814/45)	1,028 (967/61)

Enlisted Women in  
Traditional/Nontraditional DOD Occupational Groups

	<u>FY 1978</u>	<u>FY 1979</u>	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1981</u>
Infantry/Gun Crew	0	27*	2*	0
Electronic Equipment Repair	124	139	207	243
**Communication/Intelligence	272	408	518	578
Other Technical	123	145	136	141
**Support & Admin	2,007	2,238	2,510	2,958
Mechanic Equipment Repair	203	354	392	421
Craftsmen	106	143	170	179
**Service Supply	524	624	719	925

\* Combat Engineer Billets which were later excluded because of a lack of career progression.

\*\* Considered traditional fields by USMC

More women are serving in all fields in which they may be effectively used; however, the rate of increase is closely tied to the total number of spaces available for women in each field.

B. Marine Corps Reserve

The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to maintain a reserve component of trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in time of war or national emergency. The active reserve component of the Marine Corps is divided into two categories: Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve. The primary source of units and individual manpower upon mobilization is the Ready Reserve consisting of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

SMCR units form a Division Wing Team (DWT) with balanced combat, combat support, and combat service support forces of the same type as active force counterpart units. Also included within the SMCR are individuals who are not members of the Division, Wing or FSSG but are pre-assigned to mobilization billets which must be filled on or shortly after M-Day. The IRR consists of individuals who have some period of obligated service remaining on their contracts, and individuals who have completed their military service agreements and elected to remain in the IRR.

The Standby Reserve consists of members of the reserve component other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve. The Standby Reserve provides additional manpower to augment active and reserve forces in a national emergency declared by the Congress. If mobilized, Standby Reservists would require refresher training.

The most probable employment roles for the active reserve component are:

- Provide trained units to augment and reinforce the active forces selectively in order to field three MAFs at full wartime structure.
- Provide a MAB or, if augmentation/reinforcement is not ordered, a 4th DWT.
- Provide a nucleus for reconstitution of a Fourth Division, Wing, and FSSG.

Individual reservists will be the prime source of individuals for active and reserve units. They will provide qualified individuals to fill shortfalls in active operating forces and reserve units and expand the supporting base as necessary to meet wartime contingency requirements.

SMCR wartime requirements call for 42,335 personnel. The wartime requirements provide personnel to fully man the 4th DWT and ancillary mobilization manpower requirements. Without considering active force mobilization requirements, the SMCR wartime requirements will be met by 34,065 Selected Reservists (excludes reservists at initial training), 4,584 active duty support personnel, and 2,005 Individual Ready Reservists. The end FY 1981 IRR strength was 51,222. IRR strength is projected to increase to approximately 53,582 by the end of FY 1983. The strength of the Standby Reserve will be approximately 1,500 at the end of FY 1983.

The SMCR average strength authorization for FY 1983 is 38,300. This strength supports the force structure contained in the UNITREP and ancillary mobilization personnel requirements. The end strength authorization also includes reservists on Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT) and full-time active duty personnel for administration and training of reserves.

Recruiting goals and attainment for the SMCR are as follows:

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals  
(Non-Prior Service)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Plan	7,790	7,952	7,952
Actual	8,384	-	-

For FY 1981, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve attained 108 percent of the planned enlisted end strength of 36,653. Continuing improvements in the gain-to-loss ratio during FY 1981, including a 55 percent first term reenlistment rate for non-prior service personnel and 6 percent decrease in IADT attrition, enabled the SMCR to end FY 1981 with a total paid strength of 37,049.

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals  
(Prior Service)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Plan	4,675	5,848	5,848
Actual	3,824	-	-

For FY 1981, the SMCR attained 82 percent of the prior service enlistment goal. This marked the fourth consecutive year that the goal was not attained. The downward trend must change if the SMCR is to maintain the prior/non-prior service ratio needed to have the expertise, maturity, and grade manning required by the structure. Beginning in FY 1982, a full-time support reserve prior service recruiting force will be utilized to reverse this unacceptable trend.

Accession criteria and quality goals for the SMCR are the same as for the active force. Officer input into the Selected Marine Corps Reserve comes from officers who have completed their initial obligated active service of three years or more.

C. Civilian Manpower

The Marine Corps employs civilians to meet the manpower requirements of support activities to the maximum practicable extent consistent with the need to use military people by reason of law, security, discipline, rotation, and operational readiness. The civilian work force is closely integrated with military manpower to accomplish workload requirements. Accordingly, reducing civilian strength without concomitantly reducing workload would require an offsetting increase in military manpower or contractual services.

D. Commercial Activities (CA) Program - Marine Corps

Cost Comparison Studies Completed

<u>Number of Studies Completed</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Studies Completed</u>	<u>Number of Activities Converted to Contract</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Ac- tivities Converted</u>	<u>Projected Annual Cost Advantage to Government</u>
<u>Civ. Mil. Total</u>	<u>Civ. Mil. total</u>			
FY 1981	9    0    9	1	6    0    6	\$26,000.00

The limited effort during FY 1981 is mainly a function of the continued lack of personnel resources at the field activity level to conduct studies.

Cost Comparison Studies Projected in Budget Estimate

	<u>Number of Studies</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Studies Planned Civ. Mil. Total</u>	<u>Number Estimated to Be Converted to Contract Activities Civ. Mil. Total</u>
FY 1982	38	665 110 775	0 0 0 0

These figures are based on cost comparisons announced to Congress during FY 1980 and FY 1981 that were not completed by the end of FY 1981. The limited effort during FY 1982 is due to continued lack of qualified people at the field level to conduct comparison studies. The Marine Corps has budgeted resources to alleviate this problem in FY 1983.

Cost Comparison Studies Projected in Budget Estimate

	<u>Number of Studies</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Studies Planned Civ. Mil. Total</u>	<u>Number Estimated to Be Converted to Contract Activities Civ. Mil. Total</u>
FY 1983	170	3,000 300 3,300	40 733 0 733

These figures are based on functions that are planned for review during FY 1982 and cost comparison in FY 1983 as required. The contracting effort during FY 1983 is attainable if the resources allocated for administration of the CA program in the President's FY 1983 budget are provided.

IV. Marine Corps Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

The following tables display, by DPPC, the actual Marine Corps manpower distribution for FY 1981 and manpower requirements for FY 1982 and FY 1983. (Undermanning and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are also shown.)

MARINE CORPS ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	*	*	*
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	*	*	*
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	110.5	113.4	114.9
Land Forces	85.0	85.5	86.9
Tactical Air Forces	25.0	27.3	27.3
Naval Forces	0.5	0.6	0.6
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	1.5	1.7	1.7
Intelligence	0.7	0.7	0.7
Centrally Managed Communications	*	*	*
Research and Development Activities	0.8	0.9	0.9
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*
<u>Support Activities</u>	44.8	43.3	43.5
Base Operating Support	22.0	20.7	20.6
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	4.8	4.6	4.6
Individual Training	8.1	8.2	8.6
Force Support Training	3.2	3.0	3.0
Central Logistics	0.8	0.8	0.8
Centralized Support Activities	2.4	2.4	2.4
Management Headquarters	2.3	2.3	2.3
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.3	1.3
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	156.8	158.4	160.1
<u>Undermanning</u>	-	-3.0	-2.1
<u>Individuals</u>	33.8	36.6	36.5
Transients	6.6	8.1	8.1
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	1.9	1.6	1.6
Students, Trainees	25.3	26.9	26.8
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	190.6	192.1	194.6

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

\* Fewer than 50 spaces.

MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1981 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1982 FY 1983 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>32.9</u>	<u>32.9</u>	<u>33.8</u>
Land Forces	23.2	23.7	24.4
Tactical Air Forces	9.6	9.1	9.4
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	-	-
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development Activities	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.7</u>
Base Operating Support	-	-	-
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	-	-	-
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	0.1	0.4	0.7
Management Headquarters	-	-	-
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>33.0</u>	<u>33.3</u>	<u>34.5</u>
<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.3</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	3.8	4.3	4.3
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>37.0</u>	<u>38.5</u>	<u>39.7</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.



MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	-	-	-
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	-	-
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development Activities	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	19.8	20.1	20.6
Base Operating Support	14.8	15.0	15.0
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
Individual Training	0.2	0.2	0.2
Force Support Training	*	*	*
Central Logistics	2.7	2.7	2.9
Centralized Support Activities	1.3	1.4	1.6
Management Headquarters	0.6	0.6	0.7
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	19.8	20.1	20.6

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

\* Less than 50.

### A. Tactical/Mobility Forces

Marine Corps Tactical/Mobility Forces include Land Forces, Tactical Air Forces, and Naval Forces. About 114,900 Marines (59 percent of the Corps) will be in this category in FY 1983. Tactical/Mobility units are all rapidly deployable and intended to operate in the combat theater. Only military people are included in these units.

With the exception of reserves filling Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) billets, undergoing initial active duty for training, or serving on full-time active duty, the entire Selected Reserve contributes to Tactical/Mobility Forces.

1. Land Forces. Land Forces include the four Marine divisions and supporting Force Service Support Groups. Additionally, this category includes helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Marine aircraft wings. The following table displays Land Forces for FY 1981 to FY 1983.

Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 81 (Actual)	FY 82	FY 83
Military			
Active	85.0	85.5	86.9
Reserve Components	23.2	23.7	24.4

Actual active force strength in FY 1981 largely reflects the temporary undermanning on 30 September 1981 associated with the seasonal fluctuation of recruiting inlets. The strengths in FY 1982 and FY 1983 provide for the addition of force structure, primarily for air defense and logistics units.

Increases in FY 1982 and FY 1983 reserve component numbers reflect strength improvements resulting from exceeding the FY 1981 non-prior service recruiting goals, continued higher retention, and lower initial training attrition. Increases also reflect programmatic growth necessary to meet wartime requirements and to support mobilization. These increases are primarily associated with training reserve Force Service Support Group units previously in cadre status.

2. Tactical Air Forces. Tactical Air Forces manpower includes air crews and aircraft organizational and intermediate maintenance personnel who support fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons. It also includes the manpower associated with reserve component support, Marine security detachments in aircraft carriers, and various command, control, and support functions.

The Tactical Air Force manpower requirement is as follows:

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	25.0	27.3	27.3
Reserve Components	9.6	9.1	9.4

Active force increases reflect increased manning of Tactical Squadrons in FY 1982. The reserve manpower program will support nine fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons with appropriate air control, maintenance, and expeditionary support.

The reserve component strength fluctuations reflect realignment within the Fourth Marine Air Wing that deactivates a helicopter squadron (land forces), activates an electronic warfare squadron and increases aerial refueling aircraft.

3. Naval Forces. The Marine Corps request for Naval Forces includes people assigned to ships' detachments (except those assigned to aircraft carriers which are included in Tactical Air Forces), security detachments aboard submarine tenders and missile support ships, and Marine Corps staff billets for Naval operational and amphibious commands and ships.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.5	0.6	0.6

B. Auxiliary Activities

The Marine Corps program for the Auxiliary Activities category totals approximately 1,600 active military people, most of whom are in either Intelligence or Research and Development. The Marine Corps has no reserve or civilian manpower in the Auxiliary Activities category.

1. Intelligence. The manpower in the Intelligence category supports the national intelligence effort under the Director of the National Security Agency. The manpower program also provides for a small number of people (less than 50) who provide Marine Corps representation at Naval Intelligence Centers.

Marine Corps Intelligence Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.7	0.7	0.7

The Marines in the Intelligence function in peacetime are cryptologic specialists gaining valuable training and experience through work in their occupational specialty. Under wartime conditions, approximately one-third of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine Amphibious Force.

2. Research and Development. Marine Corps participation in research and development activities is small and remains essentially constant throughout the period.

Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.9	0.9

Most of the Marines who perform this function are assigned to the Development Center of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command located at the Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. A significant subordinate organization of the Development Center, the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, is a tenant activity at the Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Marine Corps research and development efforts include the development of the organization, doctrine, tactics, techniques, equipment, and weapons for employment by the Fleet Marine Force. Primary emphasis is placed on efforts in support of the landing force in amphibious operations. All development activity is closely coordinated with the other services to avoid duplication. Marines assigned to research and development activities conduct studies that identify required operational capabilities, manage materiel development projects designed to satisfy requirements, and conduct and coordinate developmental and operational test and evaluation of all systems intended for procurement and deployment. Additionally, they review and revise Marine Corps doctrinal publications. Some Marines are also assigned in a liaison capacity to developmental activities of the other services. The difference between FY 1981 (actual) and FY 1982 levels reflects temporary undermanning of activities primarily located at the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia.

3. Other Auxiliary Forces. In FY 1983, fewer than 50 Marines will be in the remaining Auxiliary Forces categories. The Marines in the Centrally Managed Communications category support the Military Affiliate Radio System and the Defense Communications Agency. The Marines in the Geophysical Activities category are assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency as instructors in schools attended by Marines.

## Support Activities

1. Base Operating Support. The following table displays the total manpower request for this category and provides detail regarding the sub-categories of Combat Installations and Support Installations.

### Marine Corps Base Operating Support (End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 81 (Actual)	FY 82	FY 83
	<u>Total of Sub-Categories</u>		
<u>Military</u>			
Active	22.0	20.7	20.6
<u>Civilian</u>	14.8	15.0	15.0
	<u>Combat Installations</u>		
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.4	15.7	15.7
<u>Civilian</u>	10.5	10.7	10.7
	<u>Support Installations</u>		
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.6	5.0	4.9
<u>Civilian</u>	4.3	4.3	4.3

Civilians in this sub-category reinforce capabilities that directly affect the readiness and sustainability of Marine Corps operating forces and provide for improved safety and quality of life.

The FY 1981 actual military strengths included Marines temporarily attached in a restricted or limited duty status and a number of Marines who entered the initial skill training pipeline during the prime summer recruiting months. A portion of those individuals were assigned to Marine Corps bases for their training. Such personnel will be used as replacements in base or co-located Fleet Marine Force units upon com-

pletion of training. The small decline in active military strengths in the Combat Installations sub-category reflects conversion of Morale, Welfare and Recreation spaces to civilian billets.

Base Operating Support manpower constitutes an essential adjunct to Fleet Marine Force readiness by providing the administration, operation, and maintenance of the base structure in which combat forces are housed, supported, supplied, and trained. Manpower in the Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category is assigned to operate the installations at which Fleet Marine Forces are based. The Support Installations sub-category includes manpower assigned to operate logistic and training bases.

The Marine Corps determines manpower requirements for Base Operating Support-Combat Installations using a fixed/variable support concept. Only the fixed portion is presently included in the Base Operating Support manpower request. The fixed portion consists of the functions and services that are required because of the existence of the base, apart from the Fleet Marine Force units that are located there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewage disposal. The variable support portion of the manpower requirement results directly from the presence of the tenant units. To the extent feasible, the tenant unit provides augmentation to the base under agreements worked out by local commanders and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. Since the augmentation manpower is part of the tenant unit and will train and deploy with that unit, it is counted in the Tactical/Mobility Forces. This system, which enables a percentage of the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain their military skills in a garrison status prior to deployment, significantly reduces the manpower assigned to Base Operating Support-Combat Installations. It does, of course, correspondingly reduce the number of personnel available to Fleet Marine Force units for routine training.

The Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category also includes Marines assigned to security duties with Marine barracks located at major Navy bases throughout the world. Personnel are provided for security guard posts based on the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory, supply, mess, and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit and to meet other assigned responsibilities.

The determination of manpower requirements for Base Operating Support-Support Installations is based on an analysis of the functional and work load requirements of bases in this sub-category. Since such bases do not support Fleet Marine Force tenant units, computation of the variable support element is excluded.

The Marine Corps constantly reviews the requirement for Base Operating Support manpower at all combat and support installations. All support functions are reviewed periodically to determine if economies can be achieved by changing the method of performance from in-house to contract (and vice versa), consistent with military readiness requirements.

A full-scale, on-site manpower survey is conducted at each installation at least once every three years and authorized manning levels are reviewed annually. Organizations, functions performed, and services provided are evaluated to ensure that the approved manpower, grade, and skill levels are appropriate. Once the functions to be performed are determined and a work measurement system devised, staffing becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished. Manpower survey efforts have improved support organizations by consolidating duplicative functions, improving staffing efficiency, and eliminating dual staffing requirements, thereby releasing manpower resources for reallocation into areas of more critical need.

2. Personnel Support. Manpower requirements in this category are:

Marine Corps Personnel Support Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 81 (Actual)	FY 82	FY 83
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.8	4.6	4.6
Reserve Components	-	-	-
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2

Marine Corps requirements in this category include recruiting and examining services, support to disciplinary commands, and other personnel support. The program in this category is actually level. The higher actual figures at the end of FY 1981 reflect temporary seasonal overmanning at Marine Corps District headquarters and at the U.S. Naval Academy.

3. Individual Training

Marine Corps Individual Training Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 81 (Actual)	FY 82	FY 83
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.1	8.2	8.6
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2

Individual Training manpower is required to conduct formal military and technical training and professional education of Marine Corps personnel through the use of other service and Marine Corps schools. The Individual Training manpower requirements in excess of school capabilities are trained through alternative methods such as on-the-job or

field skill training. During FY 1982, approximately 19 percent of those Marines undergoing initial skill training will be trained through such alternative methods. The increase in non-formal training from FY 1982 to FY 1983 is the result of recruiting increases and the non-availability of school seats during the peak months of recruiting. Additionally, the formal school structure and overhead costs have increased as a result of end strength increases and the requirement to train for new system acquisitions. A detailed justification of training requirements is contained in the FY 1983 Military Manpower Training Report.

4. Force Support Training. Force Support Training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to operational squadrons and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Training Group are tasked with providing wartime interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower program is based on the projected student load and the need to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission.

This category also includes manpower to support the Marine Corps Institute which provides military skill training to individual Marines through correspondence courses. It also includes instructor personnel for unit training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California. The following table summarizes the manpower requirement for the Force Support Training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.2	3.0	3.0
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

\* Fewer than 50 spaces

The FY 1981 end strength reflects overmanning of aviation training squadrons associated with fluctuations in training load.

5. Central Logistics. The Central Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities. These activities procure materiel, maintain centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other logistics support services. A constant military strength is programmed for FY 1982 and FY 1983. Increased civilian strength in FY 1983 is associated with higher manning in depot maintenance activities in order to realize efficient depot capacities.



Marine Corps Central Logistics Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.7	2.7	2.9

6. Centralized Support Activities

Marine Corps Centralized Support Activities Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.4	2.4	2.4
Reserve Components	0.1	0.4	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.4	1.6

The Marines in this category provide centralized support for non-management headquarters activities. They serve in such diversified areas as United Nations truce teams, audit and judiciary activity support, Marine membership on the Naval Council of Review Boards, public affairs activities, family assistance activities, and Marine Corps support to OSD and JCS. Military and civilian personnel in this category also include the Marine Corps Personnel Support Activity, which administers all active and reserve Marine Corps personnel records, the Marine Corps Automated Services Center, which maintains the automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System, and the Marine Corps Finance Center, which administers the JUMPS system for the Marine Corps. Reserve personnel on full-time active duty in support of reserve training and administration are accounted for in this category. The active and civilian component increases in FY 1983 result from full implementation of centralized manpower and recruiting management systems and civilianization of activities at the Marine Corps Finance Center. Increases in the reserve program reflect support of additional aviation assets and activation of a centralized Individual Reserve Management Organization.

7. Management Headquarters. The following table displays the manpower requirement in the Management Headquarters category.

Marine Corps Management Headquarters Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.3	2.3	2.3
<u>Civilian</u>	0.6	0.6	0.7

The manpower requirement for this function is associated with three sub-categories of Management Headquarters. Marines serving at NATO, NORAD, and U.S. Forces Korea headquarters activities are categorized under International Military Organizations. Marines assigned to Unified Commands are also so categorized. The Service Support-Combat Commands sub-category includes the Fleet Marine Force and major Navy operational command headquarters. Manpower requirements for Marine Corps and Navy departmental headquarters and service administrative headquarters are categorized under Service Support-Service Commands.

All of the sub-categories of Management Headquarters include requirements external to the Marine Corps. Marines so assigned perform two important functions. First, they provide readily available expertise on amphibious warfare matters. Second, they provide a channel through which the Marine Corps keeps current on contingency planning alternatives and through which external staffs stay aware of current Fleet Marine Force capabilities and limitations. Management Headquarters civilian personnel strength increases in FY 1983 as a result of implementation of the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) program and the Marine Corps' function as the Department of Defense executive agent for newly introduced communications equipment.

8. Federal Agency Support. The following table displays Marine Corps manpower committed to Federal Agency Support.

Marine Corps Federal Agency Support Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.1	1.3	1.3

Federal Agency Support manpower consists almost exclusively of the Marine Corps Security Guard Battalion, which furnishes security guards for Foreign Service Posts around the world for the Department of State. Between FY 1981 and FY 1982, Marines manned six new posts in Africa, Asia, and South America.

D. Undermanning

Undermanning  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	N/A	3.0	2.1

The Marine Corps' internal manpower management process is based on an average strength projected for force unit manning. Average strength for a given unit differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning. The projected undermanning for 30 September is expressed as a force structure deviation, or undermanning factor. This undermanning is shown as a single minus entry in the Active Military Manpower Requirements DPPC table.

E. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)

Individual Mobilization Augmentees  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Reserve	.2	.9	.9

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are individual SMCR members not assigned to the 4th DWT. IMAs are preassigned to active force billets that must be filled on or shortly after M-day. These individual Selected Reservists are assigned to Training/Pay Categories A, B, C or D, depending on the amount of training required in peacetime to insure immediate and effective performance of duty upon mobilization. IMAs will possess premobilization orders for execution upon statutory authorization and notification for execution by the assigned operational sponsor. Each IMA will attend drill periods at their respective gaining command, as determined by the training category code, and will spend 14 days on active duty each year in the mobilization designee billet.

IMAs in FY 1980 were included in the Reserve Land Forces DPPC; in FY 1981 they were accounted for in Centralized Support Activities. In this report they have been addressed separately.

F. Individuals

The following table displays the Individuals accounts.

Marine Corps Individuals Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Transients	6.6	8.1	8.3
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	1.9	1.6	1.6
Trainees/Students	<u>25.3</u>	<u>26.9</u>	<u>26.6</u>
Total	33.8	36.6	36.5
Reserve Components			
Trainees/Students	3.8	4.3	4.3

The strengths shown in the Individuals accounts are estimates of the number of people who will be in a transient, trainee/student, or patient/prisoner/holder status at the end of a fiscal year. These estimates are based partly on historical data and partly on current and projected manpower plans and policies. The Individuals accounts are as necessary as the force structure spaces and shortages in authorizations for these accounts will result in strength reductions in the combat or support forces.

The low FY 1981 actual transient numbers, compared to FY 1982 and FY 1983, reflect a change relative to the projected move pattern which resulted in an abnormally low 30 September 1981 transient number. The FY 1982 to FY 1983 increase reflects increased moves associated with reactivation of Force Service Support Group units in Fleet Marine Force Pacific.

The patient/prisoner/holder population is expected to remain even during FY 1982 and FY 1983 as a result of continued quality in recruiting and the small number of people awaiting separation. A continued increased number of Marines on appellate leave characterizes the FY 1981 actual strength.

The increased trainee/student request reflects the impact of strength increases that have been partially offset by training efficiencies in recruit and specialized skill training. Although the number of trainees/students will increase because of higher end strength and increasing sophistication of equipment, lower attrition from training and more efficient utilization of available training assets will reduce the overall impact of increased numbers of trainees/students.

VI AIR FORCE

## CHAPTER VI

### AIR FORCE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

#### I. Introduction

##### A. Summary and Authorization Request

The FY 1983 request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1983 and FY 1984 is as follows:

Air Force Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Active Military	600.0	609.7
Reserve Components		
ANGUS	101.8	103.2
USAFR	66.6	68.6
Civilian	242.8	243.0

The Air Force manpower program for FY 1983 and FY 1984 reflects continued application of the Total Force Policy to accomplish assigned missions. Active military manpower continues to build in FY 1983 after showing, for the first time since FY 1968, an increase in both FY 1981 and FY 1982. Civilian manpower declines in FY 1983, as a result of work load evaluations and best estimates of cost-effective contracting.

##### B. Major Force Structure Changes

The mission and associated force structure of the Air Force are the primary indicators of resource requirements. Consequently, the size and composition of the force structure to be supported provide the base for the majority of manpower requirements. From a manpower requirements standpoint, the most important force structure characteristics are the numbers and types of aircraft, missiles, and other systems authorized.

The Air Force continues with its efforts of modernizing and fully equipping its 26 active tactical fighter wings in addition to modernizing the Air Reserve Force (ARF) tactical fighter force. Due to fiscal constraints, completion of the 26 wing build has now slipped to 1987.

The manpower strength supports the following Air Force force structure in FY 1983:

Strategic Offensive Forces. B-52 and FB-111 bomber forces are 272 Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA) and 58 PAA respectively. KC-135 aircraft will remain at 615 PAA. Minuteman missiles continue at 1,000 PAA while Titan II missiles continue at 53 PAA.

Strategic Defensive Forces. The force will consist of five active and ten Air National Guard (ANGUS) interceptor squadrons. The Air Force began, in FY 1978, the phased replacement of long-range radars used in the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system with joint use USAF/FAA radars. Since FY 1980, and to FY 1982, the Air Force is transferring additional radars to the FAA as joint use and eliminating other USAF radars. The E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) augments this surveillance capability. In 1982, the modernization of active F-106 squadrons began with the conversion of the units to F-15 squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces. The active tactical fighter force consists of 26 organizationally structured wings, which the Air Force plans to bring to full equipage by the end of the 1980s. In FY 1983, the Air Force is continuing its tactical fighter force modernization with the addition of four F-16 tactical fighter squadrons.

By end FY 1983, a 12 plus wing equivalent Air Reserve Force structure composed of 45 fighter squadrons augments the active force. Modernization of ANGUS forces in FY 1983 continues with the conversion of the remaining F-105s. Modernization of the Air Force Reserve (USAFR) continues in FY 1983 with the addition of an A-10 unit. The USAFR also contributes one half of the aircrews for the KC-10 through collocated associate programs. The active force will have an 15 PAA KC-10 squadron by end FY 1983.

Other changes programmed in the tactical aircraft force structure in FY 1983 include an increase in E-3A AWACS aircraft to 26 PAA, providing a significant command and control capability, and an addition of two EF-111 tactical electronic combat aircraft.

Airlift Forces. Although strategic airlift forces remain at 234 PAA C-141 aircraft and 70 PAA C-5 aircraft, the "stretched" C-141B program was completed and the Air Force began modifying the C-5 in FY 1982. These modifications increase C-141 cargo volume capacity by about 30 percent and provide an air refueling capability that reduces our dependence on foreign enroute basing structures. The C-5 wing modernization program will extend wing life by 30,000 hours.

Air Force Reserve associate units provide the ability to use more fully existing bases and aircraft by providing reserve air crews and maintenance personnel to active C-141, C-5, and C-9 units. C-5 associate crew ratios continue to increase to allow the ARF to assume a greater role in strategic airlift. ARF tactical airlift forces decrease by 26 PAA in FY 1983 for a total of 310 C-130 and C-7 aircraft.

## II. Manpower Requirements Determination

### Manpower Management System

The most fundamental task in effective manpower management is the systematic determination of manpower requirements. Despite the use of recognized techniques for quantifying and aggregating total manpower needs, manpower management remains a difficult task. Greatly complicating the task is the anomaly of having to fund and manage a force structured

for peacetime against which wartime missions and taskings are assigned. As a consequence, the funded manpower levels are derived from a force structure that represents the resources available to the Air Force, rather than those desired in an unconstrained environment.

Air Force Management Engineering Program (MEP). An important aspect of manpower management is determining accurately the manpower requirements for forces deployed, operated, and maintained to carry out assigned Air Force missions. The annual application of manpower standards and force structure work load estimates determine the numbers, kinds, and distribution of manpower authorizations.

In 1959 the Air Force established the MEP to develop and maintain manpower standards and provide management advisory services (MAS). Manpower standards and guides are developed using industrial engineering work measurement techniques and computerized models such as the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM). MEP policy emanates from the Directorate of Manpower and Organization (AF/MPM), while the Air Force Management Engineering Agency (AFMEA) approves all standards, provides technical/procedural guidance, and administers the Air Force-wide MEP schedule. AFMEA has ten Functional Management Engineering Teams (FMETs) that develop and maintain manpower standards for Air Force common functional areas (supply, security police, etc.) that encompass over 70 percent of total authorized manpower. In addition, about 150 command METs develop/maintain command unique and single point standards and guides and perform on-site work measurement and coordination for FMET studies.

Cumulative results of the MEP through FY 1981 reflect 66 percent of authorizations placed under a standard, about \$800 million in combined savings from standard applications and MAS, a return on investment of \$3 for each dollar spent, and 90,000 authorizations deleted or redistributed. The remaining Air Force authorizations (34 percent) are covered by manpower guides. These guides are quantitative expressions of manpower; however, they are less structured than standards and are based on staff estimates, manpower surveys, and contractor estimates rather than on formal work measurement techniques. The Air Force prefers guides where standards development is not practical, for example, when it is inexperienced with new systems or when standards would be short-lived because a system or activity is approaching phase-out.

A continuing effort of the MEP is to emphasize productivity improvements and reduce the time required from the start of the standards development process to its conclusion when the required manpower adjustment is approved in the budget and entered into the Air Force's Command Manpower Data System. Activity in this area ranges from refinement of present procedures to testing of new concepts. Initiatives include: designing standards to enhance their maintainability, integrating productivity improvement efforts with standards development, improving the wartime manpower determination process, and designing studies to meet the specific needs of Air Force functional managers.

This program has progressively improved and enjoys increased credibility because of experience gained over the years and through constant refinement of methodology. Annual application of manpower standards and guides provides an accurate, objective, and consistent



basis to forecast future manpower requirements based on projected work loads. When mission or force adjustments cause work load changes, this system assures that manpower will also be revised in accordance with the changed mission or force levels and resultant work loads.

This system supports the fundamental task of programming, which is to translate Air Force approved plans and requirements into time-phased resource packages including people, money, and materials. The Air Force accomplished this task by systematically costing force levels, supporting programs, and modernization efforts in terms of money and manpower. Programming actions, therefore, provide the resource detail necessary as a bridge between the approved plans and the annual Air Force Budget submission.

### III. Significant Program Highlights

#### A. Active Military Manpower

General. Military manpower increases 19,200 between FY 1982 and FY 1983. In the tactical force, 3,800 authorizations are added for modernization and training, with modernization concentrated in the addition of F-16 and A-10 aircraft. Military manpower is also added for new weapon systems (3,700) such as Compass Call, GLCM, EF-111, AWACS, TR-1, and ALCM. In addition, the Air Force is increasing support for wartime readiness initiatives in tanker forces, strategic programs, rapid runway repair, increased HARVEST EAGLE and BARE BASE equipment, WRM munitions, as well as new and expanded programs such as PRIME RIBS and RED HORSE (+4,500), increased physical security of nuclear weapons (+800), and tactical aircraft maintenance (+1,900). Other programs with lesser manpower impact include aerial port/airlift (+700), communications/intelligence (+700), DoD Agency Support (+100), CSOC (+100), FMS (+200) and NATO AEW&C (+100). To obtain a quality force as well as support the increased end strength, 5,600 spaces are added to the training and medical areas. The additional manpower for training is for increased flying training rates and personnel accession levels as well as increased course lengths to compensate for known training deficiencies. These increases are partially offset by decreases for phase downs in B-52D, Titan II, and F-101 force structures (-2,600).

#### B. Accessions and Retention Programs--Active Forces

1. Enlisted. The actual number of enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1981 and the accession goals for FY 1982 and FY 1983 are shown below:

<u>Enlisted Accession Plan</u>				
	<u>FY 1981</u>		<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>		
Non-Prior Service	76,918	76,918	69,000	71,300
Prior Service	4,207	4,207	6,000	10,000
Total	81,125	81,125	75,000	81,300

The Air Force achieved its FY 1981 enlisted non-prior service (NPS) and prior service (PS) recruiting objectives. Additionally, the downward trend in the quality of non-prior service enlistees was reversed as indicated by both the increase in high school diploma graduate and combined Mental Category I and II rates relative to FY 1980. This improvement is encouraging and reflects a year in which recruiting resources were adequate. However, increased civilian competition, the documented 14 percent decline in the available 18-year-old male population by 1986 and 22 percent by 1992, and anticipated economy improvements are causes for concern in view of programmed increases in enlisted requirements.

The Air Force FY 1983 prior service program is the largest in 24 years, approximately 140 percent higher than the FY 1981 actual achievement. The vast majority of FY 1983 enlistments are required in traditionally critical, hard-to fill skills. In addition, the use of direct duty assignments in lieu of retraining options is designed to reduce training costs and increase experience levels but will require increased recruiting resources to ensure accomplishment. All in all, prior service recruitment will be extremely difficult.

2. Officer. The actual number of officers recruited in FY 1981 and the accession goals for FY 1982 and FY 1983 are shown below:

Officer Accession Plan

<u>FY 1981</u>		<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>		
9,429	8,346	8,855	10,711

The officer procurement program supports undergraduate flying training (pilot and navigator) and the broad range of essential combat sustaining scientific and engineering, management, and medical requirements. The Air Force did not achieve some of its FY 1981 officer accession requirements because of continued difficulties recruiting for scientific and engineering specialties, and critical physician specialties. The market for these professional skills is highly competitive and particularly difficult in the All-Volunteer Force environment. In FY 1981, the Air Force achieved only 38 percent of its total engineering officer recruiting objective. Numerous actions, such as the realignment of recruiting resources, new accessions programs, and recruiting incentives have been initiated in an effort to achieve scientific and engineering objectives. The majority of these requirements are for specific engineering disciplines, such as electrical and aeronautical. These disciplines are also those most needed by civilian industry and command the highest initial salary offers. The Air Force is approximately 1,000 engineering officers below requirements which directly affects the ability of the research and development community to perform its mission. The Engineering and Scientific Career Continuation Pay Authority has been authorized by Congress and should have a positive impact on the retention of skilled engineers and scientists. However, this bonus cannot be paid until Congress approves the implementation plan and the Appropriations Committees allocate funds. At the end of

FY 1981, the Air Force was short 1,100 pilots and 600 navigators. Pilot shortages are projected to continue beyond FY 1987, while navigator shortages are expected to be eliminated by FY 1986. In FY 1981, the Air Force achieved only 67 percent of the requirement in critical physician specialties. This deficit requires the continued use of costly civilian consultants and directly reduces the quantity of health care provided. As in the enlisted arena, the enactment of a new educational entitlement program is essential to assist in the recruitment and retention of officers.

3. Retention. The career force entries for FY 1981 and the goals for FY 1982 and FY 1983 are shown below:

Active Air Force Enlisted Retention Goals

	FY 1981		FY 1982	FY 1983
	Goal	Actual		
<u>Career Force Entries</u> (Enlisted)	20,470	21,829	20,400	20,400

The Air Force met its goal for first-term career force entries in FY 1981; however, increasingly high second-term and career reenlistment rates are needed to make up for the loss of experienced NCOs in past years and to meet requirements of the increasing force size. While officer retention has increased since FY 1979, the Air Force's worst year in recent history, retention rates are still below long-term objectives for most categories of officers. High losses in recent years have created experience shortages throughout the force. Extraordinary retention is needed over the long run for both officer and enlisted if the Air Force is to overcome skill shortages, rebuild experience levels, and provide a balanced career/first-term growth as Air Force end strength increases over the next five years.

The recent improvements in compensation have essentially restored military pay to the relative level of comparability that existed with the private sector at the advent of the All-Volunteer Force. In order to achieve the recruiting levels required, sustainment of military pay comparability is essential. Also, the incentive that surveys indicate as the most important reason for enlistment is education. The Air Force is reviewing various initiatives that would provide a more attractive education assistance program. With continued adequate resources levels, sustainment of military pay comparability, and a more attractive educational entitlement, the Air Force expects to continue meeting its enlisted personnel requirements under the All-Volunteer Force concept.

4. Women. The total number of women in the Air Force increased from 59,905 to 62,944 during FY 1981. The Air Force anticipates accessing approximately 11,000 female officers and enlisted members in FY 1982. As a result, the total number of women in the Air Force is expected to exceed 65,000 by the end of September 1982. Continual increases in the female population in both the officer and enlisted force are anticipated through FY 1987. The rate of increase will depend upon the types of skills for which

accessions will be required, the extent that women are qualified and interested in such duties, and the attrition and retention rates of female personnel. Based upon current estimates, projected female end strengths over the next five fiscal years are as follows:

	<u>Projected Female End Strengths</u>				
	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Female End Strengths	66,915	67,888	68,672	69,817	70,318

The Air Force has identical enlistment, commissioning, and job entry standards for both men and women. Female officers are assigned to all career fields and enlisted female personnel to all but five of 230 enlisted skills. Women are precluded from assignment to combat related specialties or positions on the basis of Section 8549 of Title 10, United States Code, and associated Air Force policy. This restriction affects only 10 percent of the positions in the Air Force. The Air Force uses approximately 30 percent of the women in the Air Force in jobs considered non-traditional.

5. Congressional Support. With the increased emphasis on national defense and the projected force build-up, The Air Force encourages continued strong Congressional support for adequate recruiting and advertising resources, pay and entitlements commensurate with the unique demands of military life, and restoration of an effective noncontributory educational entitlement with features that assist in recruitment and retention of both enlisted and officer personnel. Also, a positive public attitude toward national defense coupled with a recognition of the opportunities available in the military must be transmitted to our youth. Toward this end, the Air Force solicits a strong statement of support from members of Congress to solidify public backing and to encourage youth toward military service.

#### C. Air Reserve Forces Manpower

The Air Reserve Forces (ARF) play a vital role in our total force posture. During the last several years, the Air Force has recognized the need to modernize the ARF and has incrementally equipped them with first line aircraft: A-7s, F-4s, C-130s, F-106s and A-10s. By the end of FY 1982, the ARF will possess approximately 33 percent of the tactical fighter aircraft, 61 percent of the tactical airlift aircraft, 49 percent of the strategic airlift crew capability, 53 percent of aerial port capability, 21 percent of the strategic tanker aircraft, 70 percent of the strategic defensive interceptor aircraft, and 52 percent of tactical reconnaissance aircraft.

#### Accession Programs - Air Reserve Forces

ARF enlisted recruiting goals for FY 1982 and FY 1983 and the number of personnel recruited in FY 1981 are shown below:

<u>Air Reserve Forces Enlisted Strength Plan</u>				
<u>FY 1981</u>		<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	
<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>			
25,700	26,669	27,205	28,109	

Both the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve exceeded their Congressionally authorized end strength objectives in FY 1981. However, fact-of-life problems in manning certain critical specialties require that the ARF concentrate their effort toward a more precise recruiting program to fill these vacancies. This effort will require the full recruiting resources requested for FY 1983. The comments regarding the facts-of-life in today's market place made in the previous section also apply to the Air Reserve Forces.

The Air Reserve Forces will continue to offer an enlistment bonus and educational assistance to non-prior service personnel during FY 1982 for certain hard-to-fill career fields. The recently extended affiliation bonus for prior service obligors will be used to attract prior service personnel into critical skills.

The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, during FY 1981, were successful in their aggressive campaign to procure officers. However, the Air Reserve Forces still have critical manning level problems in some essential skill areas, such as weapons systems officers, and in the professional areas, such as doctors. These shortages have direct impact on operational capabilities.

#### D. Civilian Manpower

At the end of FY 1981, the Air Force employed 246,165 in-service civilians. Civilian manpower for FY 1983 is nearly 3,900 below this level. In FY 1983, in-service civilians assigned to the vitally important Central Logistics function will comprise 94 percent of the total in-service Central Logistics manpower. Other civilian intensive areas include Research and Development (56 percent), Base Operating Support (37 percent), and Centralized Support Activities (39 percent).

The decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1983 is due primarily to work load evaluations and best estimates of cost effective contracting.

#### E. Commercial Activities (CA)

The Air Force uses a mix of military (active, reserve, and National Guard), federal civilian employees, and contractors to satisfy mission requirements. This practice helps provide sufficient military personnel to meet wartime commitments while taking advantage of the experience and continuity provided by civilian employees and the economies often generated by contracting.

Guidance for determining whether to accomplish commercial activity (CA) workload in-house or by contract is provided in OMB Circular A-76. Generally, A-76 reaffirms the Government's policy of reliance on the private sector for goods and services. While recognizing that certain functions are inherently governmental in nature and others must be performed in-house for national defense reasons, the Circular directs all other CA workload be reviewed to determine the most cost-effective method of operation.

The Air Force has established an aggressive program to implement A-76. First, determinations are made as to the work load that military members must perform based on military essentiality. Criteria for military-essential positions include combat and direct combat support duties, maintenance of favorable overseas rotation indices, and career progression requirements. Additionally in-house positions are retained that must be manned by Air Force military or civilian employees, because of inherent management responsibilities or to comply with applicable statutes or regulations. All remaining CA work load is considered eligible for contract. From these eligible work loads, the Air Force develops a cost-comparison program for each fiscal year by identifying candidate activities that will be cost studied for possible contract performance.

The Fiscal Year 1980 cost comparison program, announced to Congress in March 1979, and the first conducted using revised A-76 guidelines, considered approximately 225 candidates and 5,500 associated manpower authorizations. The Fiscal Year 1981 program, announced to Congress in December 1980 will consider about 160 activities with 2,500 authorizations while the FY 1982 program is expected to address 4,300 authorizations. The Air Force, as a budget planning assumption, has programed 6,800 authorizations (the combined FY 1981 and 1982 programs) to convert to contract in FY 1982; the Fiscal Year 1981 program and contract awards are not expected until FY 1982. The FY 1982 program, announced in February 1982, is expected to be slipped to FY 1983. The Air Force, as a budget planning assumption, has programmed for potential conversions of 3,700 in FY 1983.

Air Force experience with revised A-76 guidelines began with the FY 1980 cost-comparison program. To date, 191 studies have been completed, resulting in 137 activities going contract and 54 remaining in-house. Cost advantages generated by the 137 contract decisions exceed \$186 million while the 54 activities remaining in-house will generate over \$27 million in cost avoidance, primarily from more efficient use of in-house manpower. The program, under the revised guidelines, has thus far resulted in 26 percent of the activities remaining in-house compared to 19 percent in FY 1979. This pattern may reflect a trend toward more competitive in-house bids resulting from increased pressure to ensure in-house calculations are based on the most efficient estimates to perform the statement of work. Also, new "performance-oriented" work statements, which in effect become mission statements for each activity after the cost comparison, have enabled in-house bids to concentrate on performance rather than on conformance with past procedures.

COST COMPARISON STUDIES  
In-House Vs Contract Decisions  
(FY 1981)

Number of Studies Completed	End Strengths Involved		Number of Activities To Be Converted	End Strengths To Be Converted		Projected Annual Cost Advantage	
	Civ.	Mil.		Civ.	Mil.		
181	2,528	626	3,154	169	2,051 658	2,709	\$45,221

COST COMPARISON STUDIES  
PROJECTED IN BUDGET ESTIMATE

	Number of Studies	End Strength Involved in Studies Planned			Number Estimated to Be Converted to Contract			
		Civ.	Mil.	Total	Activities	Civ.	Mil.	Total
FY 1982	200	3,203	1,087	4,290	140	5,700	1,400	7,100
FY 1983	TBA	4,788	781	5,569	TBA	3,000	300	3,300

F. Wartime Manpower, Requirement Versus Supply.

Currently, the Air Force determines the total force manpower required to support the national strategy through an annual exercise in which each major command identifies resources needed to achieve its wartime objectives. The exercise begins with Secretary of Defense guidance to the services that prescribes the wartime scenario at an established level of risk. Through a series of modeling techniques, the Air Force quantifies the manpower it must mobilize to meet the deployed, strategic, and war-sustaining requirements. Against this total requirement, the Air Force compares actual manpower authorized. The resultant shortfalls or functional mismatches serve as the basis for program adjustments. While the Air Force cannot afford to maintain all forces on a wartime footing during peacetime, it recognizes the inherent danger in underfunding peacetime levels to such an extent that readiness might be impaired. The Air Force goal is to strike a balance between peacetime and wartime requirements that will permit effective responses to potential contingencies.

Although substantial progress has been made in documenting wartime total force manpower as outlined above, the Air Force is currently developing an enhanced process to more accurately compute its wartime manpower requirements. This enhanced process is based on a current-year operation plan orientation by our major commands (MAJCOMs) and a subsequent projection to the outyears by HQ USAF aided by the Air Force Wartime Manpower and Personnel Readiness Team (AFWMPRT). The basic process calls for the development of support force manpower requirements by the MAJCOMs identified as an addendum to real-world (current) operations plans. This process results in the establishment of an Air Force requirements plan that is reviewed and approved by functional managers within HQ USAF. Then, using computer modeling, AFWMPRT extrapolates current-year requirements plan data to the first and last years of the budget Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). The resulting product is known as the Program Force Sizing Plan. After HQ USAF approval, this data is sent to the MAJCOMs for their use in developing manpower requirements packages to be used in program development.

This enhanced wartime manpower planning process will improve the quality of the Air Force statement of wartime requirements. The process will provide MAJCOMs relief from having to make outyear projections of their wartime requirements because they will be working with

current operations plans. Furthermore, this data will identify wartime manpower shortfalls in combat support activities, influence decisions concerning manpower resource realignment, and provide information for evaluating potential contract candidates.

The Air Force is continuing to use simulation modeling techniques such as the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM) to evaluate and validate direct combat wartime requirements. Moreover, the Air Force has developed procedures to provide wartime manpower standards for base operating support functions. The Air Force goal remains to improve readiness by insuring an appropriate military and civilian manpower resource mix by skill, the most effective balance between active and reserve forces, and the proper balance between combat and combat sustaining forces.

#### IV. Air Force Manpower Requirements By Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)

The following tables display Air Force manpower by DPPC for the period FY 1981 through FY 1983. (Undermanning and Individual Mobilizations Augmentees are also shown.) Continuing a policy which began in FY 1980, Selected Reserve numbers throughout this chapter include reservists on full-time active duty for administration and training of the reserve forces. This section relates Air Force manpower requirements to force levels and describes the significant features of and changes in the FY 1982 through FY 1983 program.



AIR FORCE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983</u>	FY 1983 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>73.2</u>	<u>77.2</u>	<u>76.8</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	54.1	57.9	57.7
Defensive Strategic Forces	8.0	8.0	7.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	11.1	11.4	11.8
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>126.2</u>	<u>136.2</u>	<u>144.2</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	89.2	97.8	104.8
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	37.0	38.4	39.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>48.2</u>	<u>50.2</u>	<u>50.9</u>
Intelligence	14.1	14.7	15.4
Centrally Managed Communications	15.9	16.7	16.2
Research and Development	10.5	10.8	11.1
Geophysical Activities	7.7	8.0	8.2
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>258.0</u>	<u>261.3</u>	<u>268.5</u>
Base Operating Support	154.9	156.6	161.1
Medical Support	14.0	14.5	14.5
Personnel Support	6.3	6.3	6.3
Individual Training	21.3	21.9	23.5
Force Support Training	24.8	25.6	26.2
Central Logistics	4.4	4.6	4.7
Centralized Support Activities	14.0	13.8	14.1
Management Headquarters	18.0	17.8	17.9
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.2	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>505.7</u>	<u>524.9</u>	<u>540.5</u>
<u>Undermanning</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-8.2</u>	<u>-7.4</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>64.6</u>	<u>64.1</u>	<u>67.0</u>
Transients	16.6	15.6	16.1
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	0.6	0.6	0.6
Students, Trainees	43.0	43.5	45.9
Cadets	4.4	4.4	4.4
<u>Total</u>	<u>570.3</u>	<u>580.8</u>	<u>600.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (ANGUS)  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>21.6</u>	<u>20.8</u>	<u>20.8</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	10.9	10.7	10.7
Defensive Strategic Forces	10.0	9.4	9.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>61.2</u>	<u>61.7</u>	<u>62.7</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	43.9	45.0	45.3
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	17.3	16.7	17.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>12.3</u>
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	10.5	11.6	11.8
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.5	0.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.3</u>
Base Operating Support	0.5	0.5	0.5
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.5	0.5	0.5
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	1.4	2.1	2.2
Management Headquarters	0.1	0.1	0.1
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>96.2</u>	<u>97.8</u>	<u>99.3</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.5</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	2.1	2.2	2.5
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>98.3</u>	<u>100.1</u>	<u>101.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (USAFR)  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	2.0	2.0	2.0
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>40.5</u>	<u>40.7</u>	<u>41.8</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	6.8	9.3	9.9
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	33.7	31.4	31.9
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	*	0.1
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>9.6</u>
Base Operating Support	5.8	5.8	6.1
Medical Support	1.9	2.3	2.6
Personnel Support	0.3	0.3	0.3
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	0.4	0.4	0.4
Management Headquarters	0.2	0.2	0.2
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>51.5</u>	<u>52.4</u>	<u>54.1</u>
<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees</u>	<u>8.8**</u>	<u>10.1***</u>	<u>10.8***</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holders	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	1.3	1.3	1.6
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>61.6</u>	<u>63.7</u>	<u>66.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

- \* Less than 50.
- \*\* Does not include 690 Pay Group "D" Participants.
- \*\*\* Includes 1,000 Pay Group "D" Participants.

AIR FORCE CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>7.3</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	3.8	3.4	3.2
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.2	3.0	2.9
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.0	1.2	1.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>27.4</u>	<u>28.9</u>	<u>28.9</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	14.6	15.8	15.9
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	12.8	13.1	13.0
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>20.6</u>	<u>21.2</u>	<u>21.4</u>
Intelligence	1.6	1.8	1.9
Centrally Managed Communications	4.3	4.3	4.2
Research and Development	13.6	13.9	14.1
Geophysical Activities	1.0	1.2	1.2
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>190.1</u>	<u>189.4</u>	<u>185.3</u>
Base Operating Support	89.8	89.3	86.3
Medical Support	3.1	3.1	3.1
Personnel Support	1.3	1.4	1.4
Individual Training	5.2	5.3	5.4
Force Support Training	1.8	1.8	1.9
Central Logistics	71.0	70.7	69.5
Centralized Support Activities	8.8	8.9	8.9
Management Headquarters	9.1	8.8	8.8
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total**</u>	<u>246.2</u>	<u>247.1</u>	<u>242.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

\* Fewer than 50 spaces.

\*\* Includes approximately 29,000 National Guard and Reserve technicians.

A. Strategic. Air Force Strategic Forces are subdivided into Offensive, Defensive, and Control and Surveillance forces.

1. Offensive Strategic Forces. The following tables show Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
<u>Bombers</u>			
B-52	316	316	272
FB-111	60	60	58
<u>Tankers</u>			
KC-135	487	487	487
<u>Missiles</u>			
Titan II	53	53	47
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
<u>Tankers</u>			
ANGUS KC-135	104	104	104
USAFR KC-135	24	24	24

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	54.1	57.9	57.7
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	10.9	10.7	10.7
USAFR	2.0	2.0	2.0
<u>Civilian</u>	3.8	3.4	3.2

Offensive Strategic Forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to deter nuclear war by maintaining the ability to deliver nuclear weapons to any part of the world. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 1983, we have 18 B-52 squadrons, four FB-111 squadrons, 32 active force and 16 reserve force KC-135 tanker squadrons, one KC-10 tanker squadron, six Titan missile squadrons, and 20 Minuteman squadrons with the Primary Aircraft/Aerospace Vehicle Authorizations (PAA) shown in the above table.

The FY 1982 active military manpower increase is primarily due to an assigned strength shortfall in FY 1981 and additional manpower to support the FY 1982 Budget Amendment initiatives for increased flying training for bombers. The FY 1983 decrease is due to a decrease in the Bomber Force.

Civilian decreases in FY 1983 are primarily due to reversing planned military to civilian conversions.

2. Defensive Strategic Forces. The following tables show Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Interceptor Squadrons</u>			
Active Force	5	5	5
ANGUS	11	10	10

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.0	8.0	7.4
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	10.0	9.4	9.4
<u>Civilian</u>	3.2	3.0	2.9

FY 1983 Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces include aircraft and ground radars of the Tactical Air Command and Air National Guard for surveillance and control and limited defense. To perform this mission in FY 1982, the Air Force will employ a force of one active F-15 squadron, four active Air Force and five Air National Guard F-106 squadrons, and five Air National Guard F-4 squadrons. The ground environment systems include two regional operations control centers, four regional control centers, and 60 surveillance radar sites (including USAF/FAA joint use). Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland are manned primarily by contractor personnel.

FY 1983 active military decreases reflect the continued implementation of the manpower-saving Joint Surveillance System and the phase-out of F101 units.

The FY 1983 civilian manpower reductions are primarily the result of implementation of the manpower-saving Joint Surveillance System.

3. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces. Manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	11.1	11.4	11.8
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.2	1.1

Control and Surveillance Forces include the following aircraft in FY 1983: one squadron of SR-71s for reconnaissance; 27 EC-135 post attack command and control system aircraft, which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communications relay, and launch control centers; and four E-4A/B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft. The ground environment activities include the NORAD Command Post in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American continent; three ballistic missile early warning sites; five Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM) detection and warning sites; seven SPACE-TRACK facilities consisting of radars and ground-based, electro-optical deep space surveillance system sites; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program; three Air National Guard aircraft control and warning sites; and portions of the National Military Command System. Control and Surveillance Forces also include communications and command and control support equipment. Finally, some of the Worldwide Military Command automatic data processing resources are also included in this category.

The FY 1983 active military increase is due primarily to increased aircraft maintenance manpower requirements for the Post Attack Command and Control System and National Emergency Airborne Command Post Missions.

The FY 1982 civilian decrease is due to a transfer of manpower resources from the Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces to the Central Logistics Forces.

B. Tactical/Mobility. Air Force Tactical and Mobility Forces are discussed in the following sections.

1. Tactical Air Forces. The following tables show Air Force Tactical Air Forces.

### Air Force Tactical Air Forces

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Fighter Wings	26	26	26
Tactical Fighter Squadrons	78	79	80
Reconnaissance Squadrons	6	6	7
Special Operations Force Squadrons	5	5	5
Airborne Warning and Control Squadrons	3	3	3
Airborne TACCS Squadrons	11	11	11
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10)	0	1	1
Electronic Combat Squadrons	1	2	2
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ANGUS Fighter/Attack Squadrons	31	33	35
ANGUS Reconnaissance Squadrons	8	8	7
USAFR Fighter/Attack Squadrons	8	9	10
USAFR Special Operations Squadrons	2	2	2
ANGUS Airborne TACS Squadrons	6	5	4
ANGUS Electronic Combat Squadron	1	1	1
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10) (USAFR-Assoc) 1/	0	1	1

1/ Associate squadrons provide aircrews for utilization with active USAF squadrons.

### Air Force Tactical Air Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	89.2	97.8	104.8
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	43.9	45.0	45.3
USAFR	6.8	9.3	9.9
<u>Civilian</u>	14.6	15.8	15.9

Tactical Air Forces consist of the tactical fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, and command and control aircraft for close air support, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance, tanker/cargo, and special purpose missions. Manpower supporting these forces includes air crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance personnel, and weapon systems security and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included in this category are the forces and manpower for the Air Force's Tactical Air Control Systems, the Air Force Test and Evaluation Center, civil engineering deployable heavy repair (RED HORSE) squadrons, and tactical intelligence squadrons.



FY 1982 active military increases are a result of growth of authorized tactical aircraft and associated maintenance requirement for combat readiness/capability. These increases are partially offset by savings in maintenance as a result of force modernization. Active military increases in FY 1983 are due principally to the increases in tactical combat/training aircraft and the initial manpower authorizations for European Ground Launched Cruise Missile beddown.

Reserve component increases in FY 1982 and FY 1983 reflect the continued modernization and expansion of the Air Force Reserve Tactical Fighter Force, to include conversion of A-37 and F-105 Squadrons with increases in A-10, F-4, and KC-10 PAA.

ANGUS increases in the tactical unit totals in FY 1982 are the result of conversion of one EB-57(DSE) and one OA-37 (TACS) Squadron to the tactical mission in F-4C and A-10 Aircraft. FY 1983 changes are the result of the conversion of a RF-4C and an O-2 Unit to F-4 Aircraft.

The civilian manpower increases in FY 1982 and FY 1983 are a result of growth in tactical and training aircraft and associated maintenance requirements.

2. Mobility Forces. The following tables show Air Force Mobility Forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Airlift Squadrons	14	14	14
Strategic Airlift Squadrons	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons	3	3	3
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons	8	8	8
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
Tactical Airlift Squadrons		36	35
Strategic Airlift Squadrons (USAFR-Assoc) 1/		17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons (USAFR-Assoc) 1/		1	1
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons		6	6

1/ Associate airlift squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel (maintenance personnel only in Strategic Airlift Squadrons) for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aeromedical evacuation squadron, four C-5A squadrons, and 13 C-141 squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	37.0	38.4	39.4
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	17.3	16.7	17.4
USAFR	33.7	31.4	31.9
<u>Civilian</u>	12.8	13.1	13.0

Air Force Mobility Forces consist of the tactical airlift, strategic airlift, aeromedical airlift, and aerospace rescue and recovery aircraft of the Military Airlift Command, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. Manpower supporting these forces includes crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance, and aircraft security personnel. This category also includes manpower for aerial port operations and Air Force special mission forces.

Active military manpower increases in FY 1982 and FY 1983 are primarily due to strategic aerial port increases to meet wartime shortfalls. In addition, a structural realignment in FY 1982 of tactical airlift command and control from Tactical Air Force into Air Force Mobility Forces caused a portion of the build.

ANGUS manpower increases in FY 1983 reflect the increase to the Aerial Port Squadrons and Aeromedical Crews. USAFR manpower decreases in FY 1982 and increases in FY 1983 reflect changes in force structure.

Primary civilian manpower decreases in FY 1983 are associated with transfer of postal service from Air Force Mobility Forces into Tactical Air Forces.

C. Auxiliary Activities. Auxiliary Activities are subdivided into Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development Activities, and Geophysical Activities.

1. Intelligence.

Air Force Intelligence Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.1	14.7	15.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.6	1.8	1.9

This category includes manpower for the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelligence Program, and Air Force support to the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. The Air Force Intelligence Service and the Air Force Electronic Security Command are the two Air Force organizations whose primary mission is intelligence; however, nearly all major Air Force organizations also support these activities.

FY 1983 active military and civilian increases reflect a growth in analytical efforts in support of the national intelligence program.

## 2. Centrally Managed Communications.

### Air Force Centrally Managed Communications Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.9	16.7	16.2
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	10.5	11.6	11.8
USAFR	0.0	*	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	4.3	4.3	4.2

\* Less than 50

This category includes manpower supporting long-haul defense communication systems, Air Force communications systems, satellite communications systems, and the Air Force Communications Command engineering and installation activities.

The FY 1983 active military decrease is a result of re-alignment of contingency communications resources from Centrally Managed Communications to Air Force Tactical Forces.

Increased ANGUS manpower in FY 1982 reflects the Air National Guard's efforts to enhance the readiness of its communications units. ANGUS FY 1983 manpower increases are tied to new equipment/modernization within the communications units.

FY 1983 civilian decreases are due primarily to actions taken to comply with best estimates of cost effective contracting.

### 3. Research and Development

#### Air Force Research and Development Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.5	10.8	11.1
<u>Civilian</u>	13.6	13.9	14.1

This category includes manpower, primarily in the Air Force Systems Command, which carries out basic and applied research and design, development, test, and evaluation of Air Force systems and subsystems. Manpower in this category also supports various Department of Defense research and development activities and agencies.

The increase in active military and civilian manpower in FY 1983 is the result of moving the Air Force Systems Command Product Division out of the Research and Development DPPC and into management headquarters DPPC.

### 4. Geophysical Activities

#### Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.7	8.0	8.2
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.4	0.5	0.5
USAFR	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.2	1.2

The manpower in this category supports active and reserve weather service activities, meteorological and navigational satellite/space programs, and Defense mapping, charting, and geodesy activities. The active military build in FY 1983 is the result of growth in satellite control facilities and the manned space flight support group.

D. Support Activities. Support Activities are subdivided into Base Operating Support, Medical Support, Personnel Support, Individual Training, Force Support Training, Central Logistics, Centralized Support Activities, Management Headquarters, and Federal Agency Support.

Accounting for Base Operating Support (BOS) manpower varies among the Services. All the Services include in the BOS category those people who provide fixed-site services such as housing and real property maintenance. However, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps manpower providing food, transportation, and supply type services to divisions and ships are integral with those units for operational purposes and are counted as mission manpower. The Air Force accounts for this manpower in BOS and carries only operations and maintenance manpower in its Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. These organizational differences preclude making simple "combat to support" comparisons among the Services.

1. Base Operating Support. BOS has two subcategories: Combat Installations and Support Installations.

a. Base Operating Support - Combat Installations.  
Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Combat Installations  
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	111.7	112.4	116.1
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.5	0.5	0.5
USAFR	5.8	5.8	6.1
<u>Civilian</u>	49.8	50.2	49.3

This category contains manpower resources essential for the direct support and overall readiness of our combat forces in such vital functions as control tower operations, aircraft dispatch, air-field and combat facilities maintenance and battle damage repair, fire protection and crash rescue, security, base communications, food service, transportation, data automation, and supply.

Active military manpower increases in FY 1983 are primarily due to growth in authorized tactical aircraft in Tactical Air Forces and the build of the Ground Launch Cruise Missile Forces.

USAFR manpower increases in FY 1983 reflect requirements to reduce manpower shortfalls to operate eleven bases and an increase in PRIME RIBS and other civil engineering areas.

FY 1983 civilian manpower decreases are primarily due to contract conversions and adjustments to meet best estimates of cost-effective contracting.

b. Base Operating Support - Support Installations

Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Support Installations.  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	43.2	44.2	45.0
<u>Civilian</u>	39.9	39.1	37.0

This category contains manpower resources for the operation and maintenance of auxiliary, logistics, and training installations and other base operating support activities such as base hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, laundries, and commissaries.

FY 1982 active military increase is due to an end strength shortfall at the end of FY 1981. FY 1983 military increases are the result of builds to support growth throughout the Air Force. Growth in the Tactical Air Forces is the primary cause for increases in Base Operating Support Manpower at support installations.

FY 1983 civilian manpower decreases are primarily due to the implementation of the Joint Surveillance System and civilian to military conversions in security police critical skills areas.

2. Medical Support.

Air Force Medical Support Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.0	14.5	14.5
Reserve Components			
USAFR	1.9	2.3	2.6
<u>Civilian</u>	3.1	3.1	3.1

Included in this category is manpower required to provide medical and dental care to eligible individuals in Air Force medical centers and dental facilities. It also includes medical research and development and Air Force Reserve medical service units.


The USAFR increase in 1983 is due to additional medical support for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).

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### 3. Personnel Support.

#### Air Force Personnel Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.3	6.3	6.3
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.5	0.5	0.5
USAFR	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.4	1.4

The Air Force operates over 1,000 recruiting offices and contributes manpower to 69 Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations. Air Force manpower requirements in support of investigative activities, personnel processing, and the Air Force Aerial Demonstration Team are also included in this category.

### 4. Individual Training.

#### Air Force Individual Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.3	21.9	23.5
<u>Civilian</u>	5.2	5.3	5.4

Manpower required to conduct training is included in this category. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Trainees, Students, and Cadets accounts of the Individuals category.

Increases in FY 1983 active military are due primarily to changes in accession training (both quality and quantity), changes in undergraduate pilot training rates, and changes in engineer education initiatives.

The apparent civilian build in FY 1983 reflects minor work load increases that result, due to rounding, in a program increase.

Detailed justification of training requirements is presented in the FY 1983 Military Manpower Training Report.



5. Force Support Training.

Air Force Force Support Training Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	24.8	25.6	26.2
<u>Civilian</u>	1.8	1.8	1.9

Manpower in this category includes Air Force strategic, tactical, and mobility mission support training. Tactical fighter aggressor squadrons and manpower supporting chemical/biological defensive training are also included.

FY 1983 active military and civilian increases are due to training program growths in both Strategic and Tactical Air Forces. In addition there is steady growth Air Force wide in training programs.

6. Central Logistics.

Air Force Central Logistics Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.4	4.6	4.7
<u>Civilian</u>	71.0	70.7	69.5

Air Force manpower for this category is required for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities, primarily of the Air Force Logistics Command.

The apparent military build in FY 1983 is the result of minor work load increases that result, due to rounding, in a program increase.

Civilian manpower decreases in FY 1983 are due to potential conversions of in-house functions to contract.

## 7. Centralized Support Activities.

### Air Force Centralized Support Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.0	13.8	14.1
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	1.4	2.1	2.2
USAFR	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	8.8	8.9	8.9

The manpower in this category is for centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs and includes Air Force support to OSD, JCS, unified commands, and international military organizations. Manpower supporting foreign military sales, counterintelligence activities, readiness support, personnel administration, finance centers, public affairs, and various Air Reserve Force activities is also included.

Active military manpower in FY 1983 increases principally due to a growth in the Foreign Military Sales program.

ANGUS strength increases in FY 1983 to accommodate an expanded air base ground defense mission plus aircraft conversion initiatives.

## 8. Management Headquarters.

### Air Force Manpower in DoD Management Headquarters (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	18.0	17.8	17.9
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.1	0.1	0.1
USAFR	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	9.1	8.8	8.8

The manpower in this category supports Air Force Management Headquarters including the Departmental Headquarters Air Force Secretariat, and the Air Staff (including the National Guard Bureau), Departmental Support Activities, major command headquarters and their numbered Air Force headquarters, Air Force Reserve headquarters, and Air Force Systems Command Product Divisions. Air Force manpower supporting international military headquarters and unified command headquarters is also included in this category. Active military manpower increases are due to build in the Data Services Center.

## 9. Federal Agency Support.

### Air Force Federal Agency Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.3	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

\*Fewer than 50.

This category includes manpower supporting other federal agencies on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis.

E. Undermanning. The internal manpower management system of the Air Force records authorized strength for force units as opposed to the projected actual strength shown in this report. Authorized strength for a given unit, and hence for a given DPPC, differs from the actual in-place strength because of fluctuations in manning. Active Air Force military strength fluctuates continuously as personnel enter and leave the service. High school graduates are available in the summer months, and hence the Air Force strength declines through the spring in anticipation of the prime recruiting months of June, July, and August. Thus, although the Air Force meets overall military end strength levels by the year end, some airmen will still be in the training pipeline as opposed to filling required manpower positions in field units.

### Undermanning (End Strength In Thousand)

	<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
Active Military	N/A	-8.2	-7.4

Undermanning decreases in FY 1983 as the result of a larger accessions program.

F. Individual Mobilization Augmentees. Each year the Air Force identifies its ability to meet wartime requirements using the resources of assigned active units and Reserve Force units gained at mobilization. Deficits between peacetime and wartime requirements form the basis for validating individual mobilization augmentee requirements. In FY 1982, 18,615 deficit M-Day Requirements were identified. Reserve individual mobilization augmentees -- primarily prior service military personnel -- are assigned to these positions.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees  
(End Strength in thousands)

	<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
USAFR	8.8**	10.1***	10.8***

\*\* Does not include 690 Pay Group "D" participants

\*\*\* Includes 1,000 Pay Group "D" Participants

Individual mobilization augmentee programmed strength increases in both FY 1982 and FY 1983 are based on Air Force estimates of its ability to recruit these personnel in the required skills.

G. Individuals. The Individuals accounts contain manpower required for transients; patients, prisoners, and holdees; trainees and students; and Air Force Academy cadets.

1. Transients

Air Force Transient Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.6	15.6	16.1

Transient manpower is required to maintain unit manning at authorized levels while military members are in travel and leave-enroute status during PCS moves. The active military increase for FY 1983 reflects a greater number of projected PCS moves to support the higher end strength in FY 1983.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Air Force Patient, Prisoner, and Holdee Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.6	0.6	0.6

Air Force manpower in this category includes patients, prisoners, and personnel assigned to the Correctional and Rehabilitation Squadron for retraining.

### 3. Trainees and Students

#### Air Force Trainee and Student Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	43.0	43.5	45.9
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	2.1	2.2	2.5
USAFR	1.3	1.3	1.6

This category accounts for people undergoing training. The active military increase in FY 1983 is the result of increased trainees/students projected from higher accession rates.

Air Force Reserve manpower changes in FY 1983 reflect changes in the accession program resulting from new incentive programs and a weighted recruiter awards system. ANGUS increases in FY 1983 reflect the increase in the number of individuals in initial skill training required to meet increased manning levels and to provide a balanced force mix of prior and non-prior service personnel.

### 4. Cadets

#### Air Force Cadet Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.4	4.4	4.4

This category includes only Air Force Academy cadets and remains constant throughout the program.

VII DEFENSE AGENCIES

## CHAPTER VII

### DEFENSE AGENCIES MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

#### I. Introduction

This chapter contains the manpower requirements of the following organizations:

Office of the Secretary of Defense

- Staff

- Field Activities 1/

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Defense Audit Service

Defense Audiovisual Agency

Defense Communications Agency

Defense Contract Audit Agency

Defense Intelligence Agency

Defense Investigative Service

Defense Legal Service

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Mapping Agency

Defense Nuclear Agency

Defense Security Assistance Agency

Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences.

US Court of Military Appeals

These organizations, collectively called the defense agencies for the purposes of this report, *perform specialized functions supporting the entire Department of Defense.* The National Security Agency is excluded from this report for security reasons.

#### II. Manpower Requirements

The combined manpower requirements of the defense agencies are shown in the following table. All military strengths displayed in the table and throughout this chapter are included in service strengths in the preceding chapters. In all tables in this chapter, details may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Includes people assigned to the Washington Headquarters Services, the American Forces Information Service, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services, the Tri-Service Medical Information System Project Office, the Office of Economic Adjustment, and the Department of Defense Dependents Schools.

Defense Agencies Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	7.7	8.1	8.2
Civilian, Direct Hire and Indirect Hire	80.3	84.2	85.6
	_____	_____	_____
Total	88.0	92.3	93.8

The FY 1981 data shown throughout this chapter are actual strengths as contrasted to manpower space authorizations in FY 1982 and FY 1983. Actual civilian strengths are typically below authorizations because vacated positions cannot always be immediately refilled. This accounts for all apparent FY 1981 to FY 1982 civilian increases in this chapter unless otherwise indicated.

The mission and associated manpower requirements of each agency are discussed in the following paragraphs. At the end of this chapter, the combined defense agency manpower requirements are displayed by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

A. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

1. Staff. OSD staff provides the Secretary of Defense with the analytical capability and specialized expertise necessary for him to fulfill his management responsibilities over the vast and complex operations of the Defense Department. OSD staff manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

OSD Staff Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	0.5	0.4	0.4
Civilian	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>
Total	1.6	1.6	1.6

2. Field Activities of OSD. Field activities comprise the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) and five other organizations that perform designated services, under the direct supervision of an OSD staff official, for designated DoD activities. These programs are more limited in scope than those of a defense agency. These organizations are described below.

a. The Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) provides administrative support to the OSD staff and to the other OSD field activities.



b. The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) is responsible for the DoD Armed Forces Information Program, including the dissemination of internal information and the management of materials and resources used in support of this program.

c. The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) manages the payment for medical care in non-military facilities for retired members and for dependents or survivors of active or retired members.

d. The Tri-Service Medical Management Information System (TRIMIS) Program Office centrally manages the development and application of standardized automated systems to improve the effectiveness and economy of health care in the military services.

e. The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) aids communities which have been affected by major program changes such as base closures, contract cutbacks, reductions-in-force, and growth impacts.

f. The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS) administers and operates the primary and secondary schools for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas.

The combined manpower requirements of the field activities of OSD are shown in the following table.

	<u>Manpower Requirements</u> <u>Field Activities of OSD</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	0.2	0.2	0.2
Civilian	<u>11.0</u>	<u>12.2</u>	<u>11.9</u>
Total	11.2	12.4	12.1

Civilian changes within the OSD field activities are primarily associated with DoDDS. The increase in FY 1982 is to support Title XIV requirements; the decrease in FY 1983 results from declining enrollment.

B. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)

OJCS provides military expertise and technical and administrative support to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to aid them in discharging their statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense. OJCS manpower requirements are as follows:

OJCS Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	1.0	1.1	1.1
Civilian	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>
Total	1.3	1.4	1.4

C. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

DARPA manages high-risk, high-payoff basic research and applied technology programs. Its objective is to select and pursue revolutionary technology developments that minimize the possibility of technological surprise and offer potential for major increases in national defense capability. In the performance of its work, DARPA makes use of the services of the military departments, other government agencies, private industry, educational and research institutions, and individuals. The following table shows DARPA's manpower requirements.

DARPA Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	0.1	0.1	0.1

\*Fewer than 50 spaces.

D. Defense Audit Service (DAS)

DAS plans and conducts audits for OSD, the unified and specified commands, the defense agencies, and security assistance and other DoD-wide programs. DAS manpower requirements are shown below.

DAS Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Civilian Only	0.4	0.5	0.6

The increase in FY 1982 is due to the transfer of 100 spaces from the Defense Investigative Service for the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, which is administratively assigned to DAS.

The additional increase in FY 1983 is to add audit staff to support increased audits of areas susceptible to fraud, waste, and mismanagement; support newly established contract and internal audit followup responsibilities outlined in DoD Directive 5000.41 and 5000.42; reduce the audit cycle for Defense Agency mission workload; respond promptly to OSD staff and Defense Agency requests for audit service; and implement GAO standards of computer based systems.

E. Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA)

DAVA was established by DoD Directive 5040.1 in June 1979. Its mission is to provide to all DoD components centrally managed production, acquisition, distribution, and depository support and services for selected audiovisual aids. DAVA's manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

	<u>DAVA Manpower Requirements</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	0.1	0.1	0.1
Civilian	0.5	0.5	0.3
Total	0.6	0.6	0.4

The reduction in spaces between FY 1982 and FY 1983 is due to the conversion of civilian spaces to contract.

F. Defense Communications Agency (DCA)

DCA is responsible for:

- System engineering and management of the Defense Communications System;
- System architect functions for current and future Military Satellite Communications Systems;
- System engineering and technical support to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the National Military Command System, and the Minimum Essential Communications Network; and
- Procurement of leased communications circuits, services, facilities, and equipment for DoD and other government agencies.

DCA's manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

	<u>DCA Manpower Requirements</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	1.5	1.5	1.5
Civilian	1.6	1.6	1.6
Total	3.1	3.1	3.1

G. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

The Defense Contract Audit Agency is a worldwide single mission agency responsible for assisting Department of Defense procurement authorities in achieving sound contract pricing by evaluating proposals submitted by contractors for proposed contracts, verifying the propriety and acceptability of costs charged to flexibly priced government contracts, and deterring contractors' inefficient practices that, if not detected and corrected, lead to excessive costs and contract prices. The agency also provides contract audit services to about 30 other Federal agencies at contractor locations where DoD has a continuing audit interest, or where it is considered efficient from a government-wide point of view.

DCAA's manpower requirements are as follows:

	<u>DCAA Manpower Requirements</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Civilian Only	3.5	3.5	4.0

Contract audit work load is generated by procurement and contract administration activities. The approved funding level for the DoD procurement and research and development programs directly affects the work load of DCAA. Other factors affecting contract audit work load are DoD procurement policies, the implementation of existing Cost Accounting Standards (Public Law 91-379), reviews required under Public Law 87-653 (The Truth in Negotiations Act), new or expanding programs of non-Defense agencies, and audits performed for the military departments in connection with the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program.

The expanding DoD acquisition programs planned for FY 1983 and beyond require additional staff in order for DCAA to continue to provide the financial information and advice required by the DoD contracting community.

H. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The primary mission of DIA is to produce finished, all-source foreign general military and scientific and technical intelligence and all DoD intelligence estimates and DoD contributions to National Estimates; determine information gaps and validate intelligence collection requirements; provide plans, programs, policies, and procedures for DoD intelligence collection activities; manage the production of general military intelligence by the military services, unified and specified commands, and DIA; produce or manage the production of all DoD scientific and technical intelligence; serve as the J-2 of the Joint Staff; and manage and coordinate all DoD intelligence information systems programs and the interface of such systems with the intelligence community and DoD systems.

The DIA supports the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commands, military departments, the National Security Council, various other departments of the Executive Branch, and congressional committees. The table below shows DIA manpower requirements.

DIA Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	1.8	2.0	2.0
Civilian	2.6	2.7	3.0
Total	4.4	4.7	5.0

The civilian increase in FY 1982 reflects approved program growth and includes an increase in key analytical positions and essential support personnel for unsupported analyst work force increases of FY 1980 and FY 1981. The increase in FY 1983 includes augmentation of analytical manpower, support personnel, data systems engineers and managers, and technical personnel.

I. Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

DIS conducts personnel security investigations, law enforcement investigations for DoD Components as authorized, and other investigations as directed by the Secretary of Defense. It also administers defense industrial security programs on behalf of the DoD and other Federal departments and agencies.

The following table shows the manpower requirements of the DIS.

DIS Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	0.1	0.1	*
Civilian Only	2.4	3.4	3.5
Total	2.6	3.5	3.5

The DIS civilian increase in FY 1982 is to handle increased work load, reduce investigative backlog, and improve average case completion time.

Offsetting changes in military and civilian end strength in FY 1983 reflect anticipated achievement of the DIS civilianization program.

\*Fewer than 50 spaces

J. Defense Legal Service (DLS)

The Defense Legal Service was established on August 12, 1981 to consolidate the functions of the OSD legal staff with the legal staffs of the Defense Agencies. The legal staffs of the Defense Agencies and OSD field activities will remain with their current organizations while operating under the supervision of the DoD General Counsel/Director DLS. Only the spaces on the OSD staff are being transferred to the Defense Legal Service. Manpower requirements for DLS are shown below:

DLS Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Civilian Only		53	53
Total		<u>53</u>	<u>53</u>

K. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

DLA provides common supplies and a broad range of logistic services to the military departments, other defense components, Federal agencies, and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence and medical goods, industrial and construction material, general supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services rendered by DLA include contract administration, surplus personal property disposal, documentation services to the R&D community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System.

DLA is the largest of the defense agencies, accomplishing its varied missions both in the United States and overseas through 25 major field activities. The manpower required for DLA's extensive operations is displayed in the following table.

DLA Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	1.0	1.1	1.1
Civilian	47.0	48.3	48.9
Total	<u>48.0</u>	<u>49.4</u>	<u>50.0</u>

The civilian increase in FY 1982 arises from the transfer of consumable item management from the Services and work load increases in supply service centers and depots. The increase in FY 1983 results from further increases in supply service center and depot work load.

L. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

DMA provides Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic (MC&G) support to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and other DoD components through the production and worldwide

distribution of maps, charts, precise positioning data, and digital data for strategic and tactical military operations and weapons systems. It serves as Program Manager and coordinator of all DoD MC&G resources and activities and carries out statutory responsibilities for providing nautical charts and marine navigation data for use of all vessels of the United States and of navigators generally.

DMA manpower requirements are shown below.

<u>DMA Manpower Requirements</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	0.4	0.4	0.4
Civilian	8.3	8.3	8.6
Total	<u>8.7</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>9.0</u>

The civilian increase in FY 1983 is to provide increased support to the Cruise Missile program.

M. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

DNA is the consolidated manager of the DoD nuclear weapons stockpile. It also manages the nuclear weapon effects test and development programs. DNA manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

<u>DNA Manpower Requirements</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	0.5	0.5	0.5
Civilian	0.6	0.6	0.7
Total	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>

DNA's civilian increase in FY 1983 is due primarily to augmentation of its nuclear weapon effects test program.

N. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)

DSAA is responsible for management of the DoD Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs. Its manpower requirements are as follows:

DSAA Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	0.1	0.1	0.1

\* Fewer than 50 spaces.

O. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS)

USUHS provides high quality education in health sciences to individuals who demonstrate dedication to a career in the health professions of the uniformed services. The University is authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees.

Manpower requirements of the growing University are as follows:

USUHS Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military	0.6	0.7	0.7
Civilian	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>
Total	1.2	1.4	1.4

P. US Court of Military Appeals (USCMA)

The US Court of Military Appeals serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction over every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, and confinement for a year or more.

The manpower requirements of the US Court of Military Appeals are shown below.

USCMA Manpower Requirements  
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Civilian Only	40	49	49

III. Manpower Requirements By DPPC.

The following tables show the combined military and civilian requirements of the defense agencies, arranged by DPPC.



DEFENSE AGENCIES MILITARY<sup>1/</sup> MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces			
Tactical Air Forces			
Naval Forces			
Mobility Forces			
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.5</u>
Intelligence	1.7	1.8	1.9
Centrally Managed Communications	0.9	1.0	1.0
Research and Development	0.2	0.2	0.2
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.2</u>
Base Operating Support	0.1	0.1	0.1
Medical Support	*	*	*
Personnel Support	*	*	*
Individual Training	0.6	0.7	0.7
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	0.9	1.0	1.0
Centralized Support Activities	0.3	0.2	0.1
Management Headquarters	2.2	2.2	2.2
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>8.2</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Transients			
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees			
Students, Trainees			
Cadets			
<u>Total</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>8.2</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

<sup>1/</sup> Military strengths in agencies are also included in Service tables.  
NSA is excluded due to security reasons.

\* Fewer than 50.

DEFENSE AGENCIES CIVILIAN<sup>1/</sup> MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>11.5</u>	<u>11.6</u>	<u>12.2</u>
Intelligence	2.4	2.6	2.8
Centrally Managed Communications	0.7	0.7	0.7
Research and Development	0.2	0.2	0.2
Geophysical Activities	8.1	8.1	8.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>68.3</u>	<u>72.0</u>	<u>72.8</u>
Base Operating Support	6.0	5.9	5.9
Medical Support	0.3	0.3	0.3
Personnel Support	10.3	11.4	11.1
Individual Training	0.6	0.6	0.7
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	40.0	41.3	41.9
Centralized Support Activities	7.0	8.1	8.5
Management Headquarters	4.2	4.3	4.3
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>80.3</u>	<u>84.2</u>	<u>85.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ NSA manpower is excluded due to security reasons.

PART B. SPECIAL ANALYSES  
AND DATA

## PART B - Special Analyses and Data

Part B contains special analyses of four subjects related to the Defense manpower program. It also contains a description of manpower and forces by location.

Chapter VIII	-	Recruit Quality
Chapter IX	-	Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Armed Forces
Chapter X	-	Cost of Manpower
Chapter XI	-	Manpower and Forces by Location
Chapter XII	-	Manpower Data Structure



## CHAPTER VIII

### RECRUIT QUALITY

#### I. Introduction

Quality performance in any profession is difficult to measure and even more difficult to predict. The quality of an individual's performance will be the product of many traits that are impossible to measure. Honesty, skill, integrity, loyalty, commitment, determination, and motivation are but a few. Other situational factors such as work environment, esprit, training, and leadership contribute to whether an individual succeeds or fails. We would like to measure quality with confidence and to further connect that measurement to predictable job performance. Unfortunately, we cannot.

There are two aspects of quality we can measure, however: education level attained and mental aptitude. To some extent they serve as surrogates for most of the traits described above. Certainly how far one progresses in his or her education is a function of commitment, determination, and motivation. Aptitude testing predicts skill and is an indication of training potential. While there are some limitations and disagreement on exactly how direct these relationships are, historical data suggest that such measures are valid and that they fairly describe the quality of a work force.

#### II. Educational Attainment

Possession of a high school diploma is an important indicator of the capacity of individuals to adjust successfully to military life. In fact, a non-high school graduate is twice as likely to leave the military before completing his/her first enlistment than is a high school diploma graduate.

In FY 1981, the overall educational level of non-prior service enlisted accessions (as measured by high school graduation status) was somewhat higher than the educational level of civilian youth. As shown in Table 1, the Services recruited proportionately more individuals with a high school diploma and proportionately fewer non-graduates than are found in the general population (18-23 years). Approximately 81 percent of all new recruits possessed a high school diploma, compared with 74 percent of contemporary youth.

Table 1  
Comparison of FY 1981 Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accessions and the  
U.S. Youth Population by Educational Attainment

	Percent			Percent		
	High School Graduates*			Non-High School Graduates		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Army	78	94	80	22	6	20
Navy	74	93	76	26	7	24
Marine Corps	79	100	80	21	0	20
Air Force	88	88	88	12	12	12
DoD Total	79	92	81	21	8	19
18-23 Year Old						
Youth Population	71	76	74	29	24	26

\*High school graduate data exclude General Educational Development (GED) high school equivalency. These are included as non-high school graduate accessions.

Table 2 shows the percentages, by Service and race, of non-prior service high school graduate accessions for selected years since FY 1964. The proportion of high school graduates increased in all Services between FY 1980 and FY 1981. In the Army, the proportion of white recruits with a high school diploma rose from 48 percent to 76 percent; the proportion of blacks with a high school diploma similarly jumped from 63 percent to 91 percent.

Table 2

High School Graduates<sup>a/</sup> Percentage of Total Non-Prior Service  
Enlisted Accessions By Race and Service

Service	Whites						
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Army	*	*	61	49	56	48	76
Navy	*	*	78	69	75	72	74
Marine Corps	*	*	47	47	63	69	78
Air Force	*	*	85	85	90	83	89
DoD Total	*	*	68	61	69	65	79
	Blacks						
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Army	*	*	64	50	64	63	91
Navy	*	*	69	67	81	86	87
Marine Corps	*	*	47	46	66	76	87
Air Force	*	*	81	90	93	91	94
DoD Total	*	*	65	57	70	72	90
	Total						
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Army	70	71	61	50	59	54	80
Navy	57	82	71	64	77	75	76
Marine Corps	61	58	52	50	62	78	80
Air Force	84	93	83	92	89	83	88
DoD Total	69	74	67	61	69	68	81

\*Educational data by race not available prior to FY 1971.

<sup>a/</sup> High school graduate data exclude GED recipients. These are included as non-high school graduates.

It is also apparent in Table 2 that a relatively greater percentage of blacks with high school diplomas than white high school graduates in all four Services have entered active duty each year since the mid-1970s. In total DoD, almost eight out of ten white recruits during FY 1981 possessed high school diplomas compared with about nine out of ten black recruits.

The Armed Forces encourage their members to advance in education while they serve, and many servicemembers take advantage of these opportunities. Attrition and reenlistment policy also operate over time to raise the average level of education in the active force. Table 3 shows that, in comparison with the male population of the United States, enlisted personnel appear highly overrepresentative of high school graduates and highly underrepresentative of college graduates. At the same time, it should be noted that virtually all officers (92 percent) are college graduates and that comparisons between the general population and the enlisted force only are open to questions. When officers are included in the education distribution, approximately 14 percent of all active duty military personnel are found to possess a bachelor's or advanced degree. This percentage is similar to that observed for the general population.

Table 3

Comparison of Educational Attainment of FY 1981  
Active Duty End Strength and the U.S. Male Population  
(Percent)

Service	Officers (includes Warrant Officers)			
	Non-High School	High School Graduates a/	Some College	College Graduates
Army	0	3	8	89
Navy	0	3	5	92
Marine Corps	0	9	11	80
Air Force	0	0	2	98
DoD Total	0	3	5	92

	Enlisted			
	Non-High School	High School Graduates a/	Some College	College Graduates
Army	14	74	9	2
Navy	12	86	2	1
Marine Corps	13	81	5	1
Air Force	2	80	16	2
DoD Total	10	79	9	2

	Total (Officers and Enlisted)			
	Non-High School	High School Graduates a/	Some College	College Graduates
Army	13	65	9	13
Navy	10	75	2	12
Marine Corps	12	74	6	8
Air Force	2	66	13	19
DoD Total	9	69	8	14

	U.S. Male Population			
	Non-High School	High School Graduates a/	Some College	College Graduates
Civilian Labor Force	27	37	17	19
Non-Labor Force	55	23	14	8
Total U.S. Males	32	36	16	16

a/ Includes General Educational Development (GED) equivalency certificates.



### III. Aptitude Test Scores

The "quality" of enlisted accessions is also evaluated on the basis of Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores. These scores, along with aptitude composite scores derived from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), are used in conjunction with educational, medical, and moral standards to determine applicant enlistment eligibility, enlistment guarantees, and assignment to occupations.

For reporting purposes, AFQT scores have traditionally been grouped into five broad categories. Persons who scored in Categories I and II are above average in trainability; those in Category III, average; those in Category IV, below average; and those in Category V, markedly below average and under current Service policy not eligible to enlist. The Services prefer enlistees in the higher AFQT categories because training time and associated costs are lower, and these recruits are more likely to qualify for specialized training in a greater number of occupational areas.

The AFQT in use from January 1976 through September 1980 was miscalibrated to earlier forms of the test. This error inflated the AFQT scores of low-scoring enlistees. The problem was corrected in October 1980 with the introduction of a new, accurately calibrated test. In addition, the inflated scores for the period FY 1976 through FY 1980 were recomputed. This recomputation showed that we had recruited fewer Category III recruits and more Category IV recruits than we had thought.

Table 4 shows the AFQT category distributions of military accessions for selected years. In addition, Figures 1 and 2 display graphically distributions for DoD and Army accessions over the same period. From FY 1964 through FY 1973, the proportions of new recruits who scored in the various categories remained fairly constant. The increase in AFQT scores during the period FY 1974 through FY 1976 was a function of several factors including the end of the Vietnam Conflict and the consequent drop in the number of accessions required, heightened recruiting efforts in connection with the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), and increases in military pay and compensation. Then in FY 1977, recruit AFQT scores dropped sharply. Three major factors that no doubt contributed to this decline were an improved national economy following the recession of 1974-75, a relative reduction in military pay and benefits (including the discontinuance of the G.I. Bill), and the ASVAB calibration problem.


In FY 1981, there was a dramatic increase in the proportion of enlistees who scored average or above on the AFQT. These increases in recruit AFQT scores resulted from a combination of elements: intensified recruiting efforts and increased emphasis on the recruitment of highly qualified youth; enhanced military pay, compensation, bonuses, and benefits; more positive attitudes of the American public toward the military; and the economy.

Table 4  
Distribution of Non-Prior Service Enlisted  
Accessions by AFQT Category, FY 1964 - FY 1981  
(Percent)

Fiscal Year	ARMY				NAVY				MARINE CORPS				AIR FORCE				TOTAL DOD			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
1964	6	28	47	19	6	35	48	11	5	33	53	9	9	41	46	4	6	32	47	14
1968	5	28	39	28	9	51	24	16	4	27	47	22	8	39	37	16	6	32	38	24
1972	4	29	49	18	5	33	43	20	2	22	56	20	5	38	49	8	4	31	49	17
1976	4	27	58	11	5	37	52	6	3	35	57	5	5	44	50	1	4	34	55	7
1980	2	14	35	50	4	32	46	18	2	24	47	27	4	35	51	10	3	24	42	31
1981	2	21	46	31	4	35	49	12	3	31	54	12	4	39	50	7	3	30	49	18

FIGURE 1


**DISTRIBUTION OF DOD TOTAL\*  
ACTIVE DUTY NON-PRIOR SERVICE ENLISTED  
ACCESSIONS BY AFQT CATEGORY**



\*INCLUDES NPS MALES AND FEMALES INDUCTEES, REGULARS AND RESERVES WITH 2 OR MORE YEARS ACTIVE COMMITMENT

FIGURE 2

**DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY TOTAL\*  
ACTIVE DUTY NON-PRIOR SERVICE ENLISTED  
ACCESSIONS BY AFQT CATEGORY**



\*INCLUDES NPS MALES AND FEMALES INDUCTEES, REGULARS AND RESERVES WITH 2 OR MORE YEARS ACTIVE COMMITMENT

In 1980, DoD and the Military Services sponsored a major research effort to assess the vocational aptitudes of contemporary youth. Data were obtained by administering the ASVAB to a nationally representative sample of about 12,000 young men and women, ages 16-23. The results of this study enable, for the first time, a valid comparison between the test scores of military recruits and the population of youth from which they are drawn.

Table 5 compares the AFQT score distributions of FY 1981 non-prior service enlisted accessions with those of the current youth population. Since the Services recruit primarily individuals who are ages 18 and older, data on contemporary youth were restricted to persons who were between the ages of 18 and 23 at the time of testing. Accession data are similarly limited to test scores of individuals within this age range so that direct comparisons can be made.

It can be seen in Table 5 that DoD enlisted a slightly smaller proportion of individuals with above-average scores (Categories I and II combined) than were found in the 1980 youth population. However, the proportion of accessions scoring in the average range (Category III) was considerably higher and the proportion of recruits in the below-average range (Categories IV and V combined) was lower than the comparable proportion of youth. In fact, 80 percent of all non-prior service accessions in FY 1981 received scores within AFQT Categories I through III, compared with 69 percent of contemporary young people.

Table 5

Comparison of the AFQT Category Distribution of the  
1980 Youth Population and FY 1981 Non-Prior Service Accessions  
18 to 23 years of age  
(Percent)

Population	AFQT Category					V a/ TOTAL
	I	II	III	IV		
<u>1980 Youth Population</u>	4	33	32	24	7	100
<u>1981 Accessions</u>						
DoD	3	30	47	20	0	100
Army	2	21	43	34	0	100
Navy	3	35	48	14	0	100
Marine Corps	3	30	53	14	0	100
Air Force	3	39	50	8	0	100

a/ Category V personnel are not eligible for enlistment.

Overall, individuals who entered military service in FY 1981 scored higher on the AFQT than did individuals in the youth population. This is partly the result of Service restrictions on the enlistment of individuals at the lower end of the aptitude range. Service policy, for example, currently prohibits the enlistment of applicants who score in Category V.

Table 6 compares the AFQT distributions of FY 1981 non-prior service enlisted accessions with the 1980 youth population by sex.

Table 6

Comparison of AFQT Category Distributions of the  
1980 Youth Population and FY 1981 Non-Prior Service Accessions, by Sex  
18 to 23 years of age  
(Percent)

Population	AFQT Category					V a/ TOTAL
	I	II	III	IV		
<u>MALE</u>						
<u>1980 Youth Population</u>	5	35	29	23	8	100
<u>1981 Accessions</u>						
DoD	3	30	47	20	0	100
Army	2	21	43	34	0	100
Navy	3	35	48	14	0	100
Marine Corps	3	29	53	15	0	100
Air Force	3	39	50	8	0	100
<u>FEMALE</u> <sup>b/</sup>						
<u>1980 Youth Population</u>	4	31	34	25	6	100
<u>1981 Accessions</u>						
DoD	3	29	51	17	0	100
Army	2	19	47	32	0	100
Navy	3	34	54	9	0	100
Marine Corps	3	47	50	0	0	100
Air Force	3	39	54	4	0	100

a/ Category V personnel are not eligible for enlistment.

b/ Females comprise approximately one-half of the 1980 youth population and less than one-fifth of FY 1981 accessions.

In general, a slightly smaller proportion of FY 1981 total DoD accessions of both sexes scored in the above average range (Categories I and II combined) than did their counterparts in the population of American youth. However, approximately 16 percent more DoD male and female accessions than contemporary youth scored in the average range (Category III). There were also fewer military enlistees of both sexes who scored below average (Categories IV and V combined.)

In making comparisons against the youth population, one should note that there is a portion of the population not reflected in the enlisted figures. This portion includes those youth who are college-bound and later enter DoD officer programs. The AFQT is not administered to individuals who enter officer programs. However, if officers did take the test, the proportion of accessions in the above average range would be greater since the majority of officers would most likely be in Categories I and II. Thus, if officers were included, the percentages in Categories I and II combined would probably increase between three and four percent.

The comparison of FY 1981 non-prior service accessions with the 1980 youth population indicates that the Services enjoyed a very successful recruiting year. However, it is important that the comparisons not be viewed in isolation. FY 1981 was occasioned by a sluggish economy, increased military pay and compensation, a more favorable public attitude toward the military, and sufficient recruiting resources. Not only might these factors become less favorable, but also increased manpower requirements, a declining youth market, and increased competition with academia and industry will all be strong influences on future recruiting success. Hence, it is prudent to couch the FY 1981 comparison as "where we are today," but not necessarily "where we will be tomorrow."

#### IV. College Eligibility

Some observers of the AVF have charged that the relatively low proportion of enlisted accessions with a college education is indicative of basic differences between military and civilian populations in social class, values, and academic capabilities. A comparison of the values and attitudes of military recruits and civilian youth is beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, because of methodological problems, it is not possible to evaluate the social and economic differences between military and civilian groups. It is possible, however, to estimate the potential academic capabilities of military recruits, based on the aptitude test requirements of U.S. colleges and universities. To that end, AFQT scores for FY 1981 non-prior service accessions were converted to estimates of scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). <sup>a/</sup>

Barron's Profile of American Colleges is a compendium of information about all fully accredited, four-year post-secondary institutions in the United States that offer bachelor's degrees. It groups these colleges and universities by degree of "admissions competition." These categories are not, however, ratings of schools' "quality of education." They are rather a description of their selectivity as determined by admissions test scores.

Five categories of admissions competition are defined in Barron's Profile. These are shown in Table 8 along with the range of Scholastic Aptitude Test scores of freshmen who enrolled in these institutions during school year 1979-1980. (The SAT scores were derived by averaging verbal and mathematics scores.) It should be noted that SAT scores are not the sole criterion for admissions. Most colleges and universities also place emphasis on other factors such as high school grades, participation in extra-curricular activities, work experience, interviews, and personal recommendations in accepting applicants for entry.

a/ Since the AFQT (which combines word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, and numerical operations subtests) correlates so highly ( $r=.80$ ) with the SAT, it was possible to convert AFQT scores to estimated SAT scores.

Table 7

## Levels of Competition for University Admissions

<u>Levels of</u> <u>Admissions Competition</u>	<u>Range of</u> <u>SAT Scores</u>
Most Competitive	625 and Above
Highly Competitive	575 - 624
Very Competitive	525 - 574
Competitive	425 - 524
Less Competitive	Below 425

An abbreviated list of institutions that fall within the five categories is presented below. It provides examples of colleges and universities that use the various SAT admissions criteria.

<u>Most Competitive</u>	<u>Highly Competitive</u>
California Institute of Technology	Duke University
Harvard University	Georgia Institute of Technology
Johns Hopkins University	University of California
<u>Very Competitive</u>	<u>Competitive</u>
Boston University	University of Texas
University of Michigan	Xavier University
Pennsylvania State University	Florida State University
<u>Less Competitive</u>	
University of New Mexico	
Memphis State University	
Slippery Rock State College	

Table 8 shows the percentage of FY 1981 non-prior service accessions, by Service and DoD total, whose estimated SAT scores would qualify them for admission into schools in the five categories.

Table 8  
Proportion of FY 1981 Non-Prior Service Accessions Whose Estimated SAT Scores Would Qualify Them for Enrollment\* into Four-Year Colleges and Universities

<u>Level of Admissions</u> <u>Competition</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Most Competitive	2	3	2	3	2
Highly Competitive	2	3	2	3	2
Very Competitive	3	5	3	5	4
Competitive	12	17	15	18	15
Less Competitive	81	73	78	72	76

\*Includes only high school diploma graduates and holders of GED certificates

For total DoD accessions, eight percent would qualify for colleges and universities in the "very competitive" to "most competitive" categories. When the "competitive" group is included, that proportion increases to 23 percent. Those figures vary by Service with the Army and Marine Corps slightly lower than the DoD totals and the Navy and Air Force somewhat higher.

In terms of aptitude, there is no reason to conclude that military recruits with high school diplomas are any different from their peers who decide to attend college. Military enlistees are capable, on the basis of their estimated SAT scores, of attending a representative group of U.S. colleges in approximately the same proportions as members of their peer group who elect college. Therefore, high school graduates who have the skills necessary for success in college may be choosing enlistment rather than college enrollment for economic or other reasons unrelated to their ability.

#### V. Summary

During the past several years, increasing interest has been expressed in the ability of enlisted personnel compared with that of the general population. In terms of education and aptitude test scores, recent military entrants compare favorably with contemporary youth. The overall educational level of FY 1981 non-prior service enlisted accessions (as measured by high school graduation) was higher than the educational level of civilian youth. In total DoD, approximately 81 percent of new recruits possessed a high school diploma compared with 74 percent of their civilian counterparts.

In comparison with the male population of the United States, enlisted personnel are highly overrepresentative of high school graduates, and highly underrepresentative of college graduates. Yet, when officers are included in the educational distribution, similar proportions of college graduates among military personnel and the general population are found.

Although there was a slightly smaller proportion of FY 1981 accessions who scored above average on the enlistment test, the proportion of accessions scoring in the average range was considerably higher than the comparable proportion of American youth; and the proportion of accessions who were below average was lower than in the youth population. Thus, it can be concluded that rather than being a military composed of poorly educated, low-aptitude individuals, today's recruits compare very favorably with civilian society.



IX DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE  
IN THE ARMED FORCES

## CHAPTER IX

### DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE IN THE ARMED FORCES

#### I. Background

Alcohol and drug abuse has become deeply imbedded in American society. Among 1980 high school seniors, 2 out of 3 had experimented with marijuana at least once, 3 out of 4 currently used alcohol, and 1 out of 3 reported current use of marijuana. Six percent reported daily alcohol use, and 9 percent used marijuana daily. The prevalence of abuse of drugs and alcohol varies considerably by age, sex, marital status, and education level. The highest risk group for both drug and alcohol problems consists of young, single, males -- precisely the population from which the Armed Forces recruit.

Given the widespread abuse of illicit drugs and alcohol, the Armed Forces obviously recruit drug-experienced youth. Screening procedures at accession identify those who are seriously dependent on chemicals, but the majority, whose drug or alcohol abuse has not been extensive enough to cause noticeable health impairment, pass all tests and enter the military. Moreover, excluding those former drug experimenters or users who are otherwise fully qualified for service is obviously impractical. They represent the majority of young people in the pool of potential servicemembers.

#### II. The Nature of the Problem in the Armed Forces

The substances abuse problem in the Armed Forces is best described as adolescent misbehavior. The group at risk has the following characteristics:

- Most are drug abusers; few are drug dependent (i.e., addicts).
- Most are between the ages of 18 and 25. After age 25, most develop more mature behavior. (For example, note the better auto insurance rates for people over 25.)
- Alcohol and marijuana are the most frequently abused chemicals.

The absolute drug abuse rates among the Services vary considerably. The Air Force has the lowest rate of current drug use (14%), followed by the Army (29%), Navy (33%), and the Marine Corps (37%). Details are in Table 1. Table 2 documents the fact that drug usage is concentrated among the junior enlisted portion of the Services. These data are derived from the DoD Worldwide Survey of Nonmedical Drug Use and Alcohol Use Among Military Personnel: 1980, dated November 14, 1980 (Sample size: 15,268).

TABLE 1  
POPULATION USING EACH DRUG  
(PERCENTAGE)

DRUG TYPE/ USE PERIOD	TOTAL DOD	SERVICE			
		ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
ANY DRUG USE					
PAST 30 Days	27	29	33	37	14
PAST 12 MONTHS	36	38	43	47	23
MARIJUANA/HASHISH					
PAST 30 DAYS	26	28	32	36	14
PAST 12 MONTHS	35	37	42	47	22
AMPHETAMINES OR OTHER UPPERS					
PAST 30 DAYS	6	6	10	8	3
PAST 12 MONTHS	13	12	19	19	6
COCAINE					
PAST 30 DAYS	4	4	7	8	1
PAST 12 MONTHS	11	10	17	19	5
HALLUCINOGENS (OTHER THAN PCP)					
PAST 30 DAYS	3	2	5	7	1
PAST 12 MONTHS	8	7	12	15	3
TRANQUILIZERS					
PAST 30 DAYS	2	2	3	2	1
PAST 12 MONTHS	6	5	9	7	2
BARBITURATES OR OTHER DOWNERS					
PAST 30 DAYS	2	3	3	3	1
PAST 12 MONTHS	6	6	8	9	3
OPIATES (OTHER THAN HEROIN)					
PAST 30 DAYS	1	2	2	2	+
PAST 12 MONTHS	4	4	5	6	1
PCP					
PAST 30 DAYS	1	1	1	3	+
PAST 12 MONTHS	4	4	5	10	1
HEROIN					
PAST 30 DAYS	1	1	1	+	+
PAST 12 MONTHS	2	3	1	1	+

+ Less than half of one percent

TABLE 2  
POPULATION USING EACH DRUG -- BY PAY GRADE GROUP  
(PERCENTAGE)

DRUG TYPE/ USE PERIOD	TOTAL DOD	PAY GRADES				
		E1-E5	E6-E9	W1-W4	O1-03	04-06
ANY DRUG USE						
PAST 30 DAYS	27	38	5	3	4	1
PAST 12 MONTHS	36	50	9	4	9	2
MARIJUANA/HASHISH						
PAST 30 DAYS	26	37	4	3	3	1
PAST 12 MONTHS	35	49	9	3	8	1
AMPHETAMINES OR OTHER UPPERS						
PAST 30 DAYS	6	9	1	0	+	+
PAST 12 MONTHS	13	19	2	0	1	+
COCAINE						
PAST 30 DAYS	4	7	+	0	+	0
PAST 12 MONTHS	11	17	1	2	+	+
HALLUCINOGENS (OTHER THAN PCP)						
PAST 30 DAYS	3	5	+	0	+	0
PAST 12 MONTHS	8	12	1	0	+	+
TRANQUILIZERS						
PAST 30 DAYS	2	3	+	0	+	0
PAST 12 MONTHS	6	8	1	+	1	+
BARBITURATES OR OTHER DOWNERS						
PAST 30 DAYS	2	3	+	0	+	0
PAST 12 MONTHS	6	8	1	0	1	0
OPIATES (OTHER THAN HEROIN)						
PAST 30 DAYS	1	2	+	0	+	0
PAST 12 MONTHS	4	5	+	0	+	+
PCP						
PAST 30 DAYS	1	1	+	0	0	0
PAST 12 MONTHS	4	6	+	0	+	0
HEROIN						
PAST 30 DAYS	1	1	+	0	0	0
PAST 12 MONTHS	2	2	+	0	0	+

+ Less than half of one percent

While absolute rates of abuse are important to know, the consequences of that abuse are of most concern. Substance abuse affects discipline, individual competence, and unit cohesion, thereby increasing the cost of maintaining readiness. About 20 percent of the junior enlisted group reported being "high at work" at least once during the course of a year. (See Table 3.)

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE\* WHO REPORT BEING HIGH WHILE  
WORKING DURING PAST 12 MONTHS

<u>Illicit Drug Use</u> <u>(E1-E5's Only)</u>		<u>Alcohol Use</u> <u>(Total Military Population)</u>
Total DoD	19	11
Army	21	11
Navy	26	16
Marine Corps	25	15
Air Force	8	6

\*These percentages cannot be added together, as a substantial number of the E1-E5 population who get high on duty from drugs also get high on duty from alcohol.

Including those who reported lowered performance, being late for work, and not coming to work, 27 percent of the total force reported at least minor work impairment due to alcohol, and 21 percent of the E1-E5s reported at least minor work impairment due to drug use sometime during a 12-month period. In addition to these adverse work effects, other drug and alcohol abuse consequences included illnesses, non-promotion, poor ratings by supervisors, arrests (driving and non-driving), fights, property damage, family problems, and entrance into treatment and rehabilitation programs. Drug and alcohol abuse is by all measures a significant problem in the military and requires continuing attention.

Before describing current DoD programs to combat substance abuse, we must address one final aspect of the nature of the problem: the allegation that the drug problem is much more serious in the military than in society. This perception is both true and false.

A. Relative Rates of Use

When key demographic variables such as sex, age, marital status, and education are standardized for the military and for the civilian population, the allegation is false. Standardizing these variables, we compared the subpopulation at highest risk (18- to 25-year-olds) for drug and alcohol abuse in both military and civilian populations and found no general pattern of drug or alcohol use being more prevalent for military or civilian populations. (See Table 4.)

TABLE 4

PREVALENCE OF NONMEDICAL DRUG USE  
AND ALCOHOL USE AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL  
AND COMPARABLE CIVILIANS -- AGE 18-25  
(PERCENTAGE OF 18- to 25-YEAR-OLD POPULATION)

TYPE	MILITARY (n= 8,224)	COMPARABLE <sup>1</sup> CIVILIANS (n= 2,022)
MARIJUANA/HASHISH		
PAST 30 DAYS	40	42
PAST 12 MONTHS	52	54
AMPHETAMINES OR OTHER UPPERS		
PAST 30 DAYS	10	4
PAST 12 MONTHS	21	12
COCAINE		
PAST 30 DAYS	7	10
PAST 12 MONTHS	18	23
HALLUCINOGENS		
PAST 30 DAYS	5	5
PAST 12 MONTHS	13	12
BARBITURATES OR OTHER DOWNERS		
PAST 30 DAYS	4	4
PAST 12 MONTHS	9	10
TRANQUILIZERS		
PAST 30 DAYS	3	3
PAST 12 MONTHS	9	12
HEROIN		
PAST 30 DAYS	1	1
PAST 12 MONTHS	3	1
ALCOHOL		
PAST 30 DAYS	84	82
PAST 12 MONTHS	93	90

<sup>1</sup>Data standardized with respect to sex, age, marital status, and education.  
Based on special tabulations from the 1979 national survey on drug abuse.

Nonmedical drug and alcohol use by military personnel and civilians is about the same. However, the evidence that substance abuse problems are relatively no worse in the military leaves little room for comfort.

#### B. Absolute Rates of Use

In absolute terms, the perception that the military has a more serious problem than do civilian institutions is true. Per capita, the problem is worse in the military. If random groups of civilians and military were studied (without standardizing for demographic variables), a greater percentage of substance abusers would be found in the military. Higher risk persons populate the military; they are largely male, young, single, and more likely to be at least temporarily living in remote locations without families. These factors are known to predispose all populations to alcohol and drug abuse problems.

The military must confront and manage the absolute scope of the problem. The unit commander can take no comfort in knowing that his soldiers, sailors, marines, or airmen are no worse than their civilian contemporaries in their substance-abusing habits. He must confront and deal with the adverse consequences of alcohol and drug use as they occur in his environment and as they impede his mission accomplishment.

### III. DoD Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention Programs

DoD is progressively developing a substance abuse control system. This system is designed to be realistic, data-based, and self-correcting. It is operationally decentralized but is monitored from a central point of authority. The system strives to balance properly the needs of the individual with the needs of the military institution. Significantly, the substance abuse control system focuses on specific consequences or potential consequences of abuse. It is organized so that it can be continually evaluated and improved in light of new knowledge and experience.

While this comprehensive system is not yet fully established in all military departments, significant progress has been made. The primary program components, Assessment, Prevention, Treatment/Rehabilitation, and Program Evaluation, are discussed below.

#### A. Assessment

The Assessment component is designed to define accurately the nature, extent, and consequences of the substance abuse threat to the Department of Defense. Assessment occurs at each level of command: base (or ship), major command, service headquarters, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

In addition to the management-oriented assessment component, the DoD Office of Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention has designed and implemented an epidemiological assessment system. This worldwide assessment system consists of a point prevalence assessment (a survey of the nature, extent, and consequences at a given point in time) coupled with a trend assessment (analysis of indicators to identify trends occurring between surveys). The prevalence information presented above was derived from this prevalence

component of the assessment system. Trend assessment reports include reports of rejections of recruits for drug or alcohol reasons, identifications of abusers, drug testing (urinalysis) results, treatment and rehabilitation entries and dispositions, law enforcement trends, accident and injury trends, and reports of drug and alcohol related deaths.

Additionally, information obtained from other Federal agencies such as the State Department, Drug Enforcement Administration, the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, the Office of Personnel Management, and others is integrated into the assessment.

The goal of this comprehensive assessment system is to enable DoD to assess continually and accurately the nature of substance abuse problems in the military so that it can adjust policy and program responses rapidly to reduce the impact of substance abuse on our forces.

#### B. Prevention

The prevention component of the DoD program consists of two elements: Deterrence/Detection and Education/Training. Deterrence and Detection programs are intended to suppress drug use and alcohol misuse in the military. Education and Training programs provide information and skills to help members avoid drug and alcohol abuse and deal effectively with these problems in their subordinates.

Deterrence and Detection efforts begin before induction. Recruiters screen potential enlistees and reject those who are drug or alcohol dependent or who have a record of serious drug or alcohol abuse. After induction, background checks performed on the individual insure that no history of recent or serious substance abuse exists. At the Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Stations (AFEES), recruits are medically evaluated and screened. Urine tests for illicit drugs are conducted frequently. At basic training the individual is taught military standards of behavior and performance. Recruits sign documents acknowledging that they understand DoD drug and alcohol abuse policy and the consequences for violating that policy.

Drug testing through urinalysis is done at all military installations. Individuals are required to provide urine samples in all situations in which suspicion of drug abuse arises. Additionally, when commanders suspect that a drug abuse problem exists in a unit, a urine test of that entire unit may be ordered. These urine tests are analyzed at one of eight DoD drug testing laboratories around the world. They are analyzed for the presence of opiates, amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, methaqualone, and phencyclidine. The capability to screen for marijuana was added in late 1981. Results are used to place service members in rehabilitation, if necessary. Under appropriate circumstances, disciplinary action is also taken based on urine test results.

Law enforcement efforts are intense, particularly in areas with high drug availability. To reduce alcohol problems, driving-while-intoxicated, driving-under-the-influence, and alcohol incident laws are strictly enforced. These efforts are backed up by breath analyzers and blood tests. In drug law enforcement, undercover investigators, drug detector dogs, searches at the gates of



people entering the base, barracks inspections, and stringent customs procedures are widely used. The goal of all of these efforts is to make drug use and alcohol misuse in the military a high risk behavior that can be expected to result in identification, disciplinary action, and rehabilitation or, if appropriate, separation from the service.

The second critical element of the DoD prevention effort is the education and training program. The program requires that specific learning objectives be accomplished by specific target groups. Classes for enlisted personnel entering the military emphasize both the positive and the negative aspects of the prevention program. Desired behaviors are specified, credible role models are provided, and participation in healthy alternatives to drug and alcohol abuse is encouraged. New enlistees are also made aware of the legal, health, and career consequences of substance abuse. For young officers and warrant officer candidates, emphasis is placed on the role, duties, and responsibilities of junior leaders in the prevention and control of alcohol and drug problems. Each time servicemembers are reassigned, continued alcohol and drug abuse education is required.

Probably the most critical portion of the education program is embedded in the system of professional military education. Officers and noncommissioned officers are required to continue their professional education, and alcohol and drug abuse education is one requirement in that educational program.

Even with all of this effort, however, a large number of DoD personnel experience problems with alcohol and drugs. These persons may enter the Treatment and Rehabilitation component of the DoD substance abuse control system.

#### C. Treatment and Rehabilitation

The Department operates the largest alcohol and drug abuse rehabilitation program in the world. In 1981, we operated 56 inpatient facilities and 422 non-residential and referral centers. During fiscal year 1981, over 100,000 servicemembers were treated for alcohol or drug abuse problems; over 20,000 were cared for in residential facilities as inpatients. Operational costs for the treatment, rehabilitation, and referral component approximated \$60 million.

We tailor rehabilitation programs to the needs of the individual; the programs range from intensive education seminars to inpatient hospital care. However, a general sequence of events for a person entering treatment would be as follows: First, the servicemember is identified in some manner as a person having problems with chemicals. If the person is using illicit drugs, disciplinary action as well as rehabilitative action may be taken (except for self-referrals). Working together, appropriate drug/alcohol staff, medical authorities, and the commander determine the appropriate rehabilitative regimen for each person.

If the member is not deeply involved in substance abuse, he or she will be sent to a remedial education program. If the member is judged to have a more serious problem, the education program will be supplemented by a formal non-residential program of rehabilitation that includes individual and group counseling; special supervision on the job; medical, legal, financial, or

other assistance; recreational and fitness programs; spiritual assistance by the chaplain; and participation in an appropriate organization like Alcoholics Anonymous. Each participant's progress is formally evaluated regularly, and the regimen is adjusted accordingly.

If the person's alcohol problem is considered too serious for non-residential care, he or she is sent to one of the 56 inpatient facilities for care. If the person is addicted to illicit drugs, she or he is normally provided 30 days of drug free treatment, is discharged from the military, and is transferred to a Veterans Administration hospital for further care. Most services separate addicts based upon the history of poor results and high costs of such long-term treatment programs.

When servicemembers return from inpatient care, they generally are provided formal follow-on support, including participation in Alcoholics Anonymous. Those who succeed in returning to military standards of performance and behavior are retained; those who do not are separated from the military and referred to the Veterans Administration.

Rehabilitation success rates average around 60 percent for drug abusers and 70 percent for alcohol abusers. However, there is wide and complex variance based on the nature of the substance; the degree of involvement; the age, job, career, and family status of the abuser; and the military service. For example, young first-term enlisted who are single and are both heavy drinkers and drug users have low rates of success (i.e., 40 percent and less, depending on degree of drug involvement). On the other hand, married career noncommissioned officers and officers have very high rates of success (85 percent successful completion).

#### D. Program Evaluation

The Program Evaluation component of the DoD substance abuse control system is the least developed of the components. A great deal of effort has gone into program evaluation, both by the individual services and by the Office of Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention. Some noteworthy accomplishments have come out of these efforts, but progress is slow. To quantify and measure things that have been prevented from happening is inherently difficult. Almost as difficult is measuring changes in drug or alcohol consumption patterns. It is impossible to quantify the human worth of increased organizational cohesion, recovered servicemembers, stronger families, more contented base communities, and other similar factors related to an environment with lower levels of substance abuse. An ideal program evaluation system has simply not yet evolved, but efforts are continuing.

Given the present inability to design a truly satisfactory scientific evaluation system, one of the most important existing evaluation techniques remains the field visit. The Office of Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention has visited over 150 installations, commands, and programs during late 1980 and 1981 to evaluate program effectiveness subjectively. The Service staffs have conducted comparable visits. This direct observation by knowledgeable professionals remains one of the more effective evaluation tools.

### E. Program Impact

Clear, unequivocal, scientific evidence of overall program efficiency does not yet exist; but persuasive, persistent, and significant pieces of evidence from several quarters suggest that the stronger DoD programs are working and working well. Table 5 summarizes drug program trends from 1974 to 1980.

TABLE 5  
COMPARISON: 1974 and 1980  
DRUG USE E1 - E5 DURING PAST 30 DAYS  
(PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION)

PREVALENCE WORLDWIDE	1974 <sup>a</sup>	1980 <sup>b</sup>	CHANGE
CANNABIS	37	37	SAME
STIMULANTS	15	12	DOWN 3
DEPRESSANTS	11	5	DOWN 6
HALLUCINOGENS	14	5	DOWN 9
NARCOTICS	7	2	DOWN 5

<sup>a</sup> A. D. Little, 1975

<sup>b</sup> Burt and Biegel, 1980

Prevalence of hard drug use by junior enlisted (E1-E5) declined in all areas of the world. Prevalence of cannabis use declined in the Air Force (26% to 20%) and the Army (46% to 40%) but increased in the Navy (35% to 47%) and Marine Corps (43% to 47%), resulting in a stable rate of use in DoD as a whole. However, these results are only suggestive, not conclusive. A wide range of variables other than program effectiveness may have contributed to these changes over a six-year span of time, and the exact causes of the variance cannot be accounted for in retrospect.

With regard to alcohol rehabilitation programs, a RAND study for the Air Force provides the most compelling evidence of effectiveness. A treatment follow-up survey indicated that clients experienced substantial improvement after treatment. A significant reduction in the overall problem rate of more than 50 percentage points occurred during the follow-up assessment period when contrasted with the year prior to admission. Both alcohol dependence symptoms and adverse consequences occurring to non-dependent drinkers decreased.

Two other pieces of evidence came from independent studies unassociated with the Department of Defense. The first piece was supplied by Dr. Lloyd

Johnston of the Institute for Social Research in the course of his national study of drug-using patterns of high school seniors. He found that for marijuana smokers overall there is a 2.6 percent increase in the prevalence of daily marijuana use after graduation from high school. However, daily use declined for two categories of people, those who had children (down 1.5%) and those entering the military (down 1%).

A second piece of evidence was found in a study of drug abuse in rural America by Dr. Harrell and Dr. Cisin in a study performed for the National Institute on Drug Abuse. The researchers expected rural drug use to be consistently higher in areas where visitors or temporary residents were able to bring in drug use experience, such as near colleges, military bases, and resort areas. The expectation of higher rates of drug use held true in the cases of resorts and colleges. However, the researchers consistently failed to find proximity to military bases a prediction of higher than average rural drug use.

As indicated, these pieces of evidence do not provide scientific proof that DoD alcohol and drug abuse prevention programs are working. However, the preponderance of evidence suggests that those programs that are functioning properly are having a positive impact on alcohol and drug problems. As current program evaluation and assessment efforts mature, and as all programs achieve the quality of the best, we expect to document scientifically the exact nature of the impact of military intervention programs.

In summary, a common concept for preventing alcohol and drug abuse in the Department of Defense has been developed. The core elements of this concept are a systems approach to organization; comprehensive assessment of the nature, extent, and consequences of abuse expressed in scientifically valid but policy-relevant terms; application of the best prevention and intervention resources to those aspects of the problem that cause the most serious consequences; local community organization monitored from central points of authority; continued evaluation of program effectiveness; and thematic emphasis on manpower conservation and mission accomplishment.

This unifying concept is taking time to translate into programs. The core elements have been incorporated into DoD directives. The Services are at varying stages of implementation. Long-term emphasis and systematic management of the problem are expected to reduce significantly the impact of drug and alcohol abuse on the Armed Forces in the future.

X COST OF MANPOWER

## CHAPTER X

### COST OF MANPOWER

#### A. Introduction

DoD outlays for manpower costs, excluding personnel support costs, will be \$ 93 billion in the President's Budget for FY 1983. This chapter discusses the makeup of those costs.

#### B. Description of Defense Manpower Costs

##### 1. Cost Categories

The manpower cost categories used in this chapter are described below:

a. Military Personnel Appropriations, one for each Service, fund all the active military pay, cash allowances, enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, permanent change of station travel expenses, and the cost of feeding military people (subsistence-in-kind) in military messes or with field rations.

b. Defense Family Housing Costs. These fund the leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. This category also includes funds for paying civilians who operate and maintain family housing. The pay for all DoD civilians, however, is counted under another category, "Civilian Costs," in this chapter. Thus, the Defense Family Housing cost category here excludes civilian costs to avoid double counting and is not the equivalent of the total Defense Family Housing appropriation.

c. Military Retired Pay Appropriation funds the compensation of retired military personnel for previous service. The retired pay appropriation is a single appropriation for DoD; funding is not appropriated or managed with respect to the Service from which annuitants retired. The amount funded in this appropriation depends on the retired military population and is independent of the current force. The budget does not reflect future retirement costs for members of the current force.

d. Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations, one for each of the six reserve components, fund inactive duty drills, active duty training, ROTC, full-time reservists for administration and training, the Health Professions Scholarship Program, and management and training for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

e. Civilian Costs. Unlike military personnel costs, which are funded through separate appropriations, civilian costs are spread among several appropriations in accordance with the function being performed. Civilian costs include compensation for both direct and indirect hires. Also included are the DoD contributions to retirement and to health and life insurance. Nearly 90 percent of DoD civilian costs are paid from the O&M appropriations or from industrially - funded activities largely financed out of O&M. Much smaller percentages of civilian costs are paid from RDT&E (8.8%), Military Construction (1.1%), and Family Housing (1.4%).

f. Personnel Support Costs. Personnel support costs are defined as the non-pay portions of the costs of the following functions:

- Individual Training
- Medical Support (including CHAMPUS)
- Recruiting and Examining
- Overseas Dependents Education
- Base Operating Support (50 percent of total BOS)
- Other Personnel Support

Direct personnel costs, including pay, are not included in personnel support costs, as they have already been included in the previously defined cost categories.

## 2. Cost Trends

Table 1 shows trends in manpower costs, including payments to retired military personnel, and the associated strengths for the President's FY 1983 budget and selected historical years.

TABLE 1  
DEFENSE MANPOWER COSTS <sup>1/</sup>  
(Outlays, \$ Billion)

	FY 64	FY 68	FY 74	Actual			FY 81	FY 1983 President's Budget Request	
				FY 76	FY 78	FY 80		FY 82	FY 83
Total Defense	49.5	77.3	77.6	87.9	103.0	132.8	156.1	182.8	215.9
Manpower Costs									
Direct Manpower Costs									
Military Personnel Appropriations	12.3	19.0	22.1	23.3	25.1	28.4	33.4	38.9	43.0
Def. Family Housing Costs <sup>2/</sup>	.5	.4	.7	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.8	2.1
Military Retired Pay Appropriations <sup>3/</sup>	1.2	2.1	5.1	7.3	9.2	11.9	13.7	15.0	16.5
Reserve and Guard Personnel Approps.	.7	.9	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.4	3.0	3.8	4.7
Civilian Costs <sup>4/</sup>	7.5	10.6	14.1	16.4	18.9	21.4	23.3	24.3	26.5
Subtotal: Direct Manpower Costs	22.2	33.0	43.7	49.7	56.3	65.5	74.8	83.8	92.8
Personnel Support Costs <sup>5/</sup>	1.7	2.8	2.9	3.8	4.2	4.8	6.0		
Total Manpower Costs	23.9	35.8	46.6	53.5	60.5	70.3	80.8		

End Strengths (000s)  
Regular Employees

Active Military	2,687	3,547	2,161	2,081	2,061	2,050	2,082	2,110	2,148
Civilians <sup>4/</sup>									
Direct Hire	1,035	1,274	1,015	960	936	916	940	947	947
Indirect Hire	140	119	94	87	81	75	79	87	88
Total	1,176	1,393	1,109	1,046	1,017	990	1,019	1,034	1,035
Total	3,863	4,940	3,270	3,127	3,078	3,040	3,101	3,144	3,183
Others									
Selected Reserve <sup>6/</sup>	953	992	925	823	788	851	899	946	1,000
Retired Military	435	651	1,012	1,132	1,243	1,328	1,363	1,405	1,445

- <sup>1/</sup> Data exclude civil functions, NSA, and special programs for disadvantaged youths.
- <sup>2/</sup> Excludes civilian pay portion of this appropriation which is included under civilian costs.
- <sup>3/</sup> For those already retired. Future retirement costs for current members are not currently reflected in the budget.
- <sup>4/</sup> The cost of civilians is budgeted under the functional appropriations -- e.g., operations and maintenance, family housing, RDT&E. Often indirect hire civilians are excluded from manpower costs and strength data.
- <sup>5/</sup> Excludes the pay of military and civilian personnel, since they are accounted for separately. Includes costs of individual training, medical support, recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, half of base operating support, and a miscellaneous category. Note that FY 1982 and FY 1983 personnel support costs are not available as this report goes to press.
- <sup>6/</sup> Includes National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also counted as civilian employees. Includes all people attending paid drills or receiving initial training. From FY 1980 on, the reserve data also include officers on statutory tours and other reservists on full-time duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve forces.



A number of improvements were made in military compensation and reimbursement which significantly increased the Military Personnel Appropriation account. Chief among these were a 10 to 17 percent pay raise on October 1, 1981, increases in the basic allowance for subsistence, basic allowance for quarters, hazardous duty incentive pay, continuation pay for engineering and scientific officers. These actions are aimed at making military pay reasonably competitive with the private sector and thus improving retention.

### 3. Pay Raise Assumption

The pay raise assumptions contained in the FY 1983 budget submissions and the previous actual experience are shown in Table 2. These figures are for base pay only and are expressed as percentage increases over the previous year's base pay.

TABLE 2

#### PERCENTAGE PAY RAISES

<u>FY</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>General Schedule</u>	<u>Wage Board</u>
74	4.8	4.8	10.2 <sup>1/</sup>
75	5.5	5.5	8.9
76	5.0	5.0	9.0
77	4.8	4.8	8.3
78	7.1	7.1	7.9
79	5.5	5.5	5.3
80	7.0	7.0	6.4 <sup>2/</sup>
81	11.7	9.1	9.1 <sup>2/</sup>
82	14.2 <sup>3/</sup>	4.8	4.8
83	8.0		

1/ Includes approximately 4 percent increase that was a catch-up increase resulting from the release from economic controls effective the first pay period after April 30, 1974.

2/ Wage board raises were limited by legislative action in 1980 and 1981.


3/ Military pay raises for FY 1982 range from 10 percent for pay grade E-1 to 17 percent for E-7 through E-9, and 14.3 percent for all warrant officers and commissioned officers.

### 4. Perspectives

Constant versus Current Dollar Defense Spending. Current dollars are the prices actually paid for goods and services in a particular year. Constant dollars reflect the spending for goods and services in any year based upon prices that existed in a specified base year. Figure 1 shows the FY 1964 to FY 1983 trends in current and constant manpower costs.

FIGURE 1

CURRENT AND CONSTANT MANPOWER COSTS  
EXCLUDING PERSONNEL SUPPORT COSTS



Note that although the current dollar trend is upward, the constant dollar trend follows the expansion and contraction of the defense work force.

### C. Detailed FY 1983 Manpower Costs

The costs in this section are derived from budget support detail submitted to Congress and, therefore, are stated as total obligational authority (TOA). The pay raise contingency fund is provided as a separate item for each cost classification. Since these data are expressed as TOA, they will not compare exactly with the cost data provided elsewhere in this chapter.

#### 1. FY 1983 Manpower Costs

Table 3 provides a detailed breakout of FY 1983 manpower costs by DoD Component. Key elements, indexed in the margins of Table 3, are discussed in more detail following the table.

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Table 3

**FY 1983 MANPOWER COSTS BY COMPONENT**  
(From FY 1983 President's Budget in TOA-\$M)

<u>Index</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Defense Agencies</u>	<u>DoD Wide</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>Index</u>
<b>Military Personnel Appropriations</b>									
a	Basic Pay	9,390	6,524	2,084	7,868			25,867	a
b	Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,079	839	240	998			3,156	b
c	Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	175	255	64	210			704	c
d	Subsistence (In-Kind and Cash Allowance)	1,081	871	266	883			3,101	d
e	Bonuses	262	296	84	122			764	e
f	Other Pay	209	476	45	250			981	f
g	Other Allowances	465	291	118	310			1,184	g
h	FICA	620	433	139	524			1,715	h
i	PCS Travel	1,242	692	251	969			3,154	i
j	Cadets	31	34	-	32			96	j
k	Miscellaneous	6	5	2	2			16	k
	Subtotal	14,561	10,716	3,293	12,169			40,739	
	- Reimbursables (Pay and Allowances)	-160	-137	-17	-137			-452	
	Direct Obligations	14,401	10,579	3,276	12,031			40,286	
1	Pay Raise Contingency	1,007	708	224	838			2,776	1
	<b>TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</b>	<b>15,408</b>	<b>11,287</b>	<b>3,500</b>	<b>12,869</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>43,064</b>	
<b>Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations</b>									
m	Pay	2,422	534	122	794			3,872	m
n	Allowances	180	16	12	36			244	n
o	Clothing	125	15	22	19			182	o
p	Travel	158	67	7	34			266	p
q	Other	26	9	2	13			49	q
	Direct Obligations	2,911	641	165	896			4,613	
	Pay Raise Contingency	162	31	9	49			251	
	<b>TOTAL RES/GUARD PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</b>	<b>3,073</b>	<b>672</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>945</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>4,864</b>	

<u>Index</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Defense Agencies</u>	<u>DoD Wide</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>Index</u>
r	Defense Family Housing Appropriation (Non-pay)	-	-	-	-	-	2,449	2,449	r
s	Military Retired Pay Appropriation	-	-	-	-	-	16,511	16,511	s
<u>Civilian Costs 1/ 2/</u>									
t	Salaries	9,011	8,764		6,605	2,148		26,528	t
u	Health and Life Insurance	267	260		196	64		787	u
v	Retired Pay (DoD Contribution)	634	617		465	151		1,867	v
	Direct Obligations	9,912	9,641		7,266	2,363		29,182	
	Pay Raise Contingency								
	TOTAL CIVILIAN COSTS 1/ 2/	9,912	9,641	-	7,266	2,363		29,182	
<u>Personnel Support Costs 1/</u>									
w	Individual Training	860	849		714	47		2,470	w
x	Medical Support	373	133		366	1,135		2,007	x
y	Recruiting and Examining	265	133		45	0		443	y
z	Overseas Dependents Education	0	0		0	607		607	z
aa	Base Operating Support (50%)	2,016	1,893		2,578	58		6,545	aa
bb	Other Personnel Support	54	130		57	0		241	bb
	Total Personnel Support Costs 1/	3,568	3,138		3,760	1,847		12,313	
	TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS 1/	31,961	24,738	3,674	24,840	4,210	18,960	108,383	

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Navy civilian costs and personnel support costs are Department of Navy totals including Marine Corps.

2/ Defense-wide totals include the costs of civilians employed under the Defense Family Housing, Military Court of Appeals, Civil Defense, and Military Assistance Accounts.

a. Basic Pay (\$ 25,867 million TOA) is the only element of compensation received in cash by every active duty military member. It ranges in FY 1982 from \$ 6,015.60 a year for a new recruit to \$57,500 a year for a four-star officer. <sup>1/</sup> The amount of basic pay any member receives is a function of his pay grade and length of military service. For this reason, the total value of basic pay is controlled by the total number of people in uniform and their grade and length of service distribution.

b. Basic Allowance - Quarters (BAQ) (\$ 3,156 million TOA) is paid to military members who do not occupy government housing, or when the government housing occupied is declared inadequate. Members without dependents who are provided government quarters or who are assigned to field or sea duty receive a partial BAQ payment to offset certain undesirable and unintended effects of pay raise reallocation. In addition to the overall strength, BAQ is a function of the force grade and dependency status distribution, and the numbers and condition of units of government housing. The range of BAQ in FY 1982 is from \$ 1,414.80 a year for an E-1 with no dependents to \$ 7,340.40 a year for a flag/general officer with dependents. The costs of in-kind housing are not shown in this category but are included in the family housing and base operating support categories.

c. Variable Housing Allowance. (\$704 million TOA) is paid to military members who reside in high housing cost areas of the continental United States, or who are assigned overseas but whose dependents reside in high housing cost areas of the continental United States. It is a function of the number of military families residing in high housing cost areas of the continental U.S., and the cost of housing.

d. Subsistence (BAS) (\$ 3,101 million TOA) represents both the cost of food for military personnel eating in military messes, and cash payments to military members in lieu of food (called Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS)). In FY 1982, all officers are entitled to cash allowances of \$ 1,132.68 a year. Enlisted members receive "subsistence-in-kind" in military messes, or in the form of field rations. Enlisted members are paid a cash allowance of \$ 5.09 per day when a mess is not available. They receive \$ 4.50 per day, or \$ 1,642.50 annually when on leave or authorized to mess separately, which is the most common form of BAS. When assigned duty under emergency conditions where no U.S. messing facilities are available, the rate is \$ 6.73 per day. This BAS rate, however, is rarely used. In addition to varying with strength, subsistence costs vary with the number of people assigned to locations where no mess is available, and with general food prices.

e. Bonuses (\$ 764 million TOA) include both Enlistment and Reenlistment Bonuses.

(1) Enlistment Bonus (\$ 175 million TOA) is paid as an incentive for people to enlist in shortage skills. In FY 1983, all Service personnel enlisting in combat and some combat support skills will receive this incentive. The maximum enlistment bonus allowed by law is \$8,000, but the actual level is a function of supply and demand in the national youth labor market.

<sup>1/</sup> Effective January 1, 1982. The maximum rate previously was \$50,112.

(2) Reenlistment Bonus (\$ 589 million TOA) includes Selective Reenlistment Bonus and Regular Reenlistment Bonus (saved-pay). All personnel who were on active duty on the effective date (June 1, 1974) of PL 93-277, receive the regular bonus up to a cumulative total of \$2000 over a 20-year period. PL 93-277 limited the payment of reenlistment bonuses to critical skills with chronic and sustained shortages. This law replaced the Regular and Variable Reenlistment Bonuses with the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB). The SRB is given only to qualified people reenlisting in a critical and shortage skill during the first 14 years of active military service. The current maximum SRB level is \$20,000 for nuclear skills, with a \$16,000 maximum for other critical skills. The SRB concept is intended to apply the economic laws of supply and demand to the career manpower requirements of the Services on a skill-by-skill basis. The current SRB, effective January 15, 1982, provides for a lump-sum payment up to 50 percent of the bonus with the rest paid in equal installments over the reenlistment period.

f. Other Pays (\$ 981 million TOA) include Incentive, Special, and Proficiency Pay.

(1) Incentive Pay (\$ 461 million TOA) includes payments made to personnel engaged in hazardous duty, such as flying, submarine duty, flight deck duty, parachute jumping, demolition, and duty involving toxic fuels or live/dangerous biological organisms. Payments are influenced by the grade distribution, as well as by the number of qualifying personnel. Although incentive pay varies with the strength of special populations, it does not vary directly with total strength.

(2) Special Pays (\$ 473 million TOA) are paid to medical and nuclear qualified officers to continue on active duty. Sea and foreign duty pay are paid to enlisted members.

(3) Proficiency Pay (\$ 47 million TOA) is authorized for enlisted personnel in critical undermanned skill areas and for those in special requirements. These payments are, in effect, additional incentives to attract and retain people. In accordance with the intent of Congress, Proficiency Pay has been sharply curtailed in favor of the use of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus.

g. Other Allowances (\$ 1,184 million TOA) include uniform allowances, overseas station allowances, family separation allowances, and separation payments.

(1) Uniform Allowances (\$ 465 million TOA) include the cost of providing uniforms to enlisted members entering active duty, and to Reserve officers and ROTC graduates upon commissioning. Also included in these allowances are the costs of uniform maintenance for enlisted personnel with more than six months of active service.

(2) Overseas Station Allowances (\$ 357 million TOA) are payments made to certain military personnel serving outside the continental United States to reimburse them for increased cost of living in the areas



designated. These separate allowances take the form of per diem for cost of living, housing, and temporary lodging. The rates vary by geographical location and by the availability of commissary and post exchange facilities.

(3) Family Separation Allowances (\$ 47 million TOA) are paid to military members who are serving at duty stations apart from their dependents. FSA Type I is paid for added housing expenses incurred maintaining two homes, along with BAQ at the "without dependents" rate, while assigned in a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) outside the U.S. or in Alaska. FSA-Type II is paid in a set monthly amount for added expenses of enforced family separation due to PCS duty aboard ship or temporary duty.

(4) Separation Payments (\$ 316 million TOA) are paid to four groups of people who are leaving the Services: (a) members with unused leave accrued for which they receive lump sum terminal leave payments; (b) members separated for physical disability reasons; (c) officers separated for reasons of unfitness or failure of promotion; and (d) reserve members involuntarily released from active duty after completing at least five years continuous active duty. The largest component in terms of cost among these four groups is lump sum terminal leave. The value of this component is influenced by the rate of basic pay and the number of days of unused leave. In conjunction with the FY 1976 budget, the President proposed, and Congress enacted a law (PL 94-212) which limits to 60 days the total terminal leave in a career for which an individual can be paid. The FY 1977 Authorization Bill (PL 94-361) prohibits quarters or subsistence payments for any leave accrued after 31 August 1976.

h. FICA Contributions (\$ 1,715 million TOA) are those payments made for Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security) by the Defense Department as the employer of military personnel. Payments are influenced by the levels of basic pay and the Social Security tax rates established by law (6.7% of basic pay up to \$32,400 per person per year in calendar year 1982, and up to \$35,700 in calendar year 1983).

i. PCS Travel (\$ 3,154 million TOA) is the cost of moving people and their households when they enter the Service, move for training, leave the Service, are reassigned to a new duty station, or are part of a unit movement to a new duty location. Table 4 shows detailed PCS costs by type and Service for FY 1983.

TABLE 4

FY 1983 PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS  
(\$MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	188	146	46	103	483
Training travel	47	45	8	37	137
Operational travel	75	123	28	130	356
Rotational travel	637	213	109	528	1,487
Separation travel	199	108	45	109	461
Travel of Organizations	14	27	2	5	47
Temporary Lodging	55	24	10	33	106
Non-Temporary Storage	27	7	2	25	76
Total Obligations	1,242	692	251	969	3,155
Less Reimbursements	5	2	1	1	10
Total Direct Obligations	1,237	690	250	968	3,145

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

j. Cadet Pay and Allowances (\$ 96 million TOA) includes the pay and allowances of those attending the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, and the Air Force Academy.

k. Miscellaneous Costs (\$ 16 million TOA) include death gratuities and apprehension of deserters.

(1) Death Gratuities (\$ 8 million TOA) are paid to beneficiaries of military personnel who die on active duty. The cost of these payments varies with the age distribution of the force and levels of hostilities as well as with overall strength.

(2) Apprehension of Deserters (\$ 8 million TOA) covers the costs of finding and returning military deserters to military control.

l. Pay Raise Contingency Funds (\$ 3,027 million TOA total: \$ 2,776 million for active military; and \$ 251 million for Reserve/Guard) are listed as a proposed supplemental in the President's budget to cover expected FY 1983 military and civilian pay raises.

m. Reserve Pay (\$ 3,872 million TOA) includes drill pay and pay for active duty for training of Reserve Component personnel.

n. Allowances (\$ 244 million TOA) include BAQ, which was described under Item (b) and subsistence, as described under Item (d) in this section. Other allowances include special and incentive pays, and also FICA payments, as discussed above.

o. Clothing (\$ 182 million TOA) includes both cash allowances and in-kind clothing issued to recruits.

p. Travel (\$266 million TOA) includes the cost of travel and transportation of persons in the Reserve Personnel Appropriation.

q. Other Reserve/Guard Military Personnel Costs (\$ 49 million TOA) include monthly student stipends (ROTC, Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarships, and Platoon Leader Class), educational assistance, disability and hospitalization benefits, Death Gratuities, Administrative Duty Pay, and management and training costs for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

r. Defense Family Housing Appropriation (Non-Pay) (\$ 2,449 million TOA) funds leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. The total appropriation includes funds for paying civilians, which are counted in this report under civilian costs. To avoid double counting, this civilian pay has been excluded from the Defense Family Housing cost category.

s. Military Retired Pay Appropriation (\$ 16,511 million TOA) funds the compensation of retired military personnel for previous service. The retired pay appropriation is a single appropriation for DoD and is not normally shown by Service. This appropriation depends on the retired military population and is independent of the current force.

t. Salaries (\$ 26,528 million TOA) are the direct monetary compensation paid to civilian employees including basic pay, overtime, incentive, and special pays.

u. Health and Life Insurance (\$ 787 million TOA) includes the government share of the DoD Civilian Health and Life Insurance programs.

v. Retired Pay (DoD Contribution) (\$ 1,867 million TOA) is the DoD contribution, as employer, to the Civil Service retirement fund. This is currently 7% of the civilian salaries.

w. Individual Training (\$ 2,470 million TOA) includes all the non-pay parts of individual training, including recruit training, flight training, professional training, Service Academies, and other training of individuals (rather than units).

x. Medical Support (\$ 2,007 million TOA) includes the non-pay parts of medical support, including CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services), military hospitals, and some research and development activities.

y. Recruiting and Examining (\$ 443 million TOA) is the non-pay part of recruiting (including advertising) and examining military personnel.

z. Overseas Dependents Education (\$ 607 million TOA) includes the non-pay part of this program.

aa. Base Operating Support (50%) (\$ 6,545 million TOA) includes half of the non-pay part of Base Operating Support (BOS) costs. The 50 percent factor is an estimate of the portion of non-pay BOS costs related to the support of people.

bb. Other Personnel Support Costs (\$ 241 million TOA) is a miscellaneous category covering the non-pay part of personnel administration, civilian education and development programs, and other personnel activities.

2. Treatment of FY 1983 Pay Raises. Contingency funds, listed as a proposed supplemental in the President's Budget, are included to cover expected military and civilian pay raises. In this report, these funds are allocated to the appropriations where they are expected to be spent. The exception to this rule is in Section C.1 above where the costs are shown in TOA, and the contingency funds are shown as a separate item to maintain comparability with the detail submitted in support of the President's FY 1983 budget.

#### D. Current Civilian and Military Pay Rates

The current civilian pay rates are shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7. The General Schedule pay rates are shown in Table 5. Wage Board pay rates are shown in Tables 6 and 7, for Appropriated Fund and Nonappropriated Fund personnel, respectively. Note that the Wage Board pay table entries are simple averages for wage areas. Each area has its own distinct pay table. These tables are included as samples only.

Current military pay rates are shown in Tables 8 and 9. Table 8 contains the active military pay rates, as well as Basic Allowance for Quarters and Basic Allowance for Subsistence rates. Table 9 lists the pay per training weekend for military reserve personnel. A training weekend is defined as 4 four-hour training periods. The annual pay for reserves is a function of the number of drills, which varies by pay group.

Table 10 shows Regular Military Compensation (RMC) for active military personnel. RMC is the total of basic pay, quarters (BAQ) and subsistence (BAS) allowances, variable housing allowance (VHA), station housing allowance, and the estimated value of the tax advantage which results because the allowances are not taxed. Figures shown in Table 10 are the average cash and in-kind RMC for each pay grade and longevity step assuming that all military personnel receive the allowances in cash. The RMC averages assume that the total housing allowance received by members living off post is the sum of BAQ plus VHA, while in-kind quarters are valued at the BAQ rate only. Station housing allowance, a part of RMC, is not included in this table.

All of these tables are as of 1 October 1981 and do not include the military and General Schedule pay raises scheduled for October 1982.

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TABLE 5  
ANNUAL GENERAL SCHEDULE PAY RATES\*

Step	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS-1	\$8,342	\$8,620	\$8,898	\$9,175	\$9,453	\$9,615	\$9,890	\$10,165	\$10,178	\$10,439
2	9,381	9,603	9,913	10,178	10,292	10,595	10,898	11,201	11,504	11,807
3	10,235	10,576	10,917	11,258	11,599	11,940	12,281	12,622	12,963	13,304
4	11,490	11,873	12,256	12,639	13,022	13,405	13,788	14,171	14,554	14,937
5	12,854	13,282	13,710	14,138	14,566	14,994	15,422	15,850	16,278	16,706
6	14,328	14,806	15,284	15,762	16,240	16,718	17,196	17,674	18,152	18,630
7	15,922	16,453	16,984	17,515	18,046	18,577	19,108	19,639	20,170	20,701
8	17,634	18,222	18,810	19,398	19,986	20,574	21,162	21,750	22,338	22,926
9	19,477	20,126	20,775	21,424	22,073	22,722	23,371	24,020	24,669	25,318
10	21,449	22,164	22,879	23,594	24,309	25,024	25,739	26,454	27,169	27,884
11	23,566	24,352	25,138	25,924	26,710	27,496	28,282	29,068	29,854	30,640
12	28,245	29,187	30,129	31,071	32,013	32,955	33,897	34,839	35,781	36,723
13	33,586	34,706	35,826	36,946	38,066	39,186	40,306	41,426	42,546	43,666
14	39,689	41,012	42,335	43,658	44,981	46,304	47,627	48,950	50,273	51,596
15	46,685	48,241	49,797	51,353	52,909	54,465	56,021	57,577	59,133	60,689
16	54,755	56,580	58,405	60,230	62,055	63,880	65,705	67,530	69,355	
17	64,142	66,280	68,418	70,556	72,694					
18	75,177									

\* The rate of Basic Pay is limited to the rate payable for Level 5 of the Executive Schedule. This was \$50,112 until January 1, 1982, when it was increased to \$57,500.

TABLE 6

FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM NATIONAL HOURLY AVERAGE SCHEDULE (APPROPRIATED FUND)\*  
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

STEP	GRADE	WG-RATES					WL-RATES					WS-RATES				
		1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1		\$ 5.61	\$ 5.84	\$ 6.07	\$ 6.31	\$ 6.54	\$ 6.16	\$ 6.42	\$ 6.68	\$ 6.93	\$ 7.19	\$ 8.28	\$ 8.62	\$ 8.96	\$ 9.31	\$ 9.65
2		5.97	6.22	6.47	6.72	6.97	6.57	6.84	7.11	7.39	7.66	8.64	9.00	9.36	9.72	10.08
3		6.36	6.62	6.88	7.15	7.41	6.99	7.28	7.57	7.86	8.15	9.02	9.40	9.78	10.15	10.53
4		6.73	7.01	7.29	7.57	7.85	7.40	7.71	8.02	8.33	8.64	9.40	9.79	10.18	10.57	10.96
5		7.09	7.39	7.69	7.98	8.28	7.80	8.13	8.46	8.78	9.11	9.76	10.17	10.58	10.98	11.39
6		7.46	7.77	8.08	8.39	8.70	8.21	8.55	8.89	9.23	9.58	10.13	10.55	10.97	11.39	11.82
7		7.82	8.15	8.48	8.80	9.13	8.61	8.97	9.33	9.69	10.05	10.49	10.93	11.37	11.80	12.24
8		8.19	8.53	8.87	9.21	9.55	9.00	9.38	9.76	10.13	10.51	10.86	11.31	11.76	12.21	12.67
9		8.55	8.91	9.27	9.62	9.98	9.41	9.80	10.19	10.58	10.98	11.22	11.69	12.16	12.63	13.09
10		8.91	9.28	9.65	10.02	10.39	9.80	10.21	10.62	11.03	11.44	11.58	12.06	12.54	13.02	13.51
11		9.26	9.65	10.04	10.42	10.81	10.20	10.62	11.04	11.47	11.89	11.88	12.37	12.86	13.36	13.85
12		9.63	10.03	10.43	10.83	11.23	10.59	11.03	11.47	11.91	12.35	12.26	12.77	13.28	13.79	14.30
13		9.98	10.40	10.82	11.23	11.65	10.98	11.44	11.90	12.36	12.81	12.74	13.27	13.80	14.33	14.86
14		10.34	10.77	11.20	11.63	12.06	11.36	11.85	12.32	12.80	13.27	13.31	13.86	14.41	14.97	15.52
15		10.69	11.14	11.59	12.03	12.48	11.76	12.25	12.74	13.23	13.72	13.96	14.54	15.12	15.70	16.28
16												14.70	15.31	15.92	16.53	17.15
17												15.54	16.19	16.84	17.49	18.13
18												16.46	17.15	17.84	18.52	19.21
19												17.48	18.21	18.94	19.67	20.40

\* Rates at Step 2, WG represent a simple average of 133 area wage schedules. Other rates are computed as defined in FPM Supplement 532-1, 85-117.

TABLE 7  
FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM NATIONAL HOURLY AVERAGE SCHEDULE (NON-APPROPRIATED FUND)  
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

STEP GRADE	NA-RATES					NL-RATES					NS-RATES				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1	\$ 3.43	\$ 3.57	\$ 3.71	\$ 3.86	\$ 4.00	\$ 3.77	\$ 3.93	\$ 4.09	\$ 4.24	\$ 4.40	\$ 4.51	\$ 4.70	\$ 4.89	\$ 5.08	\$ 5.26
2	3.67	3.82	3.97	4.13	4.28	4.03	4.20	4.37	4.54	4.70	4.75	4.95	5.15	5.35	5.54
3	3.96	4.12	4.28	4.45	4.61	4.35	4.53	4.71	4.89	5.07	5.04	5.25	5.46	5.67	5.88
4	4.24	4.42	4.60	4.77	4.95	4.67	4.86	5.05	5.25	5.44	5.33	5.55	5.77	5.99	6.22
5	4.54	4.73	4.92	5.11	5.30	4.99	5.20	5.41	5.62	5.82	5.63	5.86	6.09	6.33	6.56
6	4.83	5.03	5.23	5.43	5.63	5.31	5.53	5.75	5.97	6.19	5.91	6.16	6.41	6.65	6.90
7	5.13	5.34	5.55	5.77	5.98	5.64	5.87	6.10	6.34	6.57	6.21	6.47	6.73	6.99	7.25
8	5.42	5.65	5.88	6.10	6.33	5.97	6.22	6.47	6.72	6.97	6.51	6.78	7.05	7.32	7.59
9	5.73	5.97	6.21	6.45	6.69	6.31	6.57	6.83	7.10	7.36	6.87	7.16	7.45	7.73	8.02
10	6.03	6.28	6.53	6.78	7.03	6.63	6.91	7.19	7.46	7.74	7.24	7.54	7.84	8.14	8.44
11	6.34	6.60	6.86	7.13	7.39	6.97	7.26	7.55	7.84	8.13	7.60	7.92	8.24	8.55	8.87
12	6.64	6.92	7.20	7.47	7.75	7.31	7.61	7.91	8.22	8.52	7.97	8.30	8.63	8.96	9.30
13	6.94	7.23	7.52	7.81	8.10	7.63	7.95	8.27	8.59	8.90	8.33	8.68	9.03	9.37	9.72
14	7.25	7.55	7.85	8.15	8.46	7.98	8.31	8.64	8.97	9.31	8.70	9.06	9.42	9.78	10.15
15	7.55	7.86	8.17	8.49	8.80	8.30	8.65	9.00	9.34	9.69	9.05	9.43	9.81	10.18	10.56
16											9.44	9.83	10.22	10.61	11.01
17											9.81	10.22	10.63	11.04	11.45
18											10.19	10.61	11.03	11.46	11.88
19											10.56	11.00	11.44	11.88	12.32

\* Rates at Step 2, NA represent a simple average of 141 area wage schedules. Other rates are computed as defined in FPM Supplement 532-2, SS-11F.



TABLE 8

MILITARY BASIC PAY (MONTHLY)\*  
Effective 1 October 1981

## YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS													
O-10	4,506.60	4,665.30	4,665.30	4,665.30	4,665.30	4,844.10	5,215.20	5,215.20	5,588.10	5,588.10	5,961.90	5,961.90	6,333.90
O-9	3,994.20	4,098.90	4,186.20	4,186.20	4,186.20	4,292.70	4,471.20	4,471.20	4,844.10	4,844.10	5,215.20	5,215.20	5,588.10
O-8	3,617.70	3,726.00	3,814.50	3,814.50	3,814.50	4,098.90	4,292.70	4,292.70	4,471.20	4,471.20	4,844.10	4,844.10	5,038.20
O-7	3,006.00	3,210.60	3,210.60	3,210.60	3,354.30	3,549.00	3,549.00	3,726.00	4,098.90	4,098.90	4,380.60	4,380.60	4,380.60
O-6	2,228.10	2,448.30	2,608.20	2,608.20	2,608.20	2,608.20	2,608.20	2,696.70	3,123.60	3,283.20	3,354.20	3,354.20	3,490.00
O-5	1,782.00	2,092.80	2,237.10	2,237.10	2,237.10	2,237.10	2,305.20	2,428.80	2,591.40	2,785.50	2,945.40	3,034.20	3,140.40
O-4	1,502.10	1,828.80	1,951.20	1,951.20	1,951.20	1,986.90	2,075.10	2,216.40	2,448.30	2,555.40	2,626.20	2,626.20	2,626.20
O-3	1,395.90	1,560.60	1,668.30	1,668.30	1,668.30	1,845.90	1,934.10	2,004.00	2,111.70	2,216.40	2,271.00	2,271.00	2,271.00
O-2	1,217.10	1,329.30	1,329.30	1,329.30	1,329.30	1,329.30	1,329.30	1,329.30	1,329.30	1,329.30	1,329.30	1,329.30	1,329.30
O-1	1,056.60	1,099.80	1,099.80	1,099.80	1,099.80	1,099.80	1,099.80	1,099.80	1,099.80	1,099.80	1,099.80	1,099.80	1,099.80
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER FOUR YEARS ACTIVE DUTY AS ENLISTED MEMBERS OR WARRANT OFFICERS													
O-3E	0	0	0	1,845.90	1,934.10	2,004.00	2,111.70	2,216.40	2,305.20	2,305.20	2,305.20	2,305.20	2,305.20
O-2E	0	0	0	1,650.60	1,685.10	1,738.50	1,828.80	1,899.00	1,951.20	1,951.20	1,951.20	1,951.20	1,951.20
O-1E	0	0	0	1,329.30	1,419.90	1,472.40	1,525.50	1,578.60	1,650.60	1,650.60	1,650.60	1,650.60	1,650.60
WARRANT OFFICERS													
W-4	1,422.00	1,525.50	1,525.50	1,560.60	1,631.40	1,703.40	1,774.80	1,899.00	1,986.00	2,057.10	2,111.70	2,180.40	2,253.60
W-3	1,292.70	1,402.20	1,402.20	1,419.90	1,436.70	1,541.70	1,631.40	1,685.10	1,738.50	1,790.70	1,845.90	1,917.30	1,986.90
W-2	1,132.20	1,224.60	1,224.60	1,260.30	1,329.30	1,402.20	1,455.00	1,508.40	1,560.60	1,615.20	1,668.30	1,721.10	1,790.70
W-1	943.20	1,081.50	1,081.50	1,171.80	1,224.60	1,277.40	1,329.30	1,384.20	1,436.70	1,489.50	1,541.70	1,596.90	1,596.90
ENLISTED MEMBERS													
E-9	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,653.90	1,691.40	1,729.80	1,769.70	1,809.00	1,844.10	1,941.30
E-8	0	0	0	0	0	1,387.50	1,426.60	1,464.30	1,502.70	1,542.00	1,577.70	1,616.40	1,711.50
E-7	968.70	1,045.50	1,084.50	1,122.00	1,160.70	1,197.30	1,236.00	1,274.10	1,331.70	1,369.50	1,408.20	1,426.50	1,522.20
E-6	833.10	908.40	946.50	986.40	1,023.00	1,060.50	1,099.20	1,135.90	1,192.20	1,230.60	1,249.20	1,249.20	1,249.20
E-5	731.40	796.20	834.60	870.90	927.90	965.70	1,004.40	1,041.30	1,060.50	1,060.50	1,060.50	1,060.50	1,060.50
E-4	682.20	720.30	762.30	821.70	854.40	854.40	854.40	854.40	854.40	854.40	854.40	854.40	854.40
E-3	642.60	677.70	705.00	732.90	732.90	732.90	732.90	732.90	732.90	732.90	732.90	732.90	732.90
E-2	618.30	618.30	618.30	618.30	618.30	618.30	618.30	618.30	618.30	618.30	618.30	618.30	618.30
E-1	551.40	551.40	551.40	551.40	551.40	551.40	551.40	551.40	551.40	551.40	551.40	551.40	551.40

C/S 6,988.50 M/S 2,589.00

\* Basic Pay is limited to \$4,791.60 (\$57,500.00 annually), effective January 1, 1982. Basic Pay was limited to \$4,176.00 (\$50,112.00 annually) previously.

TABLE 8 (Continued)

MONTHLY  
BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR QUARTERS RATES  
EFFECTIVE 1 OCTOBER 1981

PAY GRADE	WITHOUT DEPENDENTS		WITH DEPENDENTS	BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE RATES	
	FULL RATE <sup>1/</sup>	PARTIAL RATE <sup>2/</sup>		Officers:	\$94.39 per month
O-10	489.00	50.70	611.70	Enlisted Members:	
O-9	489.00	50.70	611.70		
O-8	489.00	50.70	611.70		
O-7	489.00	50.70	611.70		
O-6	438.90	39.60	535.50	When on leave or authorized	\$4.50 per day
O-5	404.70	33.00	487.20	to mess separately:	
O-4	360.30	26.70	434.70	When rations in-kind are not	\$5.09 per day
O-3	316.80	22.20	390.90	available:	
O-2	275.10	17.70	348.00	When assigned to duty under	
O-1	214.80	13.20	279.60	emergency conditions where no	
W-4	347.10	25.20	419.10	messing facilities of the	
W-3	309.60	20.70	381.60	United States are available:	\$6.73 per day
W-2	269.10	15.90	342.60		
W-1	243.00	13.80	314.70		
E-9	261.90	18.60	368.70		
E-8	241.50	15.30	340.50		
E-7	205.50	12.00	316.80		
E-6	186.60	9.90	291.60		
E-5	179.40	8.70	267.90		
E-4	158.10	8.10	235.50		
E-3	141.30	7.80	205.50		
E-2	124.80	7.20	205.50		
E-1	117.90	6.90	205.50		

<sup>1/</sup> Payment of the full rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates for members of the uniformed services to personnel without dependents is authorized by 37 United States Code 403 and Part IV of Executive Order 11157, as amended.

<sup>2/</sup> Payment of the partial rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates to members of the uniformed services without dependents who, under 37 United States Code 403(b) or 403(c), are not entitled to the full rate of basic allowance for quarters, is authorized by 37 United States Code 1009(d) and Part IV of Executive Order 11157, as amended.

TABLE 9

## RESERVE PERSONNEL PAY PER TRAINING WEEKEND\*

PAY GRADE	YEARS OF SERVICE													
	UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS													
O-8	482.36	496.80	508.60	508.60	508.60	546.52	546.52	556.80	556.80	556.80	556.80	556.80	556.80	556.80
O-7	400.80	428.08	428.08	428.08	447.24	447.24	473.20	473.20	496.80	546.52	556.80	556.80	556.80	556.80
O-6	297.08	326.44	347.76	347.76	347.76	347.76	347.76	347.76	359.56	416.48	437.76	447.24	473.20	513.20
O-5	237.60	279.04	298.28	298.28	298.28	298.28	307.36	323.84	345.52	371.40	392.72	404.56	418.72	418.72
O-4	200.28	243.84	260.16	260.16	264.92	276.68	295.52	312.16	326.44	340.72	350.16	350.16	350.16	350.16
O-3	186.12	208.08	222.44	246.12	257.88	267.20	281.56	295.52	302.80	302.80	302.80	302.80	302.80	302.80
O-2	162.28	177.24	212.92	220.08	224.68	224.68	224.68	224.68	224.68	224.68	224.68	224.68	224.68	224.68
O-1	140.88	146.64	177.24	177.24	177.24	177.24	177.24	177.24	177.24	177.24	177.24	177.24	177.24	177.24
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER FOUR YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS WARRANT OFFICERS OR ENLISTED MEMBERS														
O-3E	0.	0.	0.	246.12	257.88	267.20	281.58	295.52	307.36	307.36	307.36	307.36	307.36	307.36
O-2E	0.	0.	0.	220.08	224.68	231.80	243.84	253.20	260.16	260.16	260.16	260.16	260.16	260.16
O-1E	-0.	0.	0.	117.24	189.32	196.32	203.40	210.48	220.08	220.08	220.08	220.08	220.08	220.08
WARRANT OFFICERS														
W-4	189.60	203.40	203.40	208.08	217.52	227.12	236.64	253.20	264.92	274.28	281.56	290.72	300.48	323.84
W-3	172.36	186.96	186.96	189.32	191.56	205.56	217.52	224.68	231.80	238.76	246.12	255.64	264.92	274.28
W-2	150.96	163.28	163.28	168.04	177.24	186.96	194.00	201.12	208.08	215.36	222.44	229.48	238.76	238.76
W-1	125.76	144.20	144.20	156.24	163.28	170.32	177.24	184.56	191.56	198.60	205.56	212.92	212.92	212.92
ENLISTED MEMBERS														
E-9	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	220.52	225.52	230.64	235.96	214.20	245.88	258.84	284.00
E-8	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	185.00	190.20	195.24	200.36	205.60	210.36	215.52	228.20	253.64
E-7	129.16	139.40	144.60	149.60	154.76	159.64	164.80	169.88	177.56	182.60	187.76	190.20	202.96	228.20
E-6	111.08	121.12	126.20	131.52	136.40	141.40	146.56	154.12	158.96	164.08	166.56	166.56	166.56	166.56
E-5	97.52	106.16	111.28	116.12	123.72	128.76	133.92	138.84	141.40	141.40	141.40	141.40	141.40	141.40
E-4	90.96	96.04	101.64	109.56	113.92	113.92	113.92	113.92	113.92	113.92	113.92	113.92	113.92	113.92
E-3	85.68	90.36	94.00	97.72	97.72	97.72	97.72	97.72	97.72	97.72	97.72	97.72	97.72	97.72
E-2	82.44	82.44	82.44	82.44	82.44	82.44	82.44	82.44	82.44	82.44	82.44	82.44	82.44	82.44
E-1	73.52	73.52	73.52	73.52	73.52	73.52	73.52	73.52	73.52	73.52	73.52	73.52	73.52	73.52

\* Training weekend normally consists of four, four-hour training assemblies.

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TABLE 10

REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) - ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL  
Cash and In-Kind Pay Grade Average (RMC)

PAY GRADE	YEARS OF SERVICE													
	UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS														
C/S														
O-10														74,124.95
O-9														74,474.24
O-8														74,342.40
O-7													75,149.20	
O-6											70,166.37			
O-5														
O-4														
O-3														
O-2														
O-1														
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER FOUR YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS WARRANT OFFICERS OR ENLISTED MEMBERS														
O-3E														
O-2E														
O-1E														
ALL O3														
ALL O2														
ALL O1														
ALL CO														

TABLE 10 (Continued)

REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) - ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL  
Cash and In-Kind Pay Grade Averages (RMC)

YEARS OF SERVICE														
PAY GRADE	UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
WARRANT OFFICERS														
W-4							29,832.38	32,346.21	33,525.20	34,511.35	35,215.31	36,162.61	37,161.01	39,580.71
W-3							26,616.86	27,798.68	28,509.35	29,212.37	29,902.36	30,641.73	31,593.02	32,523.05
W-2							21,392.82	21,858.00	22,316.21	23,203.11	24,141.02	25,119.23	26,200.81	27,612.31
W-1							17,676.54	19,442.61	19,446.89	20,607.38	21,282.84	21,964.75	22,636.25	23,335.27
														24,008.16
														24,686.48
														25,372.98
														26,076.45
ALL WO	17,676.54	19,455.96	20,470.09	21,363.96	22,397.22	24,271.61	25,244.69	25,487.08	26,372.50	27,369.65	29,263.82	30,454.04	33,219.23	38,363.74
ALL OFF	18,994.40	21,902.35	25,280.54	29,685.43	30,992.20	32,049.35	34,132.99	36,828.09	38,163.84	42,726.10	45,213.74	47,253.65	52,344.83	59,579.65
ENLISTED MEMBERS														
M/S														40,626.23
E-9														35,724.45
E-8														31,980.02
E-7														28,851.51
E-6														25,102.95
E-5														22,169.07
E-4														19,071.79
E-3														18,825.95
E-2														15,554.99
E-1														13,504.47
ALL ENL	11,541.06	13,351.47	14,504.61	15,565.64	16,982.30	18,584.06	19,562.15	20,818.45	21,365.39	23,345.68	24,037.26	26,348.55	28,490.47	33,126.02
ALL DOO	11,925.01	13,912.43	15,447.23	16,903.26	19,242.53	21,505.19	22,911.55	24,985.93	26,383.64	27,840.33	29,227.66	31,573.11	37,339.20	42,457.28

XI MANPOWER AND FORCES  
BY LOCATION

# CHAPTER XI

## MANPOWER AND FORCES BY LOCATION

### I. U.S. Strategic Forces

#### END FY 1983 STRATEGIC FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>OFFENSIVE</u>		
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
1054 ICBM	CONUS	
20 Bomber Squadrons (B-52/FB-111)	1 Guam 19 CONUS	
32 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	1 Japan 31 CONUS	
1 KC-10 Tanker Squadron	1 CONUS	
<u>ANGUS</u>		
13 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	CONUS	Deter nuclear and conventional attack against the US and our allies, our military forces, and bases. If deterrence should fail, support measures aimed at early war termination at the lowest possible level of conflict on terms acceptable to the US and our allies.
<u>USAFR</u>		
4 Tanker Squadrons (3 KC-135, 1 KC-10)	CONUS	
<u>NAVY</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
33 SSBNs <sup>1/</sup>	10 in Holy Loch, Scotland Remainder in CONUS	
4 Submarine Tenders (for SSBNs)	Holy Loch, Scotland Kings Bay, Georgia Charleston, South Carolina New London, Connecticut	
8 Submarine Tenders (for SSNs)	CONUS	
1 Submarine Tender (for SSNs)	Guam	

<sup>1/</sup> Includes one TRIDENT SSBN



## DEFENSIVE

### AIR FORCE

#### Active

5 Interceptor Squadrons (F-15, F-106)	CONUS	Airspace control and crisis air defense.
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#### ANGUS

10 Interceptor Squadrons (F-4, F-106)	CONUS	Airspace control and crisis air defense.
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## II. U.S. Tactical/Mobility Forces

Forward deployments of US tactical/mobility forces are shown in the first display below. In addition to location, this display provides the missions of deployed units. The second display shows the locations of units in or near the United States.

### FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

#### END FY 1983 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Army Divisions</u>		
1st Armored Division	W. Germany	Force presence. In concert with allied and other US forces, deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Failing that, stop any Warsaw Pact ground attack with a minimum of loss of NATO territory and ensure the prompt restoration of prewar boundaries.
3d Armored Division		
3d Infantry Division (M)		
8th Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 1st Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 2d Armored Division		
Bde, 4th Infantry Division (M)		
2d Infantry Division	S. Korea	Force presence. Provides ground combat and security forces for South Korea.

#### Special Mission Brigades

Berlin Brigade	W. Germany	Force presence.
172d Infantry Brigade	Alaska	Defense of Alaska.
193d Infantry Brigade	Panama	Defense of the Panama Canal.

#### Armored Cavalry Regiments

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment	W. Germany	Force presence. Provides reconnaissance and security forces.
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment		

Unit	Location	Mission
<u>Navy Ships and Aircraft</u> <sup>1/</sup>		
<u>Sixth Fleet</u> <sup>2/ 3/</sup>	Mediterranean	Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean. Provide naval force in Mediterranean in the event of a NATO conflict. Provide crises management or contingency force in Mediterranean.
1 Multipurpose Carrier		
11 Surface Combatants		
12 Attack Submarines and Auxiliaries		
1 Amphibious Ready Group (3 ships) <sup>4/</sup>		
2 ASW Patrol Squadrons (18 aircraft)		
<u>Middle East Force</u> <sup>2/ 3/</sup>	Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. Provide limited contingency force in the area.
1 Flagship (AGF)		
4 Surface Combatants		
<u>Seventh Fleet &amp; Western Pacific</u> <sup>2/ 3/</sup>	Western Pacific	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management of contingency force in Western Pacific. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific.
2 Multipurpose Carriers		
16 Surface Combatants		
15 Attack Submarines and Auxiliaries		
2 Amphibious Ready Groups (7 ships) <sup>4/</sup>		
4 ASW Patrol Squadrons		

<sup>1/</sup> These numbers and locations are representative and continually subject to change due to vessel acquisitions, deployment changes, decommissionings, and new conflict crises.

<sup>2/</sup> Figures shown are approximate averages. Most ships are rotated to distant assignments from US homeports. Mediterranean and Western Pacific forces, however, contain a few units selectively homeported overseas, including one CV homeported in Japan.

<sup>3/</sup> SIXTH and SEVENTH Fleets are providing units from the assigned forward deployed forces to the Indian Ocean in response to JCS tasking for presence in that area. Requirement is to maintain 1.5 overall CV presence in the Indian Ocean. SIXTH fleet CV total will exceed 1.0 at times.

<sup>4/</sup> An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is one-ninth of an Amphibious Task Force (ATF). It consists of 6 to 9 amphibious ships with a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) or a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) embarked. In WESTPAC the two ARGs consist of one MAU (afloat) and one BLT (administratively loaded).

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Marine Corps Forces</u>		
Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Mediterranean	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean and intermittently in the Indian Ocean.
Battalion Landing Team (afloat)	Atlantic Deployed afloat intermittently	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean.
III Marine Amphibious Force 3d Marine Division (-)	Japan (Okinawa)	Provide forward deployed ground/air combat forces and logistical forces with amphibious forcible entry capability.
1st Marine Aircraft Wing (-) 3d Force Service Support Group (-)		
Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Western Pacific	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Pacific and intermittently in the Indian Ocean.
Battalion Landing Team (afloat)		

Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces 1/

Europe

14 Squadrons	United Kingdom	Provide force presence in forward areas. Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction and reconnaissance for a Nato conflict.
16 Squadrons	West Germany	
1 Squadron	Netherlands	
3 Squadrons	Spain	
1 Squadron	Iceland	
5 Squadrons (Dual-based)	W. Germany,	
<u>40</u>	Italy, England. (US Based)	

Pacific

4 Squadrons	Philippines	Provide force presence.
3 Squadrons	Japan (Okinawa)	Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction and reconnaissance for an Asian conflict.
6 Squadrons	Korea	
<u>13</u>		

1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, TACCS and airborne TACS squadrons.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Air Force Mobility Forces 1/</u>		
<u>Europe 2/</u>		
2 Squadrons	W. Germany	Provides transportation air logistic support, and aeromedical evacuation capability for theater forces.
1 Squadron	United Kingdom	
<u>Pacific</u>		
1 Squadron	Japan	
2 Squadrons	Philippines	

- 1/ Includes tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation aircraft.  
2/ Includes rotational squadron.

#### UNITS IN OR NEAR THE UNITED STATES

#### END FY 1983 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Active Army</u>	
<u>Army Divisions</u>	
1st Infantry Division (M) 1/	Fort Riley, Kansas
2d Armored Division 1/	Fort Hood, Texas
4th Infantry Division (M) 1/	Fort Carson, Colorado
1st Cavalry Division 2/	Fort Hood, Texas
9th Infantry Division	Fort Lewis, Washington
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
82d Airborne Division	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
7th Infantry Division 3/	Fort Ord, California
24th Infantry Division (M) 3/	Hunter/Stewart, Georgia
5th Infantry Division (M) 3/	Fort Polk, Louisiana
25th Infantry Division 3/	Hawaii
1/ These divisions each have one brigade in Europe.	
2/ Composed of two active brigades.	
3/ Composed of two active brigades and one from the reserve components.	

#### Army Separate Brigades

194th Armored Brigade	Fort Knox, Kentucky
197th Mechanized Brigade	Fort Benning, Georgia
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)	Fort Hood, Texas

#### Armored Cavalry Regiment

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Fort Bliss, Texas
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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Reserve Components</u>	
<u>Army Divisions</u>	
49th Armored Division	Texas
50th Armored Division	New Jersey, Vermont
40th Infantry Division (M)	California
38th Infantry Division	Indiana, Michigan
28th Infantry Division	Pennsylvania
26th Infantry Division	Massachusetts, Connecticut
42d Infantry Division	New York
47th Infantry Division	Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa

<u>Army Separate Brigades 1/</u>	
30th Armored Brigade	Tennessee
31st Armored Brigade	Alabama
149th Armored Brigade	Kentucky
155th Armored Brigade	Mississippi
48th Infantry Brigade (M) 2/	Georgia
157th Infantry Brigade (M)	Pennsylvania (USAR)
218th Infantry Brigade (M)	South Carolina
256th Infantry Brigade (M) 2/	Louisiana
69th Infantry Brigade (M)	Kansas
32d Infantry Brigade (M)	Wisconsin
67th Infantry Brigade (M)	Nebraska
30th Infantry Brigade	North Carolina
29th Infantry Brigade 2/	Hawaii
81st Infantry Brigade (M)	Washington
45th Infantry Brigade	Oklahoma
187th Infantry Brigade	Massachusetts (USAR)
39th Infantry Brigade	Arkansas
205th Infantry Brigade	Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa (USAR)
41st Infantry Brigade 2/	Oregon
53d Infantry Brigade	Florida
73d Infantry Brigade	Ohio
92d Infantry Brigade	Puerto Rico
58th Infantry Brigade	Maryland
116th Infantry Brigade	Virginia

- 1/ The 33d Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) is provided for school support and is not included.
- 2/ Round-out brigade for active Army division.

<u>Army Armored Cavalry Regiments</u>	
107th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Ohio, West Virginia
116th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Idaho, Oregon, Mississippi
163d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Montana, Texas
278th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Tennessee

UnitLocationNavy Ships and AircraftActiveTycom/Second Fleet/Western Atlantic

U.S. East Coast and Western Atlantic

- 5 Multipurpose Carriers
- 86 Surface Combatants
- 107 Attack Submarines, Patrol Combatants, Mine Warfare Ships, Amphibious Ships, and Auxiliaries
- 11 ASW Patrol Squadrons

Tycom/Third Fleet/Eastern Pacific

U.S. West Coast and Eastern Pacific

- 4 Multipurpose Carriers
- 72 Surface Combatants
- 90 Attack Submarines, Patrol Combatants, Amphibious Ships, and Auxiliaries
- 11 ASW Patrol Squadrons

Reserve ComponentsSecond Fleet and Western Atlantic

U.S. East Coast and Western Atlantic

- 7 Surface Combatants
- 16 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships
- 3 Auxiliaries
- 7 ASW Patrol Squadrons

Third Fleet and Eastern Pacific

U.S. West Coast and Eastern Pacific

- 1 Surface Combatant
- 12 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships
- 5 Auxiliaries
- 6 ASW Patrol Squadrons

Marine Corps ForcesActiveI Marine Amphibious Force

(1st Marine Division/3d Marine Air Wing, 1st Force Service Support Group, plus supporting elements).

Camp Pendleton, Calif.; Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), El Toro, Calif.; and Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, Calif.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>II Marine Amphibious Force</u> (2d Marine Division/2d Marine Air Wing, 2d Force Service Support Group plus supporting elements).	Camp Lejeune, N.C.; MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C.; MCAS, New River, N.C.; and MCAS, Beaufort, S.C.
<u>1st Marine Brigade</u> (Regimental Landing Team 3/Marine Aircraft Group 24, plus supporting Brigade Service Support Group).	MCAS, Kaneohe Bay; and Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii
 <u>7th Marine Amphibious Brigade (Command Element)</u>	
(HQ 27th Marine Regiment/Marine Air Group 70 (Nucleus)/Brigade Service Support Group 7 (Nucleus)	Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, Calif. (Operational Units will be assigned from Marine Amphibious Forces as directed to support Near-Term Prepositioned Forces)
 <u>Reserve Components</u>	
<u>Division Wing Team</u> (4th Marine Division/4th Marine Air Wing/4th Force Service Support Group).	Headquarters at New Orleans, Louisiana
 <u>Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces 1/</u>	
 <u>Active</u>	
60 Squadrons 2/ 56 CONUS 3 Alaska 1 Hawaii	CONUS, Alaska and Hawaii
 <u>Reserve Components</u>	
60 Squadrons 58 CONUS 1 Puerto Rico 1 Hawaii	CONUS, Puerto Rico and Hawaii
 1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, elec- tronic combat, tanker/cargo (KC-10), TACCS, and airborne TACS squadrons.	
2/ Excludes dual-based squadrons.	

UnitLocationAir Force Mobility Forces 1/Active

28 Squadrons 2/	CONUS and Alaska
27 CONUS	
1 Alaska	

Reserve Components

52 Squadrons 3/	CONUS and Alaska
51 CONUS	
1 Alaska	

- 1/ Includes strategic and tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation aircraft. Does not include rescue or tanker/cargo aircraft.
- 2/ Excludes rotational squadrons.
- 3/ Includes C-130 reserve squadrons and C-5, C-141, and C-9 USAFR Associate Squadrons.

III. Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country

The following tables show active duty military personnel strengths by regional area and country for FY 1981 through FY 1983.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY \*

SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,082,897	781,473	570,302	540,502	190,620
ASHORE	1,968,596	781,473	570,302	533,311	183,510
AFLT	214,301	-	-	207,191	7,110
U.S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS					
CONTINENTAL U.S.	1,581,065	522,879	456,105	444,969	157,112
ALASKA	1,291,932	469,982	415,788	266,502	139,680
HAWAII	20,345	8,359	10,328	1,463	195
AMERICAN SAMOA	44,141	17,962	6,161	10,948	9,070
GUAM	1	1	-	-	-
JOHNSTON ATOLL	8,781	23	3,960	4,450	348
MIDWAY ISLANDS	128	120	8	-	-
PUEBLO MICO	426	-	9	417	-
INIST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	3,542	427	48	2,904	163
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	32	32	-	-	-
WAKE ISLAND	11	9	-	2	-
TRANSIENTS	6	-	6	-	-
AFLT	68,466	25,964	19,797	15,192	7,513
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES	143,234	-	-	143,091	143
ASHORE	501,832	258,594	114,197	95,533	33,508
AFLT	430,765	258,594	114,197	31,433	26,541
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE	71,067	-	-	64,100	6,967
AUSTRIA	337,373	219,637	79,208	34,275	4,253
BELGIUM*	33	6	3	-	24
CYPRUS	2,081	1,307	628	114	32
DENMARK*	12	2	1	-	9
FINLAND	54	5	21	16	12
FRANCE*	19	5	2	2	10
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)*	71	18	14	7	32
GREECE*	248,466	211,430	36,637	288	111
GREENLAND*	3,334	491	2,424	407	12
ICELAND*	318	-	318	-	-
IRELAND	2,791	2	1,017	1,678	94
ITALY*	9	2	2	-	5
LUXEMBOURG*	12,179	4,057	4,252	3,628	242
MALTA	5	-	-	-	5
NETHERLANDS*	1	771	1,670	-	-
NORWAY*	2,466	-	-	16	9
PORTUGAL*	203	38	112	32	21
SPAIN	1,400	65	1,614	311	10
SWEDEN	8,651	30	4,866	3,584	171
	16	1	7	1	7

\* This table includes approximately 400 Army personnel paid from the Civil Works appropriation and approximately 300 Navy personnel paid from the Reserve appropriation that are not included in other tables in the report.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY  
SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
SWITZERLAND	32	6	4	1	21
TURKEY*	5,125	1,216	3,828	61	20
UNITED KINGDOM*	25,101	184	22,588	2,249	280
AFLOAT	25,006	-	-	21,880	3,126
*EUROPEAN NATO	(303,594)	(219,584)	(74,323)	(18,807)	(380)
(2) EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	125,201	30,974	32,326	37,051	24,850
AUSTRALIA	657	7	267	374	9
BURMA	10	3	2	-	5
CHINA	11	4	1	2	4
FIJI	1	1	-	-	-
HONG KONG	40	7	6	12	15
INDONESIA	45	10	11	12	12
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	46,196	2,364	14,173	6,982	22,677
MALAYSIA	17	8	2	-	7
NEW ZEALAND	81	4	10	60	7
PHILIPPINES	14,500	30	8,489	4,962	1,019
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	58,254	28,486	9,332	311	125
SINGAPORE	24	4	1	11	8
THAILAND	100	46	32	10	12
AFLOAT	25,265	-	-	24,315	950
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	17,193	464	485	14,195	2,049
AFGHANISTAN	6	1	-	-	5
ALGERIA	2	2	-	-	-
BAHRAIN	59	2	-	57	-
BAHRAIN	9	2	-	-	7
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (INCLUDES DIEGO GARCIA)	1,533	-	3	1,530	-
CAMEROON	7	2	-	-	5
CONGO	6	-	-	-	6
EGYPT	143	8	82	28	25
ETHIOPIA	6	-	-	-	6
GABON	6	-	-	-	6
GHANA	10	3	-	-	7
INDIA	38	4	4	4	26
ISRAEL	93	43	23	7	25
IVORY COAST	9	3	-	-	6
JORDAN	24	13	5	-	6
KENYA	34	13	6	-	15
KUWAIT	25	16	1	1	7
LEBANON	14	2	-	1	13

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY  
SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
LIBERIA	19	6	2	4	7
MADAGASCAR	8	-	-	1	7
MALAWI	2	2	-	-	-
MALI	5	-	-	-	5
MAURITIUS	5	-	-	-	5
MOROCCO	57	10	16	3	28
NEPAL	8	1	-	-	7
NIGER	6	-	-	-	6
NIGERIA	16	5	3	-	8
OMAN	8	5	1	1	1
PAKISTAN	24	3	6	-	15
ST. HELENA (INCLUDES ASCENSION ISLAND)	1	-	1	-	-
SAUDI ARABIA	659	274	313	61	11
SENEGAL	11	-	-	2	9
SEYCHELLES	3	-	3	-	-
SOMALIA	9	3	-	-	6
SOUTH AFRICA	12	2	3	2	12
SRI LANKA	8	-	-	3	5
SUDAN	19	7	3	-	9
SYRIA	11	2	-	-	9
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	7	-	-	-	7
TUNISIA	24	14	1	1	8
UPPER VOLTA	7	-	-	-	7
YEMEN (SANA)	16	7	4	-	5
ZAIRE	21	9	5	-	7
ZAMBIA	5	-	-	-	5
AFLCOT	14,184	-	-	12,489	1,695
(4) WESTERN HEMISPHERE	21,074	7,408	2,143	9,251	2,276
ANTIGUA	117	-	4	113	-
ARGENTINA	27	4	7	6	10
BAHAMAS, THE	42	-	2	35	5
HAWAII	5	-	-	1	5
DELMUDA	1,332	-	-	1,255	84
BOLIVIA	11	4	1	-	6
BRAZIL	222	12	6	5	199
CANADA	655	11	251	379	14
CHILE	15	3	1	1	11
COLOMBIA	23	7	5	3	8
COSTA RICA	10	2	-	-	8
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,164	-	-	1,700	464

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	17	3	1	4	9
ECUADOR	28	12	4	3	9
EL SALVADOR	43	20	1	1	21
GUATEMALA	13	5	1	-	7
GUYANA	6	-	-	-	6
HAITI	8	1	1	-	6
HONDURAS	22	12	4	-	6
JAMAICA	11	-	-	1	10
MEXICO	29	12	2	2	12
NICARAGUA	10	2	1	-	7
PANAMA	9,566	7,277	1,831	316	142
PARAGUAY	13	3	1	1	8
PERU	24	7	6	3	8
SIERRA LEONE	2	2	-	-	-
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	1	-	1	-	-
URUGUAY	12	4	1	2	5
VENEZUELA	30	5	11	4	10
AFLOAT	6,612	-	-	5,416	1,196
(5) ANTARCTICA	73	-	-	73	-
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	158	56	18	4	80
BULGARIA	9	2	2	-	5
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	10	1	3	-	6
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	40	34	-	-	6
HUNGARY	13	4	2	-	7
POLAND	16	3	1	-	12
ROMANIA	13	3	1	-	9
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	40	6	5	3	26
YUGOSLAVIA	17	3	4	1	9
(7) UNDISTRICTED	756	55	17	684	-

NOTE. ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MAKINF CORPS
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,110,300	784,400	580,800	553,000	192,100
ASHORE	1,889,031	784,400	580,800	340,280	183,551
AFLAT	221,269	-	-	212,720	8,549
U.S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS					
CONTINENTAL U.S.	1,604,453	522,795	461,097	463,922	156,639
ALASKA	1,316,777	497,025	424,505	260,264	134,983
HAWAII	20,599	7,830	10,845	1,731	193
GUAM	45,619	17,506	6,475	11,709	9,929
JOHNSTON ATOLL	8,679	24	3,636	4,601	418
	125	116	9	-	-
MIDWAY ISLANDS	74	-	-	74	-
PUERTO RICO	2,936	265	45	2,462	164
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	53	21	-	32	-
U.S. MISCELLANEOUS PACIFIC ISLANDS	3	-	3	-	-
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	10	8	-	2	-
WAKE ISLAND	7	-	7	-	-
TRANSIENTS	50,660	-	15,572	25,342	9,746
AFLAT	158,911	-	-	157,705	1,206
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES					
ASHORE	505,847	261,605	119,703	89,078	35,461
AFLAT	443,489	261,605	119,703	34,063	28,118
	62,358	-	-	55,015	7,343
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE					
AUSTRIA	353,429	224,055	83,546	40,363	5,065
BELGIUM*	32	6	2	1	23
CYPRUS	2,382	1,590	632	128	32
DENMARK*	12	2	-	-	10
FINLAND	57	5	20	21	11
FRANCE*	19	5	2	2	10
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)*	73	19	13	6	33
GIBRALTAR	256,743	215,894	40,441	317	91
GREECE*	1	-	-	1	-
GREENLAND*	3,520	464	2,559	480	15
	323	-	323	-	-
ICELAND*	3,130	2	1,109	1,910	109
IRELAND	8	2	-	-	6
ITALY*	12,784	3,880	4,442	4,148	294
LUXEMBOURG*	6	-	-	-	6
MALTA	1	1	-	-	-
NETHERLANDS*	2,091	696	1,369	17	9
NORWAY*	212	39	120	40	13
PORTUGAL*	1,656	70	1,064	512	10
SPAIN	7,703	30	3,677	3,808	188

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY  
SEPTEMBER 30, 1962

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
SWEDEN	18	1	6	4	7
SWITZERLAND	44	8	3	-	33
TURKEY*	5,170	1,155	3,901	94	20
UNITED KINGDOM*	26,715	184	23,863	2,352	316
AFLDAT	30,749	-	-	26,520	4,229
*EUROPEAN NATU	(314,842)	(224,000)	(79,856)	(10,027)	(959)
(2) EAST ASIA & PACIFIC					
AUSTRALIA	132,506	29,981	33,782	41,017	27,726
BURMA	697	6	257	425	9
CHINA	11	3	2	-	6
FIJI	9	4	2	3	-
HONG KONG	1	-	-	1	-
INDONESIA	39	7	5	15	12
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	57	15	17	14	11
MALAYSIA	50,453	2,418	15,380	7,892	24,763
NEW ZEALAND	20	9	2	2	7
PHILIPPINES	64	3	9	50	6
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	14,048	38	8,337	4,994	679
SINGAPORE	37,559	27,013	9,748	355	43
THAILAND	24	4	1	11	8
AFLDAT	104	61	22	11	10
	29,416	-	-	27,244	2,172
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA					
AFGHANISTAN	5,450	496	357	3,315	1,282
ALGERIA	12	2	3	1	6
ANGOLA	2	2	-	-	-
BAHRAIN	79	7	-	72	-
BALEARES	8	2	-	-	-
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (INCLUDES DIEGO GARCIA)	1,835	-	-	1,835	-
CAMEROON	8	2	-	-	6
CHAD	2	2	-	-	-
CONGO	6	-	-	-	6
EGYPT	182	19	103	34	26
ETHIOPIA	6	-	-	-	6
GABON	6	-	-	-	6
GHANA	12	4	-	-	8
INDIA	35	4	4	7	20
ISRAEL	114	49	28	9	28
IVORY COAST	13	3	-	3	7
JORDAN	26	14	5	-	7
KENYA	37	12	6	3	16

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
KUWAIT	30	18	2	4	6
LEBANON	18	2	-	1	15
LIBERIA	18	5	2	4	7
MADAGASCAR	8	-	-	1	7
MALAWI	2	2	-	-	-
MALTA	6	-	-	-	6
MOROCCO	41	10	8	4	19
NEPAL	8	1	-	-	7
NIGER	6	-	-	-	6
NIGERIA	19	7	3	-	9
OMAN	7	2	2	1	2
PAKISTAN	32	6	4	2	16
ST. HELENA (INCLUDES ASCENSION ISLAND)	11	-	11	-	-
SAUDI ARABIA	515	275	155	72	13
SENEGAL	11	-	-	2	9
SEYCHELLES	4	-	4	-	-
SOMALIA	9	3	-	-	6
SOUTH AFRICA	21	2	3	4	12
SRI LANKA	9	-	-	3	6
SUDAN	14	3	2	-	9
SYRIA	12	3	-	-	9
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	8	-	-	-	8
TUNISIA	26	14	1	2	9
UGANDA	6	-	-	-	6
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	6	6	-	-	-
UPPER VOLTA	6	-	-	-	6
YEMEN (SANA)	14	6	2	-	6
ZAIRE	21	9	5	-	7
ZAMBIA	6	-	-	-	6
ZIMBABWE	6	-	-	-	6
AFLNAT	2,167	-	-	1,251	916
(4) WESTERN HEMISPHERE	14,274	7,003	1,999	4,371	901
ANTIGUA	122	-	1	121	-
ARGENTINA	26	4	6	6	10
BAHAMAS, THE	43	-	1	36	6
BARBADOS	11	-	-	5	6
BERMUDA	1,535	-	-	1,455	80
BOLIVIA	15	5	2	1	7
BRAZIL	51	13	6	8	24
CANADA	712	10	200	491	11

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
CHILE	22	3	3	4	12
COLOMBIA	27	7	3	4	13
COSTA RICA	11	2	-	-	9
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,249	-	-	1,835	414
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	18	4	1	4	9
ECUADOR	24	6	6	3	9
EL SALVADOR	33	6	2	1	24
GUATEMALA	17	5	1	1	10
GUYANA	6	-	-	-	6
HAITI	11	3	1	-	7
HONDURAS	20	4	7	1	8
JAMAICA	10	-	-	1	9
MEXICO	32	11	5	3	13
NICARAGUA	15	6	1	-	8
PANAMA	9,152	6,891	1,736	376	149
PARAGUAY	13	3	2	1	7
PERU	25	8	5	4	8
SURINAME	2	2	-	-	-
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	1	1	1	-	-
URUGUAY	16	4	2	3	7
VENEZUELA	29	6	7	7	9
AFLOAT	26	-	-	-	26
(5) ANTARCTICA	-	-	-	-	-
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	188	70	19	12	87
BULGARIA	10	2	2	-	6
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	3	-	7
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	54	46	-	-	8
HUNGARY	16	4	1	1	10
POLAND	17	3	1	2	11
ROMANIA	12	3	1	-	8
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	50	8	7	7	28
YUGOSLAVIA	18	3	4	2	9
(7) UNDISTRICTED	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE. ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MAKINE CORPS
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,147,600	783,800	600,000	569,200	194,600
ASHORE	1,921,226	783,800	600,000	350,948	186,478
Afloat	226,374	-	-	218,252	8,122
U.S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS					
CONTINENTAL U.S.	1,634,751	521,029	475,999	478,974	158,749
ALASKA	1,332,498	494,041	436,183	263,170	136,704
HAWAII	20,694	7,711	11,063	1,727	193
GUAM	47,718	18,443	6,913	12,240	10,122
JOHNSTON ATOLL	8,760	24	3,707	4,611	418
	125	116	9	-	-
MIDWAY ISLANDS	75	-	-	75	-
PUERTO RICO	2,984	265	44	2,511	164
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	54	21	-	33	-
U.S. MISCELLANEOUS PACIFIC ISLANDS	3	-	3	-	-
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	10	8	-	2	-
NAKE ISLAND	7	-	7	-	-
TRANSIENTS	57,423	-	16,070	31,411	9,942
Afloat	164,400	-	-	163,194	1,206
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES					
ASHORE	512,849	262,771	124,001	90,226	35,851
Afloat	450,875	262,771	124,001	35,168	28,935
	81,974	-	-	55,058	6,916
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE					
AUSTRIA	357,939	224,421	87,562	41,069	4,887
BELGIUM*	32	6	2	1	23
CYPRUS	2,388	1,592	633	131	32
DENMARK*	12	2	-	-	10
FINLAND	58	5	21	21	11
	19	5	2	2	10
FRANCE*	73	19	13	8	33
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)*	257,975	216,247	41,307	330	91
GIBRALTAR	1	-	-	1	-
GREECE*	3,471	468	2,509	479	15
GREENLAND*	319	-	319	-	-
ICELAND*	3,111	2	1,109	1,891	109
IRELAND	8	2	-	-	6
ITALY*	13,919	3,862	5,073	4,670	294
LUXEMBOURG*	6	-	-	-	6
MALTA	1	1	-	-	-
NETHERLANDS*					
NORWAY*	2,125	696	1,403	17	9
PORTUGAL*	211	39	119	40	13
SPAIN	1,667	70	1,070	517	10
	4,407	30	4,250	3,939	188

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
SWEDEN	18	1	6	4	7
SWITZERLAND	48	8	3	-	33
TURKEY*	5,307	1,162	4,031	94	20
UNITED KINGDOM*	28,544	184	25,692	2,352	316
AFLOAT	30,223	-	-	26,572	3,651
*EUROPEAN NATO	(319,174)	(224,366)	(83,299)	(10,550)	(959)
(2) EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	134,763	30,824	34,090	41,312	28,537
AUSTRALIA	696	6	257	424	9
BURMA	11	3	2	-	6
CHINA	9	4	2	3	-
FIJI	1	-	-	1	-
HONG KONG	39	7	5	15	12
INDONESIA	57	15	17	14	11
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	50,738	2,318	14,839	8,007	25,574
MALAYSIA	20	9	2	2	7
NEW ZEALAND	68	3	9	50	6
PHILIPPINES	14,951	38	9,055	5,179	679
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	38,629	28,356	9,878	352	43
SINGAPORE	24	4	1	11	8
THAILAND	105	61	23	11	10
AFLOAT	29,415	-	-	27,243	2,172
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	5,524	468	330	3,438	1,298
AFGHANISTAN	12	2	3	1	6
ALGERIA	8	2	-	-	6
BAHRAIN	80	7	-	73	-
BANGLADESH	8	2	-	-	6
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (INCLUDES DIEGO GARCIA)	1,883	-	-	1,883	-
CAMEROUN	8	2	-	-	6
CHAD	2	2	-	-	-
CONGO	6	-	-	-	6
EGYPT	154	19	75	34	26
ETHTUOPIA	6	-	-	-	6
GABON	6	-	-	-	6
GHANA	12	4	-	-	8
INDIA	35	4	4	7	20
ISRAEL	114	49	24	9	28
IVORY COAST	13	3	-	3	7
JORDAN	26	14	5	-	7
KENYA	54	12	4	26	16

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
KUWAIT	30	18	2	4	6
LEBANON	18	2	-	1	15
LIBERIA	18	5	2	4	7
MADAGASCAR	8	-	-	1	7
MALAWI	2	2	-	-	-
MALT	6	-	-	-	6
MOROCCO	42	10	9	4	19
NEPAL	8	1	-	-	7
NIGER	6	-	-	-	6
NIGERIA	19	7	3	-	9
OMAN	67	2	2	61	2
PAKISTAN	32	6	6	2	16
ST. HELENA (INCLUDES ASCENSION ISLAND)	11	-	11	-	-
SAUDI ARABIA	481	247	150	71	13
SENEGAL	11	-	-	2	9
SEYCHELLES	4	-	4	-	-
SOMALIA	9	3	-	-	6
SOUTH AFRICA	21	2	3	4	12
SRI LANKA	9	-	-	3	6
SUDAN	14	3	2	-	9
SYRIA	12	3	-	-	9
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	8	-	-	-	8
TUNISIA	26	14	1	2	9
UGANDA	6	-	-	-	6
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	6	6	-	-	-
UPPER VOLTA	6	-	-	-	6
YEMEN (SANA)	14	6	2	-	6
ZAIRE	28	9	12	-	7
ZAMBIA	6	-	-	-	6
ZIMBABWE	6	-	-	-	6
AFLAT	2,159	-	-	1,243	916
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	14,435	6,988	2,000	4,395	1,052
ANTIGUA	119	-	1	118	-
ARGENTINA	26	4	6	6	10
BAHAMAS, THE	43	-	1	36	6
BARRADOS	11	-	-	5	6
BERMUDA	1,547	-	-	1,467	80
BOLIVIA	15	5	2	1	7
BRAZIL	53	14	7	8	24
CANADA	713	10	200	492	11

(4)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
CHILE	22	3	3	4	12
COLOMBIA	26	7	3	3	13
COSTA RICA	11	2	-	-	9
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,271	-	-	1,857	414
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	18	4	1	4	9
ECUADOR	24	6	6	3	9
EL SALVADOR	33	6	2	1	24
GUATEMALA	16	5	1	-	10
GUYANA	6	-	-	-	6
HAITI	11	3	1	-	7
HONDURAS	20	4	7	1	8
JAMAICA	10	-	-	1	9
MEXICO	32	11	5	3	13
NICARAGUA	15	6	1	-	8
PANAMA	9,130	6,875	1,736	370	149
PARAGUAY	13	3	2	1	7
PERU	25	8	5	4	8
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	2	2	-	-	-
SAINT LUCIA	1	-	1	-	-
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS	1	-	-	-	-
SAINT PIERRE AND MICHELON	16	4	2	3	7
URUGUAY	29	6	7	7	9
VENEZUELA	177	-	-	-	177
AFLOAT	-	-	-	-	-
(5) ANTARCTICA	-	-	-	-	-
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	188	70	19	12	87
BULGARIA	10	2	2	-	6
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	3	-	7
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	54	46	-	-	8
HUNGARY	16	4	1	1	10
POLAND	17	3	1	2	11
ROMANIA	12	3	1	-	8
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	50	4	7	7	28
YUGOSLAVIA	14	3	4	2	9

(7) UNDISTINCTED

NOTE. ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

XII MANPOWER DATA  
STRUCTURE

## CHAPTER XII

### MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

#### I. Introduction

This chapter provides audit trails of changes to the DPPC structure that have been implemented since publication of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report Revision for FY 1982.

#### II. Structure Changes

Activity transfers and other management actions result in a number of changes within the DPPC structure. These changes do not affect total manpower but do represent corrections, refinements, and management actions that alter the manner of accounting for this manpower. The changes since the FY 1982 DMRR Revision by component are included in the following table.

**AUDIT TRAIL**  
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 81	FY 82	FY 83	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83
ARMY								
ADJ&E Restructure	Research & Development	Division Forces	0.1	*	*	0.2	0.1	0.2
Management Headquarters Restructure	Centralized Support	Management Headquarters	-	0.3	0.3	-	0.6	0.6
	Personnel Support	"	-	0.3	0.3	-	0.3	0.3
	Medical Support	"	-	*	*	-	*	*
	Central Logistics	"	-	*	*	-	*	*
	Research & Development	"	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	0.1
	Centrally Managed Comm.	"	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.3	0.3
	Land Forces - Theater Forces	"	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	0.1
NAVY (No changes)								
MARINE CORPS								
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	Personnel Support	IMA	-	0.8	0.9	-	-	-

\*Fewer than 50

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ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 81	FY 82	FY 83	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83
<b>AIR FORCE</b>								
AFSC Product Divisions	RED	Management Headquarters	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4
AF Data Services Center	Centralized Support	"	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3
NMCS-Wide Support	Strategic	"	*	*	*	*	*	*
Communications Areas	Management Headquarters	Centrally Managed Comm.	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.3	0.3	0.3
Communications Areas	Management Headquarters	BOS	1.0	1.0	1.0	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Strategic	IMA	0.1	0.1	0.1	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Tactical	IMA	0.1	0.1	0.3	*	*	*
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Mobility	IMA	*	0.3	0.3	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Intelligence	IMA	1.4	1.6	1.6	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Centrally Managed Comm.	IMA	-	*	0.1	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	RED	IMA	0.7	0.7	0.8	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Geophysical	IMA	0.2	0.2	0.2	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	BOS	IMA	2.2	2.3	2.5	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Medical	IMA	1.1	0.7	0.7	-	-	-

\*Cover than 50

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN	
			FY 81	FY 82	FY 83	FY 81	FY 82
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Individual Training	IMA	.9	1.2	1.2	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Central Logistics	IMA	0.7	0.5	0.7	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Centralized Support	IMA	0.5	1.1	1.1	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Management Headquarters	IMA	0.7	0.7	0.8	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Reserve Military)	Federal Agency Support	IMA	0.1	0.8	0.8	-	-

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